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         MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
                         NOVEMBER 1, 2019
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                         (FRIDAY SESSION)
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                 Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, Certified
19
20 Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, reported
21 by machine shorthand method, on the 1st day of November,
22 2019, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:11 p.m., at the
23 South Texas College of Law, 1303 San Jacinto Street,
24 Houston, Texas 77002-7006.
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*_*_*_* 1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right, guys. 2 quit socializing and get on the record. We're delighted to be here at the South Texas College of Law, and we thank Professor Carlson and especially the president of South Texas College of Law and the dean, Michael Barry, who is going to formally welcome us in a minute. Dean Barry has been on the job, I 8 understand, two and a half months, so you have totally wrapped your arms around this whole --10 11 DEAN BARRY: Ask me a question, and I will 12 make up an answer that may be right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know if we call 13 14 you president or dean, but in any event, he went to Yale Law School and got his J.D. there and the 15 University of San Francisco, a master's in theology at the 16 University of Virginia -- Commissioner Sullivan, you'll 17 appreciate that. Another Wahoo. 18 DEAN BARRY: Good news. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- where he got his B.A. in English and religious studies, and he's practiced 21 litigation and has -- I could go on and on. He's got quite a resume, and South Texas is very fortunate to have 23 him and, Dean, we would love to hear your remarks. 24

DEAN BARRY: Very good. Do I need to be --

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can you hear me? Thank you for being here. We are thrilled to be able to host you today and tomorrow. If you see people walking around with a little bit of sad expression, please have sympathy for them. The game was only a day and a half ago, and people are still recovering. I would ask that you can please discuss Texas law. You can discuss federal law, local law, just please don't mention "national" law. It's still too soon for people to hear that word.

We are thrilled to have you here, and today is the Feast of All Saints Day. And I went to mass last night and then went home and was reviewing the materials that Professor Carlson gave me, and it was interesting, because the Feast of All Saints is one in which we acknowledge and respect those who have come before in the church, those who have done great things. It's kind of a who's who list in the church going up through the early apostles all the way up through Mother Teresa.

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And as I was looking at the list of people who are on this committee, it's a who's who list of Texas law. It is just an amazing group of individuals. And what was particularly poignant in that comparison, as I was thinking about it, is those that we respect in the church did it not for themselves, but for a higher calling. They didn't do it for the glory. They did it

because there was something more important, and the folks who are here are doing the same thing. You do this not for the breakfast that we give you, certainly not for the pay. You do this because you recognize that justice is important, and the administration of justice is crucial to our society thriving and that the rules that we have are important. And I just wanted to take a moment to acknowledge and appreciate that you give of your time and of yourself and of your experience to be part of this.

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The issues that you face today, some of them are crucially important; and as I was just looking through the agenda, the issues that you're addressing, one particularly struck me now as a president and dean of the law school; and it was the one dealing with the ability to get a delay based on maternal or paternal leave; and I don't know if this is the right answer, but I do know that we currently have 54 percent of our students are women; but if the next 20 years reflect the past 20 years, we also know that 20 years from now, 54 percent of the people in senior positions will not be women, because there are systemic issues that are challenges that women face in the practice that add a degree of difficulty to their ability to progress. I don't know if this is the right answer.

There are a lot of issues that are potential for abuse, and there's things that need to be

addressed, but the fact that you are looking at the issue and trying to get to the heart of some of those institutional challenges, I think is vitally important, and I commend you for at least bringing that issue to bear.

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It is constitutionally required that whenever a dean addresses a group of people, he brags on his school, so I just will do that just for a second, but with a request. We found out this week that we are receiving the Texas Access to Justice award for public service this year, and I will be happy to accept that award on behalf of our clinics and our school on November 18th swearing in.

This past year, our clinics, and we have 23 of them, will give \$1.8 million worth of pro bono service 16 to the Houston community. \$1.8 million. It's, I think, very impressive. And we are nationally regarded for our advocacy programs. We have more than twice as many awards for advocacy than any other law school in the country. When it comes to legal writing, we actually have five times as many awards as any other school.

Our ADR program is nationally competitive, but our clinics are second to none, and we believe it's important for a couple of reasons. One is because it serves our mission; and as you walked in the front door, you may have seen to the right, our mission is in really big letters on the wall because it's that important to us, and part of that mission is service. But, partly, we do it as well because I take a commitment to every student who comes here that not only will they be able to pass the bar exam, but they will be ready for practice, and my law school didn't give a rat's anything about whether I was ready for practice. It didn't care. But we recognize that the world has changed, and that our students have to be ready from day one, and those clinics are vital to helping us do that. And this is where the request comes in.

I sat at a table two nights ago with Edith Jones, who with a little bit of that glint in her eye that you know, was telling me about her law clerks this year; and one of them is from South Texas and she has Chicago, I think, Vanderbilt and Emory, and she had that glint in her eye because she was telling me that the South Texas grad is knocking the pants off all of the other ones, including the ones in the University of Chicago, and the reason the glint was in her eye was sitting between the judge and me was the clerk from the University of Chicago, so she was having the fun that she likes to have, but our kids are ready, and what we have is we have many first generation students, as do all the law schools in Texas. We have

folks who need mentors. We have folks who need opportunities, externships, and internships. 3 Please reach out to our school, to your school, to schools in Texas. Please bring them in, give them that opportunity, see what practice looks like, help them be practice ready. We are training them to join a profession, and the strength that they have coming out of this school only stands to all of our practice. I can be reached at a very easy e-mail 9 address, president@stcl.edu. President@stcl.edu. South 10 Texas College of Law at e-d-u. If you would be willing to 11 help, please reach out, because not only will our students benefit, but our profession will benefit from the 13 experience that they get. We are thrilled to have you. 14 If there's anything we can do, please let us know, and 15 have a great session.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Dean, thank you very 17 18 much.

(Applause)

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you so much. couple of announcements before we get to the agenda. Behind me is the sign-in for the wireless for the internet. Marti tells me that that will disappear in seven minutes, so if you want to have your internet pass, you probably ought to write it down, although we have

written copies of that -- one written copy that I have, and I'm not sharing it with anyone. So the second announcement is we always knew 3 that Kim Phillips was a big deal, actually a big screaming deal, but now she's even a bigger screaming deal. been promoted to the global litigation general counsel of Shell, which is quite an honor. 8 (Applause) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We always knew you would 9 amount to something. 10 11 MS. PHILLIPS: Baby steps. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Okay. With that, 12 we'll go -- we'll turn to Justice Hecht for his comments. 13 Chief Justice Hecht. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT: Justice Bland is now 15 the deputy liaison for the committee. She just can't tear 16 herself away from all of you, so that's good. And her 17 investiture is Thursday the 7th at 2:00 p.m. in the House 18 chamber, so please come and be a wonderful time together. 19 As far as news, the Court has created a task 20 force for procedures related to mental health. We did 21 that October the 1st. It is -- to take care of our charge under Senate Bill 362, which passed last session in the 23 Senator Huffman's bill. It largely has to do 24 25 with mental health issues in the criminal justice system,

but the bill specifically requires the Supreme Court to adopt rules to streamline and promote the efficiency of court processes under a chapter of the Health & Safety Code, which governs emergency detentions, and adopt rules or implement other measures to create consistency and increase access to the judicial branch for mental health issues.

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So we're sort of doing that already with the Judicial Commission on Mental Health that we created jointly with the Court of Criminal Appeals, but this task force will specifically look at the issues that the Legislature has directed us to look at under Senate Bill 362. Judge Brent Carr in Fort Worth, county court at law judge, is the chair. Judge Hervey from the Court of Criminal Appeals is on it, Bill Boyce is on it, and the recommendations of that group will probably come to the advisory committee. The work has to be done by December 1st of next year, so we will be looking for that.

I'm particularly pleased by the

Legislature's directive, because it marks 16 years that

the Legislature has been fully confident of the Court's

rule-making process and of the good work that this

committee does, and some of you who are -- predate that

time remember that that has not always been the case, but

it certainly is now, and here even in issues that

predominantly affect criminal cases the Legislature is looking to this group and the Court for rules to improve efficiency in those cases.

The Judicial Committee on Information

Technology is meeting in December, and the -- as you may recall, e-filing will be mandatory in all criminal cases in all courts of the state as of January 1st of 2020. So they're down to all of the counties except those with less than 20,000 population. So once that's done, we will have to rethink whether to make e-filing mandatory in juvenile and truancy cases. We left those out originally because a lot of the lawyers who practice in those cases are criminal lawyers, and since e-filing was not going to take place in criminal courts for a while, we left those out, but we may now want to stick those back in. So we will be getting a recommendation from JCIT on that.

And then finally, we're in the process of creating a task force to re-examine the justice court rules. For those of you who were here in 2013, you remember that we put together a task force and we had representatives of the creditor's bar, Legal Aid for debtors and tenants, and representatives of the Texas Apartment Association and other landlords to go through the justice court rules principally on evictions and debt collection, but in the end they went through all of the

rules and completely revamped them.

Those changes have been very
well-received. In the end the 806 justices of the peace
embraced the rules. They were quite proud of them, but
they want us to take another look at them just because
things have changed. One of the things that have changed
is there has been an enormous uptick in debt collection
cases just in the last couple of years. They -- our
preliminary members from fiscal year '19, we won't have
the final numbers for a couple more months, but the
preliminary numbers look like the cases are up 30 percent
over 2000 -- fiscal year 2018, which is 65,000 more
cases -- 112,000 more cases than we had in physical year
'17.

So we're not sure exactly why this is happening. Of course there was a great surge in cases when the economic downturn occurred back in 2009, 2010, but that's not the case now. So we're not exactly sure where this is happening, but there's a huge number of those cases. And then effective next year the justice court jurisdiction will increase from 10,000 to \$20,000, and as you know, about half or probably two-thirds, maybe three-fourths, of the litigants in justice court are representing themselves pro se. So we really need to take a hard look at these rules to make sure they're working as

efficiently as they can so that the justices of the peace can handle these cases. If you will recall, the representatives on the task force, both sides of these issues, got together on about 90 percent of the rules and brought to this committee just a handful of issues that remain to be decided.

Issues like what does it take to get a summary judgment in a debt -- in a small debt collection case, and the JPs were all over the map on this, and you set a formula and say if the creditor has this, he's going to get it. If he doesn't have it, he's not going to get it, and if you don't like that, you can go to the district court and file your suit, and those have worked really well, so well that a lot of other jurisdictions in the country have taken our process of bringing the principals together to talk about these rules. They're using that same process as well in their jurisdictions. So you can be proud that the work that began here is having an effect in the country. And I think that's it, Chip. Oh, yeah, yeah.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Almost it.

CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT: I started to make myself a note and I forgot. This week, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and the speaker made their appointments to the Judicial Commission on judicial

selection -- I'm sorry, the Texas Commission on Judicial Selection, which the Legislature created in the last session to study judicial selection in Texas. Judge Keller and I appointed Wallace Jefferson and Tom Phillips to the commission some weeks ago. And the Lieutenant Governor and speaker were to appoint senators and members of the House respectively, which they did. And the Governor had made four appointments, one of whom is the chair of this committee, Chip Babcock. And they will be studying the judicial 10 11 selection process in Texas. Just a word about that. Governor Bullock 12 passed a selection change in the Senate back in the 13 Nineties, three times. Got to the House floor and never 14 got any further than that. But it's been a while since we 15 have talked about it seriously, but Governor Abbott is now 16 the first governor in history to publicly favor, support changes, in judicial selection. So we are counting on 18 Chip to carry the ball on this one and know that he will. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks. Thanks, Judge. 20 Justice Bland, your turn. 21 22 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, good morning, it's a real treat to have everyone here in Houston. I was 23 happy to see that the skies did not darken when the dean 24 25 compared us to saints, so --

PROFESSOR CARLSON: He's new.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But I'm so delighted to be able to continue to serve on this committee as the Chief's deputy, you know, because there are -- you know, there's no other group in the state whose work is more vital to the judiciary and whose company I enjoy more. So I look forward to continuing to be here, albeit at the other end of the table, sigh. But I look forward to it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you. Thank you, Justice Bland. All right. The first agenda item is suits affecting the parent-child relationship, and it's being led by Pam Baron, the chair of the appellate subcommittee. So, Pam, you want to take us through it?

MS. BARON: Well, actually, this is being led by Justice Bill Boyce for our committee.

We sort of dipped a toe in this topic at the end of the last meeting. I guess today we'll wade the rest of the way in, at least as far as the first aspect of this the subcommittee has looked at. But to recap briefly, we've got referrals that cover a number of topics under the general heading of appeals in parental termination cases, covering some specific aspects of it.

One aspect of the referral covers untimely appeals or -- or disrupted appeal processes and

contentions that there's been ineffective assistance of counsel in circumstances where appointment of counsel is required for parental termination, for conservatorship that is sought by a governmental entity.

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This topic covers some potential approaches to this, including whether or not to have a late appeal procedure, an abate and remand procedure, some type of collateral attack under a habeas or bill of review style, or other aspects of this. Additionally, other arms of government have been looking at issues related to parental termination appeals. This involved House Bill 7 passed during the 85th Legislature, which resulted in a task force that has issued two reports over the course of the last couple of years.

This covers areas such as right to counsel showing authority to appeal, frivolous appeals, procedures in courts of appeals to consider ineffective assistance claims, and standardizing sort of an Anders type procedure that in some respects has been looked to as an analog for dealing with appeals involving terminations of parental rights where there may be questions about whether there's really a viable basis for that appeal.

Another aspect of this involves a potential for opinion templates to address the issues that come up frequently here. This committee has previously addressed

an aspect of these issues in July 2017 report on late filed petitions for review in parental termination cases. That's attached to your materials. That has been submitted to the Supreme Court. And the state of play right now is that the issues we're going to talk about today and in coming meetings are going to be considered together with the prior recommendations with respect to late filed petitions for review in parental termination cases. So if you're looking for a road map about how we've broken this down, because there's a lot of issues here that are related but they're not necessarily the same, I direct you to page two of the September 5 memo, issues for discussion.

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The subcommittee looked at this and determined that breaking this down into two stages would be an organized way to start tackling this, stage one involving out of time appeals related issues. The topics that are covered in this specific September 5 report are really stage (1)(a), dealing with some of the House Bill 7 recommendations, right to counsel on appeal, notice of right to appeal, and showing authority to appeal.

There's additional aspects of this that we've broken down into later stages. One being that after you get past this threshold, notice of appeal, right to appeal, showing authority, how do you address untimely

appeal processes that may result, particularly when you're dealing with certain events that involves right to counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims that may arise based on that and a late appeal procedure, collateral attack and so forth.

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The second stage that we identified is briefing and opinions, how to deal with potentially frivolous appeals, looking to Anders procedures as an analog, parental termination brief checklists, and then opinion templates as well. That will be the topic for later, later discussions, although we do have another agenda item on here that may start some of that discussion.

So if you look to page three of the

September 5th memo, this is the topic that we began

discussion on at the end of the last meeting and got a bit

of a way through it. We did not get all of the way

through it, so I'm going to summarize our discussion and

summarize some of the comments that we received -- that

were received during the prior meeting. So the House Bill

7 task force made a recommendation regarding mechanisms to

provide notice of the right to an appeal and the right to

counsel on appeal. One of these involves the contents of

the citation and to begin flagging at the very initiation

of the case the right to counsel and the right to appeal.

The House Bill 7 task force provided proposed language for citation. This is in keeping with separate efforts that have been undertaken, particularly with respect to the Rules 15 through 165a subcommittee that looked at modernizing, issuing forms of citation, and really a recommendation towards moving away from rules that tell you what should be in there in kind of general terms to actual form citations that can be uniformly applied. So the House Bill 7 recommendation fits with that in terms of recommending the specific form of citation that includes a second paragraph here referencing explicitly a right to appeal and right to counsel.

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When we talked about this at the last 14 meeting, we received some comments around the form of this proposed citation form. The subcommittee largely agreed or was comfortable with the House Bill 7 task force's proposal with the addition of some language as reflected on page four at the end of the second -- of the first paragraph to say, "If the Court determines you are indigent and eligible for appointment of attorney, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent you." thought of the subcommittee was to add language, "at no cost to you" to be more clear and to also parallel the form in the second paragraph.

When we talked about this at the September

meeting, we received a number of comments from the committee as a whole. I think to summarize them, that there was I think general comfort level with the concept of a whole -- as a whole of including clear language in the notice of citation, but suggestions for a way that this language could be in plainer language, less legalese, more easily understood.

After our meeting, Frank Gilstrap had suggested some language that -- that puts it in very direct wording, and we can talk about that in a little bit, but there were other suggestions along these lines. Some discussion about whether indigent is really the best term to use, is there a more plain language along the lines of being unable to afford an attorney as a way to communicate this better. Indigent is going to be a comfortably known term to legal professionals, but not necessarily nonlegal professionals or other litigants who are navigating this process.

Robert had raised a question about whether a reference in the second paragraph to a right to appeal is potentially broad enough when we're talking about not just a right to appeal in the intermediate court of appeals, but also a right to pursue a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court, which is an appellate process broadly defined, but may not be necessarily captured by this

specific language.

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Other comments that we've covered at the last meeting, Justice Christopher had raised the possibility -- and this was issued by Commissioner Sullivan about including the form of affidavit of indigency with a citation to underscore that aspect of the process. Chief Justice Gray had raised the possibility of looking at a parallel to the certificate of right to appeal that now exists in criminal cases and trying to adapt that to this procedure.

Another possibility that Robert had raised was including a statement of the right to appeal in the 13 notice of termination to underscore what is trying to be 14 captured by having a more clear citation form, and so that -- that kind of brings us up to date on as far as we got at the last meeting, and perhaps, Mr. Chairman, this is the appropriate time to reopen the conversation for further comments about the proposal thus far, the form of citation and other aspects of that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I think so. spent, what, maybe 40 minutes or less on it last Saturday at the tail end? So comments? Additional comments from our group? Yes. Levi.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Commissioner Sullivan would like the committee to know we're out of

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coffee. We're out of coffee. That's a big problem.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. We're out of
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   coffee.
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                 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: For the guy who
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   speaks for himself.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you have a right to
   coffee before you file your notice of appeal, right? All
          That's helpful, but anything else regarding these
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   right.
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   rules?
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                 MS. HOBBS: Chip, this is Lisa on the phone.
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  Can y'all hear me?
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 MS. HOBBS: You know, one of the -- my
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  partner, Karlene Poll, does a lot of termination appeals,
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  and we've gotten called where -- I'm sorry -- we've
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   gotten called where there was an untimely motion for new
   trial, then the few days passed and there was no
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  opportunity for notice of appeal. Is that anything that
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  was discussed in the subcommittee?
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                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: No. We did not
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  discuss that specific predicate to the appeal. That may
  be captured by some of the later discussion that we might
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24 have in terms of potential for a collateral attack type
  procedure. But that -- that is something that we would
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definitely want to take into consideration in terms of reasons for why a notice of appeal might be timely and how to address that. Thank you. MS. HOBBS: 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that was Lisa Hobbs, right? On the phone? 6 MS. HOBBS: Yes, it was Lisa Hobbs. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Great. Justice Christopher. 10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I have a 11 couple of points in connection with abating and remanding for hearings. According to OCA, the Supreme Court said 12 that if we have to abate and remand for a hearing, it does 13 14 not stop our 180-day deadline. I don't know whether that is true, but that is according to what OCA said the 15 Supreme Court told them. 16 So it's pretty common at the court of 17 appeals, like if you're having trouble with the court 18 reporter's records, you abate a case, and you remand it 19 20 back, you know, to figure out what's going on with the reporter's record. And that has always stopped our 21 appellate time line in terms of getting things done. But apparently in the parental termination cases, the 23 abatement process is not doing that. And so from -- from 24 25 the court of appeals point of view, any abatement process,

especially for an evidentiary hearing in support of an IEC claim cannot count towards our 180 days. I mean, we barely get -- by the time all the briefing is done, we barely get a month to read and write the opinion, so you know, that's just the reality of getting these things done and if we're abating, we will be busting our 180 days all the time. So that's number one.

Number two, while we're looking at this issue and the idea that, you know, you're going to attach the form to citation, that's great, but the first thing that usually happens is an emergency removal hearing. All right, and that's the first time the person shows up, and they might have their form filled out saying I want a lawyer, but the emergency removal hearing will take place without them having a lawyer.

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So I think that's something that the task force needs to look at, you know, on that point, and I understand it's an emergency. That's why, you know, CPS is coming to court and saying the children are in danger, this is an emergency, but the parents do lose substantial rights by not being represented at that original hearing. I don't know how to get a lawyer involved quickly enough in that phase, truthfully, but I think it's something that y'all should look at.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MS. HOBBS: This is Lisa Hobbs again. on the House Bill 4 -- or 7, House Bill 7 task force, and, Judge Christopher, I don't have the stuff in front of me, but I'll look at it. I feel like we did talk about how these delays affect your 180-day rule. So I'll pull that back up and maybe send you an e-mail separately with that. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I'm just saying that OCA -- that's OCA's marching orders, so somebody needs to give OCA different marching orders on abatements. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Pam. MS. BARON: Well, I think the 180-day rule comes from the Rules of Judicial Administration; and I 13 think, Justice Boyce, as we proceed maybe we can recommend that there be an alteration to that if we think it's 15 necessary to accommodate these proceedings for late-filed 16 notices of appeal that are going to require some kind of trial court hearing to determine ineffective assistance of 18 counsel; and that shouldn't be counted against the court of appeals deadline for getting these cases decided. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. MR. HUGHES: I was just curious what -- what the purpose of the -- effectively on a certificate that I 23 24 have conferred with my client and they really want to

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appeal, what problem is that addressing; and my other

comment was if we're having a problem with lawyers just willy-nilly filing appeals in these cases, why require a certificate at all? Why just say we -- we're going to allow -- just cut that all together and go to the chase, that is create a procedure to challenge it and be done with it.

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HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Well, I think the concern that prompts that proposal is that it is not always clear that a parent whose rights have been terminated wishes to challenge it. It may be a circumstance where the -- the intention to challenge it changes during the course of proceedings. There's an initial desire to challenge it and maybe that changes over time, and I think that uncertainty coupled with an accelerated time frame for the handling of these appeals means it's a -- it's a great big hurry up process that may result, for example, in court reporters having to transcribe matters, and it turns out later that the parent whose rights have been terminated does not wish to proceed with the appeal, and somebody is going to be left holding, you know, uncompensated or otherwise compelled to do something that turned out not to be necessary. I think that -- that's my understanding. Other subcommittee members or other members of the whole committee may have their additional aspects of it that

they want to comment on, but that's my understanding of the motivation for this or the concern. MR. HUGHES: Well, my thought here, I mean, 3 I don't do this area of law, but I know a lot of counsel who deal with low income, poor, indigent people, they have a problem explaining things to people. And the other thing is, they worry a lot about being sued for malpractice. The client didn't understand and then they get sharp shot later; and therefore, it's easier to take the most protective course of action and worry about it 10 11 later. The other thing here is, like, well, if 12 you're counsel, and you have to make the certification, 13 when do you -- which conference with the client do you consider? I mean, do you have to like say "I certify that 15 I've talked to them within the 24 hours before I filed it, 16 or the week before I filed it"? Or can I rely on a 17 conference they gave me, et cetera, et cetera. 18 I mean I understand people are spending 19 money, et cetera, et cetera, but I might suggest this, and 20 21 of course some people will be upset with me later, to say if the attorney has filed it precipitously cost tacked to the attorney, personally. 23 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Well, I think a 24

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related issue is that --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 1 I'm sorry. HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Oh, I'm sorry. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard just had his hand 3 Go ahead, and then I'll recognize Richard. up. 5 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Just to identify one aspect, an additional aspect of this is it may be difficult to find the parent, and there may be uncertainty about the intention to appeal because they're not able to be located or they've been maybe incarcerated, so that's another aspect. Yes. 10 11 MR. HUGHES: Well, And those are the hypotheticals I was going to throw out, precisely what I was thinking about. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Orsinger. 14 MR. ORSINGER: So I was on the House Bill 7 15 task force, and what Justice Boyce is talking about was 16 certainly an important factor, but also we were very 17 concerned, not only on the task force but among family 18 lawyers generally, about what we call the phantom appeal. 19 And that was the appeal that was automatically taken by 20 the lawyer appointed to represent the parent, even if the 21 parent was completely absent from the proceeding, and you can't take a default judgment, as I understand it. 23 don't try these cases, but you can't take a default 2.4 25 judgment, the state has to have a trial and put on its

proof. if anyone knows that I'm wrong, correct, me. But because you're an appointed lawyer, you have an absent client, when the case is over and there's a termination, you have a legal obligation or somebody has a legal obligation to represent that person on appeal. And so the trial lawyer always files a notice of appeal, even if they are -- even if they've never talked to their client.

And then the notice of appeal triggers all

And then the notice of appeal triggers all of these obligations on the part of the clerk and particularly the court reporter, and they are hugely accelerated, or they were hugely accelerated for the court reporter, which disrupted the normal trial proceedings. And we were -- you know, they were begging us for two weekends to do this instead of just one. It's a mess.

And the phantom appeal is, for me, an appeal where the parent never appeared and which is one of the reasons why I became concerned that we give notice in the citation about the right to free counsel if you're indigent, because that may be the last time that you hear from this parent -- or the only time the parent hears from the judicial process at the participatory level is when they get served with citation, so --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And you say it should give them notice of their right to counsel on appeal?

MR. ORSINGER: Trial and appeal, yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Trial and appeal, right.

MR. ORSINGER: Yes, and that's one of the reasons why certainly I favor the idea of having a form instead of general instructions of what to put in the citation. Because I think the policy should be set by the Supreme Court and then it ought to be required that it be implemented, not be left to local option about what the citation says. But there are situations where you have a client who participated in the trial and there were grounds for termination, sometimes multiple grounds, and they just don't wish to appeal. And they should have a right not to appeal. They ought to have a conversation with their lawyer, and that was the source of this certification of the discussion.

As far as Roger's concern about, well, which conversation do you rely on, probably -- we envisioned that you would have a conversation after the verdict came down or maybe even after the judgment of termination was signed, saying, would you like us to appeal this to the court of appeals, we have an indigency presumption. You may qualify -- continue to qualify for an appointment, free counsel. And they ought to be given the option not to appeal if they want to. But to me the larger issue, at least on my mind and on the family lawyers that I talked to that weren't on the task force, was the true phantom

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appeal where there really is no client, and some of these
  parents are in foreign countries and are incarcerated.
                 You just never have had communication with
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   them, so there's just no point -- as long as due process
  is provided in the trial court, we felt like there was no
  point in forcing every one of these cases into an appeal,
   even if the parent didn't want it or we didn't know
  whether they want it or even if the parent hadn't
  participated. I think that covers the ground.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, but, yeah, what's
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  the trial lawyer going to do in that issue? Tell them the
  trial --
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                                Well there's --
                 MR. ORSINGER:
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- lawyer gets to file a
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  notice of appeal?
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Yeah,
                                       I think that that
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   requires some consideration by the appellate rules
   committee, but I personally don't think that we should
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   require that the trial lawyer file the notice of appeal.
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   But that requires the courts to either appoint the trial
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   lawyer or to appoint a replacement appellate lawyer
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   because many of these trial lawyers are not qualified to
   take an appeal and don't really want the responsibility of
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   taking the appeal.
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                 But somebody has to be there during this
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critical time frame when these time deadlines are running, and so we tried -- on the task force we recommended extending some of these deadlines, like the filing of the motion for new trial, which had dual benefit, because we really need to bring an appellate lawyer in to decide whether the trial lawyer was ineffective. You can't expect the trial lawyer to be sitting in judgment of their own competency or incompetency. And the timetables were so quick that the briefs were due before, you know, we even could have a hearing on a motion for a new trial, so the task force had recommended that there be an independent post-rendition timetable for motion for new trial, the appointment of appellate lawyer, who has to probably read the record in order to determine whether the trial counsel was competent or not.

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And it's not just the failure to make objections or other essential error preservation steps during the trial. There's also the failure to call witnesses and the failure to interview witnesses, which requires a little leg work on the part of the appellate counsel, and all of that takes a little bit of time. But at any rate, the concern that I heard voiced most often was not that the parent who sat through the trial that decided it was best for the child or just didn't want to continue the fight. It was the one that was truly absent,

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showed no interest at all, never contacted, never returned
               Those are cases where we really shouldn't be
  any calls.
  bringing all of the apparatus for an appeal automatically
   in every case.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but the problem
   that you identified a minute ago when you started out was
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   the, quote, "phantom appeal."
                 MR. ORSINGER: Uh-huh.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that's triggered by a
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  trial lawyer who's been appointed who thinks, look, I've
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   got a duty to preserve the right of appeal because this
   person may show up, or they may continue to be a phantom.
   I don't know, but that's my duty.
13
                                Right.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And how are you going to
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16 absolve the trial lawyer of that duty?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, you absolve them of the
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   duty by requiring that before the notice of appeal is
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   filed that they certify that they contacted their client.
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   If they can't reach their client or their client won't
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   return their calls or is at no telephone number or address
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   that they can find, then the certificate can't be filled
   and the notice can't be filed.
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                   As I understand, it's required that you
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   certify that you contacted your client and the client
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wants to go forward with the appeal, and that's a
  precondition to filing the notice. Isn't it, Bill?
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Uh-huh.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, so the actual
  mechanism, Chip, is --
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                                   If that happens, then
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
   it's not phantom then, is it?
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, by default you can't
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   file the certificate that you spoke with your client if
  you can't find your client or your client won't return
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  your calls and your letters. So let's just say that the
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   parent is in Mexico or Central America, wherever.
                                                      You're
  never going to be able to contact them.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, they have phones in
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  Mexico.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, but you don't have the
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  phone -- I mean, okay. If you want to talk to people that
   take these appointments, you can get it from the horse's
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  mouth, because I don't do these cases, but a lot of my
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   friends do. And I've served on committees with these
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   guys, and sometimes it's just really impossible to locate
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  no matter how hard you try. Even if you know -- even if
   they live in the United States or live in Texas, but you
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   can't tell where the residence is. Everybody is afraid to
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   talk to you because they're afraid you're with the
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government or an investigator or something.

weed out the cases where we cannot confirm that the parent wants to appeal. That could be because they were in trial and lost and they don't want anymore, or it could be you never spoke to them or if they vanish after the verdict. It doesn't matter. The point is that we're not going to have phantom appeals from people that haven't said, "Yes, I want to take advantage of my appellate right."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the trial lawyer is absolved if they've made sufficient effort to contact the -- their client, the parent, and they can't contact them?

MR. ORSINGER: Right. Or there may be an appellate lawyer that has been appointed by that time, in which event the duty may be devolved on the appellate lawyer, but either way, some lawyer who is going to be responsible for the case has to say that I've communicated this — with my client about this right to appeal, and they have indicated no interest in appealing or they indicated they don't want to appeal.

THE COURT: So -- so you're going to prevent the phantom appeal in two ways, either when a client -- when a client says, "I don't want to appeal," that's not really what you're talking about phantom.

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No, the phantom is the one
                 MR. ORSINGER:
   that --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You can't reach them.
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Right. And this covers both.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay.
                                           Yeah, Roger.
                 MR. HUGHES: Okay. Now I see the problem,
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  but I'm not sure this is going to solve it. I mean, if
   the lawyer -- the lawyer has to certify this to file the
   notice of appeal, you know, last time I checked, if you
   file a notice of appeal that doesn't have something
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   correct on it, it's effective. So, I mean, if you can --
   if the certificate is not there, it's not fatally
   defective. It just needs to be corrected upon the request
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   of a party.
                So now, once again, what are we requiring the
   lawyer to certify? When was the -- does he have to say
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   "I've talked with my client within the last week" in order
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   to file a an adequate certificate, within the last 24
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   hours, within the preceding month; and the next thing is,
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   if this is about protecting the lawyer from filing a
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   frivolous appeal or being sued by the client because you
   didn't keep in contact with me, et cetera, I don't know
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   that that can be fighted because the one thing I've
   learned in litigation is the lawyer can always paper a
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   file to death, but the client is going to say, "Well, gee,
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   he knew where my cousin lived, and my cousin always has my
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phone number."
                 I mean, it's always going to end up being a
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  fact question, and the lawyer has no bulletproof shield to
   drop down and say, hey, you know, that certificate, I'm
  protected.
              I mean, the only thing I can think of, that's
   why I say don't require the certificate. Instead create a
   process for the -- to have a quickie hearing of how do you
  know your client has authorized this, and I'm sorry, we
  may have to lift the client -- the lawyer may have --
  there may have to be some inroads into the lawyer-client
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  communications, but I don't think just requiring the
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  certificate in order to file the appeal is going to
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  protect anybody from anything. And God help the lawyer
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  who says, "Well, I didn't file a certificate because I
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   couldn't -- I didn't file a notice of appeal because I
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  couldn't find my client, " and the client goes, "Well, gee,
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   you know, I was on Facebook" and whatever the social media
   du jour is. You could have just used Snapchat or
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   something.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You could have Twittered
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   me.
                 MR. HUGHES:
                              Yeah. Yeah.
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23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just saying.
   Justice Gray.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      This is a really
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multi-faceted problem that I've spent a lot of time
   dealing with at our court. I think it would help us
  understand if we understood the magnitude of the issue,
  how many of these are filed in the trial court, how many
   get actually appealed to the court of appeals, and how
  many to the Supreme Court of Texas. The -- there's been a
   ongoing comparison of termination cases to criminal cases,
   and they've been referred to as the death penalty of
   the --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Family law.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- civil, family law.
   In death penalty cases -- and I say this some
   tongue-in-cheek, but depending on what these numbers are,
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   if 99 percent get appealed then this is not so much
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   tongue-in-cheek, but if it's really a strong percentage,
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  then it is. But speaking from the court of appeals
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   perspective, if this is like a death penalty, they don't
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  have to file a notice of appeal and all of the appeals of
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   death penalties go directly to the Supreme Court, and so
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   I'm fine with that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Self-interest aside.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And really, it's not
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   entirely tongue-in-cheek because if everything gets
   appealed anyway, why not make the appeal and review,
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   especially given what the Court did to us in N.G., we're
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going to have to review it anyway, even if it's an Anders case and even if they're not asking for a reversal, which, while Nathan is sitting here, I think I will say is an absurd ruling, but you'll see that in writing soon, but if you want to read the record, it's a premonition. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is just a heads-up, 6 right? 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I would like 8 to say I like the decision, and we were already doing that on the First and Fourteenth. 10 CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT: We'll carefully 11 consider it. 12 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm sure you won't 13 because you won't see it because it -- anyway, I don't think it will ever get there, but the point is there is 15 a -- there is a problem in this area. I don't know how --16 what percentage of cases we are actually dealing with. The certificate concept, if it was both certification of 18 the right to appeal and the desire to appeal. The right 19 to appeal is not to so much an issue, but the desire to 20 21 appeal is what I was focused on. 22 When paired with what Richard was talking about, including in the citation, you're not going to 23 eliminate -- and I compare this again to the criminal 24 arena, which I would say other than the court of appeal 25

justices in here, not a lot of us have had contact with, but when the certificate of the right to appeal was adopted in criminal proceedings, it dramatically affected the number of cases that stayed appealed at our level, because we would get pro se notices of appeal, and we would get appellate lawyers' notices of appeal that were trying to CYA, when at the trial court level at the time the sentence was imposed when the client was there and it wasn't, therefore, a phantom appeal problem, they actually were in the courtroom and they signed a piece of paper on that day that said, "I understand I have no right to appeal."

And it is effective when it comes to us because we can then summarily dismiss that appeal because it was — the certification is not present in the record and with the notice of appeal when it comes to us. So you're never — but we still get the case in which by writ or by an effort to appeal, they try to attack whether or not their plea was knowing and voluntarily or their waiver of the right to appeal was knowing and voluntary, so that's still going to be a problem in this case, in termination cases, just like it is in criminal cases.

One of the problems that I feel we're headed -- and I don't know exactly where to interject this into the conversation, but since y'all have been kind and

let me talk, I will interject it here. The problem of this procedure that an appointed counsel or a client that had an appointed counsel might be able to challenge the lack of certification or ever how it's done, someone else can come in and attack whether or not the attorney wants to do -- we have to be very careful that that is not just for appointed counsel appeals, or you're creating two levels of rights between that attorney or that client that is represented by an appointed counsel having a greater right to a late appeal than someone who unfortunately hired an incompetent counsel and didn't get the notice of appeal filed. So that's a different problem than what we've tried to address here so far. Because it -- you are creating a different level of right between those that are appointed by -- or represented by appointed counsel versus retained counsel.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.

the idea of the judge signing the right to appeal as opposed to the lawyer certifying that he's talked to the client, and because what will happen -- and I think the vast majority of cases are where we're talking about where the parent doesn't show up. Okay. And there is still a trial because they still have to prove that, A, the parent was the parent, which is often an issue in the case, and

then, B, they have to prove that it's in the best interest to terminate parental rights.

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So a lawyer who shows up to represent this absent parent before the trial finishes does not want to tell the judge, "I talked to my client and he could care less about this child. He didn't even know it was his child." I mean, it's generally the absent fathers. I mean, that this happens on, right? So "I tried to get him to sign a relinquishment of parental rights and he was not interested," right? Well, that would be the kind of person that shouldn't -- we shouldn't be hiring a lawyer to take the appeal for, right? And that's the kind of information that the lawyer could give after the trial is over, after the judge has made -- or the jury has made their decision to terminate. So rather than relying on, you know, some sort of certificate from the lawyer, I think it would be better to have the process of at the end of the trial the lawyer telling the judge why his client wasn't there and that he's not interested in the case.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And for comparison in the criminal arena, the certification of right to appeal, which if any of y'all have your 2019 books, it's on page 186 -- wrong one. It's appendix D, page 378, of your rule book. It is signed by the trial judge, the defendant, and

the defendant's counsel. So all three actually are involved in that certification, and that's why it's so effective at then cutting off these frivolous or -they're not even frivolous appeals in the sense that there may have been an issue. They just cut themselves out of the appellate process by that certification. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher, what 7 if the lawyer after the trial -- the appointed lawyer 8 after the trial says, "Judge, I've never been able to get a hold of this person. I don't know what his or her view 10 11 is on this whole thing, so I can't say they want to appeal or don't want to appeal. I just don't know." HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I think at 13 that point they have gotten the due process that was necessary by going through a trial and that they shouldn't 15 have a right to appeal, personally. I mean, I understand 16 people could have different viewpoints on that, but to me that should be the end of it. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Richard. 19 MR. ORSINGER: I like Roger's suggestion 20 that a certificate doesn't really protect the lawyer from 21 a later attack that they were not diligent in locating the parent; but I'm troubled, especially as explained by 23 Justice Christopher, we have to respect also the 2.4 25 attorney-client privilege; and the way the certificate is

drafted, I don't think it improperly invades it because all the lawyer is saying is that my client has authored me to file an appeal, which to me is not a confidential communication because there's going to be a notice filed and all of this, so I don't think you could argue that it was intended to remain secret. But if you have a lawyer who's either 7 speaking as an officer of the court or under oath in a 8 hearing with the judge saying, well, you know, I tried this and they told me that, and I left a message and, you 10 11 know, then the client said this and won't take my advice, or whatever, we're way into the attorney-client privilege there. So I think --13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you said a bunch of 14 things, and some of them are attorney-client privilege, 15 16 and others may not be. MR. ORSINGER: Right, because if they said 17 something and they're a representative of the client, 18 that's probably covered. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "I tried to call and 20 nobody answered." 21 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. Or if somebody left me 22 a voicemail message, is that hearsay? Maybe not if it 23 comes from the parent. But if it comes from the wife of 2.4

the parent or a cousin, it probably is inadmissible

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I mean, this is not -- having a hearing, while hearsay. it would be I think probably give better protection and perhaps even more assurance of due process, it's not a problem-free area to say that we're going to have a hearing in which a lawyer is either going to volunteer or be examined by the judge or by the CPS attorney. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you're the one that 7 brought up this phantom -- phantom appeal thing. 8 think it's preferable to have this the certificate or to have a hearing? 10 11 MR. ORSINGER: Gosh, you know, I like the fact that the hearing is a judicial determination, and so the lawyer is not responsible for deciding that there will 13 not be an appeal. The judge is responsible, and I like that. It's due process, it's protection for the lawyer. 15 I'm just -- I'm trying to envision how we're going to get 16 more out of a lawyer than you would get out of a 17 certificate, because I -- I see all kinds of problems in 18 having a hearing where the lawyer is talking about his 19 conversation with his client or her client. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 21 Harvey. HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I like the idea of 22 a hearing; and one of the things to -- that could occur at 23 that hearing, in response to your question about what if 24 25 the lawyer says, "I haven't reached him," we could have a

comment that basically refers to the procedures we're talking about for default judgments. You know, have you checked with Facebook, have you checked this, have you checked that. So the judge just asks the right questions at least, to answer some of Roger's points earlier about have you really gone forward and made a real effort, and so that would then have an independent person deciding, a judge, whether you made reasonable effort to satisfy due process. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Commissioner Sullivan, 11 and then Justice Christopher.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Well, one quick threshold comment is to say what good work I think this subcommittee has done in terms --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: She can't hear you. You 16 have to speak up.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: I was just going to start by saying what good work I think the subcommittee has done in terms of having to deal with these extraordinarily difficult issues, and you know, as you both read some of the proposals and hear them, I mean, many of them sound very good to me. The difficulty that I have, and I assume it may be a common issue, is that we're operating in a vacuum, and for many of us these are issues of first impression, and we have no -- no history to draw

from and no data to draw from in terms of what may work and what may not.

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And in circumstances like that, it always occurs to me that some form of best practice analysis might be in order, meaning for me anyway, what are the other states doing, and do any of them have experiences that we should draw from in terms of having done either research or already been down certain procedural paths that have yielded experience and/or data about how good or how bad those alternatives are.

I mean, it allows you to steal good ideas, quite frankly, when they're proven. It allows you also to avoid mistakes that other states have made, and so it just occurs to me that it might be something worth looking into in an area like this where I presume many of the issues that we're discussing are issues that are common to many, if not all, of the other states.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.

in the criminal field there is some small waiver of the attorney-client privilege when people are proving up a plea deal, for example. You know, have I explained to you the pros and cons of going to trial? Yes. Have I explained to you your right to appeal? Yes. So those sort of things are already done. And, you know, in a way

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that would be a limited -- that would be a waiver of the
  attorney-client privilege, but that sort of information is
   given to the judge, and so then the judge can then
   determine it's a voluntarily -- a voluntary plea.
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                 All right. So to me, I wouldn't worry too
  much about a small waiver of the attorney-client privilege
   in connection with this right to appeal. You know, did
   you explain -- if the answer is, "I never got hold of
  him," that's one thing. If the answer is, "I got a hold
   of him and he chose not to come to trial," you know, "Did
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  you explain the appellate process to him?"
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                 "Yes."
12
                 "Did he indicate any interest in appealing?"
13
                 "No." And then the judge would say, you
14
  know, no need to appeal here.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I was just looking
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   at Rule 12, which has a similar -- you know, someone
   challenges the authority of the lawyer to appear for a
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  particular client and the lawyer -- the challenged lawyer
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   has got to come to court and tell the judge why they do
21
   have authority and that might, Richard, get into
   attorney-client stuff to a limited degree anyway.
  Richard.
23
                                 I think the concern for the
2.4
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
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   attorney-client privilege is -- I don't know what the
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right word would be. It's almost artificial. I am claiming that I didn't have due process rights when you took my child away, and I'm going to use the attorney-client privilege to protect my right to stay in court to make that argument. We've always said that the attorney-client privilege can't be used as a sword and a shield. We've always had Rule 12 in the trial court, which requires the attorney to prove that he has the power to bring the lawsuit, and I'm not sure that an attorney could make that statement if someone contested the 10 11 attorney saying so. Well, I'm authorized by my client. Well, I 12 don't accept that, your Honor. Let the client come down 13 here and say that they've authorized this. I've had --I've filed three Rule 12 motions in my law practice in my 15 lifetime, and all three of them were contested, and I won 16 all three, and in part it was because no one could produce 17 a client that could say, "I have authorized this lawsuit." 18 I think it's almost an artificial issue to be concerned 19 with the attorney-client privilege. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Elaine, 21 Professor Carlson. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Richard Orsinger, can --23 24 may an appointed attorney in one of these cases file a 25 notice of nonrepresentation under appellate Rule 6.4?

MR. ORSINGER: You know, it's my understanding or my recollection that the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that if you're appointed as a lawyer, you're on the case until you're relieved, which means including on appeal; and the Supreme Court has ruled that there is a constitutional right to appeal in parental termination cases. So I don't think you can file a notice of nonrepresentation. 8 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Because I notice in 9 subsection (b) of that rule, it specifically provides in a 10 criminal case. 11 I agree with what Richard is 12 MS. HOBBS: saying. 13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: "An attorney appointed 14 by the trial court to represent the indigent party cannot 15 file a nonrepresentation notice." And I was just thinking 16 by analogy, does that apply? MR. ORSINGER: I think they can't. I think 18 that when you're appointed as a trial lawyer, you're on 19 until you're relieved, all the way up to the court of 20 appeals and really arguably all the way to the 21 Texas Supreme Court. Although House Bill 7 task force has made certain recommendations about trying to get more to a 23 discretionary review from the court of appeals to the 24 25 Supreme Court level, but the Supreme Court cases are out

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there, and we have to abide by them.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     Thank you.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other comments?
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  Bill.
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                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: A question.
                                                     If -- if
  the -- if there's interest in going down the certificate
  of right to appeal path, then to address Professor
  Carlson's question, does that certificate also include an
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   express statement saying, "I find that there's not
   interest in pursuing the appeal," and the appointed lawyer
10
  is now done?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Elaine.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I just raise the
13
14 questions.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: As professors do.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, I think
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  it would need to include a discharge of the trial attorney
  because they're on the hook until the appellate lawyer is
18
  appointed to move on, so I think it should include a
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20
   discharge.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I think -- I think
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  that's right. Anybody disagree with that? Okay. Any
  other comments on this?
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                 MS. HOBBS: This is Lisa, and I'm sorry, I
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   can't hear Elaine, but I do think that the whole reason
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why we have the Anders process in these cases is that you need a court to relinquish you from your representation.

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And then secondly, I just want to point out one other thing that Judge Christopher said in her original comment, was about these emergency order -- like emergency hearings to remove the children from the current situation. One of the things that the appellate committee hasn't addressed that they might consider addressing or with the permission of Chief Justice Hecht addressing is typically when those temporary hearings happen and you have appellate grounds, the only appellate remedy -- like the only appellate remedy is by mandamus. I do think that the courts of appeals have consistently said you do have a right to mandamus review of those orders, but I don't think that anything we've talked about in this advisory committee or even in the HB 7 committee was the appointment of counsel to take those mandamuses, and so I know that's an issue outside of the charge of this group right now, but I just point it out that it is a problem and it is really truly the only appellate remedy if you think that a judge has improperly removed your children from your home on a temporary basis.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments? Bill, what else do we need to talk about on this?

HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Well, we've kind of covered the authority to appeal point. I guess the only point left in -- that's highlighted right now in the September 5th memo is just a place holder to say that whatever we do here needs to be synced up with how petitions for review processes are handled in the circumstances. But I guess what would be helpful at this juncture is some kind of indication from the committee as a whole about whether this is consensus to continue down the path of authority to appeal or if there's a desire to go more in the direction of a certificate of right to appeal, and it seems like there was discussion about the wanting to get judicial -- a judicial determination with respect to whether or not there's a desire or a continuation of the appeal. So some guidance along that line would be helpful for further discussions.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So the two competing thoughts would be to go the certificate route, where in the appeal document the filing lawyer would say, "I certify that I've talked to my client and they want to appeal," or I've -- "I've been unable to talk to my client because they live in a foreign country, and I don't know how to do the international codes and, therefore, couldn't reach them." If you're Orsinger, who doesn't know how to dial to Mexico apparently.

So that would be one way to do it, and then the other would be after judgment -- I assume, Justice Christopher, after judgment there would be a hearing while the trial court still had plenary power where the lawyer comes down and says, "I can't get a hold of my client" or "I can get hold of them and they don't want to appeal," or "I got hold of my client and they very much want to appeal, and that's fine, appoint appellate counsel for them, but I'm out." In any event, all of those situations the trial lawyer would be -- judge says, "Okay, you're 10 I find that you've done a good" -- "you've, you 11 know, done a good job trying to find the person. can't find them, I accept that and so no appeal, and 13 you're off the hook." Are those the two competing ideas in broad form? 15 MR. JACKSON: Well --16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: David. 17 MR. JACKSON: I think added to the hearing 18 aspect, a hearing would put everyone on the same page as 19 20 to whether the court reporter is required to start working on the reporter's record or not, so that would be helpful 21 to get everybody on the same page about whether that's going to happen or not going to happen. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if the trial judge 24

at the hearing says, "I accept the fact you can't find the

25

client and, therefore, no appeal," or "I accept the fact that you've talked to your client and they don't want to appeal," the court reporter is off the hook. So the court reporter is only on the hook if the lawyer says, "I talked to my client, they want to appeal, please appoint appellate counsel. And, court reporter, you know you've got to get the work." 8 MR. JACKSON: And everybody knows that day. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody knows that day. 9 Richard Orsinger. 10 11 MR. ORSINGER: As an afterthought, the trial lawyer may also want to file a motion to withdraw or for 12 permission to be -- to have the appointment terminated or 13 something like that in conjunction with this appellate hearing, because I think there does need to be an official 15 end to responsibilities, and it should come from the 16 judge, not just by the playing out of the appellate 17 timetable with no notice being filed. So just as an 18 afterthought, we might expect these lawyers also to file a 19 notice -- motion to withdraw or motion to terminate the 20 21 appointment. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What about the timing of the hearing? Does it happen after judgment or after 23 Where does it come in the -- Justice Christopher, 24 25 where would you anticipate this hearing happening?

would it happen? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I think 2 it would happen on the day of trial. I mean, most transcripts that I review, the judge makes the decision at the day of trial. You know, at the end. Sometimes not, so that would be a little more complicated. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, not only that, but 7 if the -- if the appointed lawyer's client is not there, 8 they're going to need some time to either try to find them if they can or to communicate what the ruling was. 10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, true. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And do you want to 12 appeal. 13 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Although, I 14 mean, if the -- if the -- if the parent isn't there and 15 we're talking about I tried to get hold of the parent and 16 I can't get a hold of the parent, I'm not really sure 17 having more time to try and get a hold of the parent and 18 say "I can't get hold of the parent" is going to lead us 19 to anything. And then with the parent that they've 20 actually talked to and said, you know, show up for trial 21 and the parent says to them, "I'm not interested, I don't care, I don't want to be there," then, you know, to me the 23 trial attorney can say, "Well, if you lose, do you want to 24 appeal," and, you know, the answer will be "no." But I 25

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mean, I -- because that's what you tell your client.
  you don't show up for trial, you're going to lose. You're
  going to lose your rights to your child. I mean, that,
  you know, is included as part of your trial judge -- your
   trial attorney advice.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   So you --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I think you
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8
  could do it at the time, but -- and that would, you know,
   streamline things for everybody, but if -- if an attorney
  wanted just a few more days to double check then, you
10
  know, it seems like that's useful, too.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, in the situation
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  where the trial judge says, "Hey, this is complicated, I
13
14 need a couple of days to think about it," then under the
  hearing model he would have to have people come back in --
15
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right, he
16
  would.
17
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- and say, "Okay, here's
18
  my ruling and I'm terminating the child."
19
20
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And at that point the
21
   lawyer stands up and says, "Hey, I can't get a hold of my
   client, I've tried really hard, and so discharge me."
23
   the trial judge says, "Okay, no appeal, you're
24
   discharged." That's it.
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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
1
                                               Right.
  will be more work for the trial judges to require that
  second -- and for the lawyers to come in the second time,
  but I think it's important.
5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, there's no avoiding
   it, I wouldn't think.
6
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
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8
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Pam.
                 MS. BARON: But when you do have a parent
9
   there, and they --
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11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                 MS. BARON: -- clearly indicated to the
12
  attorney that they do want to appeal, you shouldn't have
13
  to go through this hoop. You shouldn't require it in that
   situation.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Harvey.
16
                 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I think it should
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  be on or before the judgment, because that gives the
18
  person some right also to go think about it. The parent
19
  may think immediately yes, I want to appeal, but may out
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21
  of reflection say no, or vice versa. It could be done on
  the date of the appeal, using on or -- I mean, day of
   verdict, but this would give a little more time for the
23
  person to reflect on an important decision.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard, you're
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the one that created this whole mess.
                 MR. ORSINGER: You know, it was really my
2
   friends, not me.
3
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Oh, really. You have
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   special little friends? Professor Carlson.
 6
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah, another question.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
7
                                    Speak up.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: If the parent was served
8
  by publication, because we don't know where they are, does
  the Family Code have anything that is -- that would
10
  override Rule 244 and give the defendant two years to file
11
12 a motion for a new trial, or does this legislative
  provision for appeal negate that?
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: I know the answer as far as
14
   divorce, but not as far as parent-child issues.
                                                    I don't
15
   know.
16
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Six months.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: Six months?
18
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Six months.
                                                   You can
19
20
   file a writ of habeas corpus in six months, or you can
   file your restricted appeal, but it is, I believe, for all
21
   purposes final, final, after six months.
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, yeah, I think that
24 Elaine's -- was talking about a two-year extended motion
25
   for new trial deadline for citation by publication, is
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what it is for a divorce.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     I guess that doesn't --
2
  that doesn't apply to an accelerated appeal, though,
           I guess that's how that works.
   right?
5
                 MR. ORSINGER: I think I'm going to have to
   get a copy of the Family Code to answer your question.
6
   just don't know off the top of my head whether -- oddly
   enough the citation by publication rules I think that
   govern parent-child issues are the ones that are stated in
   the earlier part of the Family Code relating to husband
10
11
   and wife, but I need to pull that out and read it.
   try to do that on my phone this morning.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, is there a
13
  consensus about certificate versus hearing? You want to
                It's early I know, but --
  have a vote?
15
                 MR. LEVY: I'll move for certificate.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Go ahead.
17
                 MR. LEVY: I would propose certificate, so
18
   if you want to --
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So Robert moves
20
   certificate. How many people are in favor of certificate?
21
   Was there a bark on the phone, Lisa?
                 MS. HOBBS: There was. It's Lisa, and I'll
23
   just say that I prefer the certificate over a hearing.
2.4
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And so now your
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certificate people should not vote. How many people would suggest a hearing? 2 The results of the vote are 9 for 3 certificate and 15 for a hearing. So there you go. 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Can we talk about when that hearing occurs, because it affects the timetable? 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 7 Sure. 8 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Because you've got 20 days to file your notice of appeal after the judgment is signed, and if you're going to have to have a hearing in 10 11 that time, then it's going to be tough. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Well, that's what 12 Justice Christopher was addressing I think before about --13 about you have it on the day of trial when the judge issues the ruling, but there could be some other time I 15 suppose. Do you have a thought about when it ought to be? 16 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, I'd be -- if 17 you're going to require a hearing, I think it needs to be 18 in conjunction with the signing of the judgment or the 19 pronouncement of what the judgment is going to be. 20 Judge Brown was talking about, the problem -- I mean, in 21 criminal cases it's simple because the sentencing is done in the presence of the defendant, and whether it's the 23 certificate or if it was this type of hearing, it's all 2.4 25 going to be there while they're there. Everybody is, in

theory, there on that day, whether they wanted to be there or chose to be absent, and you're really messing with the timetable, the ability to timely file the notice of appeal if you're waiting for that hearing. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 6 Justice Christopher. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I mean, 7 if it happens that, you know, the judge says, "I'm 8 terminating the parental rights" at the end of trial and then they have the hearing right then, and then the 10 11 judgment gets entered after CPS sends in the form of the judgment, you know, a week, two weeks later. If the judge 12 says, "I'm going to take it under advisement," then you 13 can either have the hearing then or you just have to put 14 in the rule that he can't sign the judgment until he's had 15 the hearing. So that -- and then there would be no 16 problem with the appellate timetables since it doesn't 17 start until the judgment. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Orsinger. 19 20 MR. ORSINGER: I just wanted to put into the record and tell Elaine that I found Family Code, section 21 102.010, for citation by publication in SAPCRs, suits affecting the parent-child relationship. I haven't found 23 anything here about an extended timetable, so I will keep 24 25 looking.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, Bill, does
  that give you guidance, 17 to 9?
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                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: I understand us to be
3
   going down the pathway of fleshing out what the hearing
  process is going to be, what it's going to look like, and
   then I think the offshoots of that are going to be once
   you have a hearing and it results in the certificate of
  some kind, then we'll have a decision tree about handling
   the inevitable late appeals after the certificate and the
   inevitable contentions that somebody will appear on scene
10
  who was determined to be unfindable later on and whether
11
   or not there's going to be some right to collateral attack
   on any of this.
13
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I didn't think there
14
   was a certificate involved in the hearing process.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
16
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE:
17
                                        Okay.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           That's what I
18
   thought, too.
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20
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: All right.
                 MS. BARON: Our decision tree is growing
21
  many branches.
23
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Just for my clarity
   then, we're talking about a hearing that results in a
2.4
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   determination, and that's it?
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
1
                                    Yeah.
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Okay.
 2
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                              Well, I was
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5
  actually anticipating the hearing and the written
   certificate that says "permission to appeal, appellate
   lawyer appointed" --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, yeah, from the
9
  judge.
10
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- with him
11
  there and trial judge discharged. I mean, I was
  anticipating something that looks like that, a
12
  certificate, but my understanding of the other certificate
13
14 that we were talking about and that people voted on was
  just the lawyer's own certificate without court
15
  involvement. So I still see a certificate after the
16
17 hearing process.
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: And to be -- to be
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  clear of what I understand us to be talking about is a
19
  certificate of a right to appeal or something signed by
20
  the judge.
21
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.
22
                                                        That's
  what I would anticipate.
23
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: As a result of the
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  hearing.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

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HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: All right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: So I would envision that what we would get is a court order, and the court order would either instruct the court-appointed trial lawyer to file the notice of appeal and handle the appeal or relieve the trial lawyer and appoint a new appellate lawyer to file a notice of appeal and conduct the appeal or say the court finds that the client has not expressed a desire to appeal and, therefore, the trial lawyer is relieved and no appellate lawyer is appointed, and then after a period of time the case dies due to lack of appeal. Levi has got 14 his hand up over there, Chip.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Levi.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: So Richard and Tracy both addressed this point of the trial lawyer being discharged during the hearing. It's not my area of law, and I don't know anything about it, but, you know, in a civil case a lawyer couldn't be discharged or permitted to withdraw without notice to the client. So how do you have this hearing and realtime have the trial judge say to the lawyer, "You're discharged," even if an appellate lawyer is being appointed when there's been no notice to the client that lawyer Richard is no longer going to be your

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lawyer.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Richard.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER: If this was simple, we would
 3
  have found the solution already.
5
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, listen, you
  made my year. I one-upped Richard Orsinger. I stuffed
  him.
8
                 MR. ORSINGER: Great, and we still have a
   couple of months.
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Robert, and then Justice
11
  Gray.
                 MR. LEVY: I don't know this field as well,
12
  but in the criminal context, I presume that an
13
14 appointment, that indigent appointment for a trial, lasts
   through that trial, and there's no obligation to carry
15
  forward an appeal on behalf of the defendant.
16
                 MR. ORSINGER: There is. I think there is
17
  an obligation to carry forward with the appeal if you're
18
   appointed in trial.
19
20
                 MR. LEVY: Okay.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And the
21
  defendant there in the courtroom --
23
                 MR. LEVY: Right.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: -- probably gets
2.4
25
  notice that Robert lawyer is going to be discharged --
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No, Richard, lawyer Richard. 1 MR. LEVY: HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Oh, lawyer Richard 2 is going to be discharged after this judgment convicting 3 you and that lawyer Lonny is handling your appeal. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 6 MR. ORSINGER: You know, the fact that the criminal defendant is present during the trial either 7 voluntarily or involuntarily, you get a lot of notice problems solved by just saying things in front of the 10 defendant. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 11 Right. MR. ORSINGER: But if you have an absent 12 parent, none of that works. You don't have the waivers 13 You're not standing in front of the judge, for a plea. 14 and so I think we need to take into account that a 15 significant number of these cases there's no parent in the 16 courtroom, and we've got to figure out what to do. But if 17 you start building in a lot of delay for time to give 18 notices to people that you don't know how to contact, then 19 we're crashing into these accelerated deadlines that we 20 have for all of these actions that have to be taken. 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think that the problem, Levi, is for the situation where the appointed lawyer has 23 not been able to get a hold of the client. 2.4 25 resulting in these phantom appeals that Richard is worried

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about.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: But even in civil
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  cases, Rule 12 --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: -- you still have to
5
  make a record that you sent the certified letter, file the
  green card with the court or you've got to file some
  record of the effort made to communicate, but, again, I
   don't -- I don't know anything about the accelerated
   appeals.
            I can see it's a problem. I don't know what the
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11
  solution is, and --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
12
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There is a -- I'm
13
14 sorry.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Gray, and
15
16 then Justice Christopher.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There is a practical
17
  problem if you try to discharge them at that hearing,
18
  because the right to appeal will still, under the rule,
19
  still exist, and they would be -- if they're appointed
20
  counsel, deprived of the counsel during a critical stage
21
  of the proceeding, and so that counsel probably needs to
  be discharged effective at the expiration of the right to
23
   appeal timetable.
24
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.
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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, and I just wanted to point out that parental termination cases have a deadline to get a final judgment, too, so it's not just appellate deadlines.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

hard and fast deadline to get that done, too, so it has to be on a pretty accelerated basis. You can't take the time to do a, you know, certified mail to your missing client that has already told you "I'm not interested in this case," if you've talked to him.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yep. Justice Gray, your problem that you're talking about, we've got three situations. One, the appointed lawyer has been in contact with the client and says they don't want to appeal. So the judge says, "Okay, I'll accept your representation, you're discharged."

Second, "I've talked to the client and they do want to appeal." All right. "File your notice of appeal and then you're discharged and I'll appoint an appellate lawyer." The problem is the third situation where the lawyer comes in and says, "I've checked Facebook, I've done Snapchat, I've tweeted, I've done all of these things. I sent the -- I have the quaint evidence of a returned green card, or an unreturned green card" and

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so the judge says, "Okay, no appeal. You're discharged."
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And I think you
2
  could -- depending on what judges were reviewing it, would
  be potentially subject to a deprivation of due process
  because you did not have counsel during a critical stage
   of the proceeding. And that would be the tied --
                 MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask how that would
7
8
  arise, because the appeal would have been forfeited, so
   they would be conducting an out of time appeal, and
  there's no habeas corpus collateral attack on termination.
10
11
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, actually, there
   is, but that's another story. It would be effective 20
   days.
13
                                   Twice in one hour.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
14
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                               WOW.
15
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You've got the 20 days
16
   in the -- between the date that that judgment is entered
   that discharges your client and terminates your parental
18
   rights to file a notice of appeal.
19
20
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Okay.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I don't have an
21
   attorney now. I find out about the judgment, and I say,
22
   "Whoa, wait, I want to file a notice of appeal.
                                                    I don't
23
  have an attorney." And so, yes, now, you're -- you're
2.4
25
   collaterally attacking that by being after the fact and
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saying, "I was deprived due process because I did not have
  an attorney during the critical stage of the proceeding
  when I could have filed a notice of appeal."
                 MR. ORSINGER: So how does the case get into
5
  your court? Because it's not going to be on direct
            That was waived because the notice wasn't timely
   filed. So if they don't file a direct appeal complaining
   that they were denied a direct appeal, then they would
  have to file a collateral attack. And you said there's
   another story, but are you saying there is a collateral
10
11
   attack on a termination decree where you failed to appeal?
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, I think there is.
12
   You could either do it by mandamus or by writ, but the
13
   writ is only good for six months, but if it's --
14
                 MR. ORSINGER: You're talking about a direct
15
  appeal for a default judgment? Or a writ of what --
16
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Writ of habeas corpus.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: A writ of habeas corpus.
18
          But this is not the parent who is in the custody of
19
   the state, so we don't have a writ of habeas corpus.
20
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: The child is in the
21
   custody of the state or has been removed pursuant to a
   judicial order.
23
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                We'll have to discuss that
2.4
25
   over the break or lunch. That's --
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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: We need that Family 1 Code here. That's where that provision is. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Apparently Richard is not conceding that you've one-upped him on this one. 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm not either. not attempting to one up him. All I'm saying is that there's a problem because there's a time period in there when the parent can do something if they disagree with the 8 court's order that they are entitled to -- or not entitled to an appeal and they don't have an attorney. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Got it. Bill, it seems to me like we've pretty thoroughly discussed this issue, but if you need more, throw it out. 13 I guess I'm not sure HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: 14 I understand if there is a consensus on the timing of the 15 16 hearing. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Timing of the 17 hearing. We've got judge -- Justice Christopher says that 18 the hearing ought to be at the time the decision is 19 announced, be it at the conclusion of the trial or at some 20 later time. I haven't heard any other proposals for when 21 the hearing ought to be. Anybody else got suggestions on when the hearing should be? 23 MS. HOBBS: This is Lisa. 2.4 I don't propose 25 going through this realm, but if you're going to do it and

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it's not practical or feasible for it to happen at the
   time of judgment, which is what I would agree with
   Judge Christopher on that point, if we're going to go this
   route, but then I would say within five days of the
   signing of the judgment.
5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not later than five days
6
7
   after the judgment is entered. Richard Orsinger.
8
                 MS. HOBBS:
                            Yeah, that was my position.
9
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Yeah, I would say no later
   than the day that the notice of appeal is due.
                                                    That would
10
  be the outside time I think for this hearing.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but --
12
                 MR. ORSINGER: I'm not recommending it.
13
  just saying that that ought to be a limit, and I think
14
   that's -- I think that's 20 days.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is too late though.
16
   Justice Christopher.
17
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                I think it
18
  needs to be either when the decision is announced or entry
19
20
   of judgment.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge Christopher,
21
   I don't know if you could hear her, Lisa, said either when
   the decision is announced or the entry of judgment,
23
  whichever is later. Well, I guess the judgment would be
2.4
25
   the last thing anyway, so --
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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: When you say --

MS. HOBBS: I would -- I mean, I don't disagree with Judge Christopher. And again, I'm against all of this having the judge involved only because judges don't want appeals of their decisions, so I think the primary concern of mine is that judges are going to be like, no, but I think she's not proposing anything unreasonable. I just think Richard's comment about it being up until the time of notice of appeal is actually impractical for those of us who do this, and I think it needs to be very short.

And if I could just say something maybe just for those members of the Supreme Court who are present, keep in mind that the reason why we have all of these deadlines, whether it's the trial court's deadlines or the court of appeal's deadlines is 30 days in the life of a child is a big deal, and 90 days in the life of a child is a big deal, and 180 days in the life of a child is a big deal.

We're looking for stability in the life of these children, and I know it sucks from the judiciary standpoint and even from the lawyer's standpoint about how quickly these move, but the reason why is because we're dealing with eight-year-olds who need stability in their life. And I think whatever we do as a committee or

whatever the Court chooses to do to implement our recommendations, I think it is critical, critical, critical that we remember that what we're looking for -- like I know we have constitutional rights involved here, and I'm more of a pro-parent person than probably half that room, but I also think we can't lose sight of the fact that litigation to us being resolved in 180 days seems like no big deal. Stability in the life of a child about where they're supposed to be or going to be, 180 days is like a super big thing.

So I constantly remind myself to get out of my appellate lawyer mode about what seems reasonable to me as an appellate lawyer versus what creates stability for these children. And that's a policy issue that's beyond my pay grade and while I'll never be a policy person, but I think it's worth reiterating to the Court that that's an important thing that you've always got to keep in mind.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I think those are good points, Lisa, and we're now going to take a vote on everybody in the room who is anti-parent. Justice Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I would just like to say for the record that I do not think trial judges will not -- will -- will waive the right to appeal when it's inappropriate. We already have this in criminal

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cases, and they don't do that. So I -- I am pushing back
  on that statement of yours, for the record, but I do --
                 MS. HOBBS: And I appreciate that, Judge
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   Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
  appreciate that we do have to get these things timely, and
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  while we're at it, let's eliminate en banc review. That's
  a long story that I'll tell you all later, privately.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're all throwing rocks
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   out here. Yeah. Lisa, as I was listening to you it
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   struck me that the hearing approach would advance the
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   interest that you're talking about, because it would
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   eliminate this -- this business of a written certificate
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  by a lawyer that somebody could then go in and
   collaterally attack later because, "Well, you did not try
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   to get hold of me," but anyway, that's neither here nor
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  there.
           Justice Gray.
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                 MS. HOBBS: That's also a fair point.
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                                                        Let's
   all recognize that these are very hard issues with
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   competing interests, and I'm glad I'm not the
   Supreme Court who has to actually decide on what the right
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   rule is, because it's complicated.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There is another
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   complicating factor that Bill is going to have to factor
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   into this whole process somehow or another. Remember that
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you've still got a right to file a motion for new trial
   that is running that cannot begin to run until the
   judgment is signed, and then you've got your 20 days to
   file your notice of appeal, but you've got 30 days to file
  your motion for new trial, and it may or may not affect
   the judgment, but I mean, it's -- it gets gnarly.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           So,
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   Justice Christopher, do you want to formulate for the
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  purposes of a vote a -- a proposal on timing when the time
   for this hearing ought to be?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                              Well, I
  believe that the time for the hearing should be at the
   time of the oral rendition by the judge of or the receipt
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   of the jury verdict or at the time of the actual signing
   of the judgment, which would require a second hearing.
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                                           It's either-or.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
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                                               Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
                                           So that's the
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              How many people think that that's the right way
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  proposal.
   to go on timing? If you do, raise your hand.
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                 How many people think that is not the right
   way to go on timing? So 20 to 2. Justice Christopher's
   thought on timing is -- seems to be the consensus of the
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   committee. Bill, what else -- what else can we do to help
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   you at this point?
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HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: We cannot talk about
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  en banc right now.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, yes,
  please, let's talk about it.
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: I think that's --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's not
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   possible to do an en banc hearing in 180 days, and so, you
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   know, we should eliminate en banc.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So en banc is off
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  the table for discussion. We'll take our morning break
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  and be back at 11:05.
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                 (Recess from 10:50 a.m. to 11:10 a.m.)
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right, let's get back
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  to it, everybody. We're back on the record, and we have
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   discussed as much as we can the suits affecting the
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  parent-child relationship, which is agenda item one.
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   Bill, agenda item two, will come back next time as well.
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE:
                                        Yes.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So agenda item two, out
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   of time appeals in parental rights termination cases, is
   dependent upon what it looks like coming out of this
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   meeting on the first agenda item. So we caught Richard
   offguard here. He thought he had plenty of time.
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                                I'm ready to go.
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                                  Yes, sir.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    So we'll move to
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protective order registry forms.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So Senate Bill 325, which passed the last Legislature, they call Monica's Law, is instruction from the Legislature to the Office of Court Administration to establish an online registry for the posting of -- or for processing and posting of protective orders, and as presently conceived, it would be elected with the victim or the target of the violence whether less or more or no public information is made available, but the database needs to be there for law enforcement as well as for the public.

And so OCA is -- it's their responsibility. They have staff. There may even be some federal money available perhaps to do this process, but it's just getting started. The deadline is next summer, and so they've got to move quickly, but this is coming to this committee for information and perhaps, you know, discussion, but not input entirely yet because we don't have the details worked out. But in the process I realized that this protective order information is needed not only for the registry to post some information about perpetrators of violence, but there's also it's important to the criminal reporting system at the state level and the federal system and the registry that needs to be checked in connection with a licensed vendor sale of

firearms.

And so what probably we need to do is not only have the database designed and implemented and a website, a web portal, put there by OCA, but we also need to design an intake form to capture the information that's going to go into the protective order registry, but also the criminal database and the federal database and with sufficient information to check off the data that goes to the registry for those who are purchasing guns.

So the tabs that you have is a simple summary, if you will, of the project, and then behind that is a summary of Senate Bill 325. That was Tab C, I think, and then Tab D is the highlights of the registry as conceived by Rule 325; and then Tab E is an indication of the databases that would need to capture this information or should capture this information, although not mandated by the Senate Bill; and Tab F is the so-called Brady worksheet, which is information that the federal law requires be evaluated in selling firearms; and then Tab G is the Texas Criminal Information Center, TCIC protective order data entry form, which is a form promulgated by the department of public services -- Department of Public Safety, but is not required, I believe, at this time.

And so what I did was reached out to OCA, and I met Kimberly Piechowiak, who is with us here today.

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Kimberly spent over 20 years prosecuting family violence
   cases in Bexar County and then has been involved in
   training and dissemination of family violence crimes
   against women information to a variety of places,
   including in municipal courts, including the law
   enforcement agencies, and whatnot. And Kimberly has --
  her job is a domestic violence training attorney for the
   Office of Court Administration; and she has been out there
   on the field talking to people, trying to tell them what
  the law requires and hearing what they have to say back to
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  her; and so Kimberly, I'm very happy is able to come
   today; and she's going to talk to us a little bit about
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   the OCA project, how they're going to undertake this
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  mission to get it done by the December 2020 and the
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  possibility that in the process of getting information and
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  the database and the linkages in place for the registry
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   for protective orders, that we can capture the information
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   that we need for DPS and for federal purposes.
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   Kimberly, welcome, and please go ahead.
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 Thank you so much.
                                                      Ι
   really appreciate y'all having me today.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Speak up, would you?
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Take the mic over there.
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: I'm usually not told I'm
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  not loud enough, but I will, since we have someone taking
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stuff down and on the phone. All right. How is that? Can you hear me? MR. LEVY: Yes. 3 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Okay. Very good. my name is Kimberly Piechowiak, and I'm so happy to be Thank you so much for letting me come and talk about this today. The registry itself, we are in the very, very beginning stages of planning for this. had our kick-off meeting within OCA. We've also met with one of the authors of the bill, Representative Landgraf, 10 and also the mother of -- I mean the father of the woman 11 who was killed, Monica Deming, in the Midland-Odessa area; and based upon that, her father, who is retired law 13 enforcement, and the family had talked to the 14 representative about what can we do to see if there's a 15 way that -- at least there's a possibility that victims --16 not victims, but potential victims can check in a database to see if this is a person that has a protective order, 18 because he had protective orders against him, but she 19 didn't know that. 20 21 So, anyway, we met with him the other day, so we're in the process of getting everything started. Our IT department is. We are building the database 23 in-house, so we are having a fair amount of control about 24 25 how that's going to work, but I want to make sure to note

that this is a database and a registry that is going to run parallel to the existing databases that are -protective orders are currently reported to; and so even though this is a separate type of issue, what we definitely want to kind of look at is being able to use this as an opportunity with the forms that Mr. Orsinger was talking about, to kind of close some gaps that the ladies to my right are way, way, way familiar with of problems that we've had with dealing with getting protective orders properly entered into TCIC, which feeds up into the national systems, so that a person is flagged that they cannot have a firearm. But there's lots of gaps in how that happens, mostly because there is not really a 14 mandated procedure on how that needs to be kind of set out for the courts to be able to make sure that information is going to the right place at the right time.

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There is a form, again, promulgated by DPS, that has a ton of information on it, and you have an example of it. It's kind of a nightmare how it's written, but that's okay, but it's also not mandated. jurisdictions use it, but it's not consistent across the board, and some jurisdictions actually change up that form a little bit, and sometimes people don't use it at all, and I know that there are times when there's no form that is filled out, and so then we're having folks at the

police departments who do the data entry for TCIC having to like dig through protective orders and find this information. And so one of the biggest issues is making sure that whether or not someone is legally prohibited from having a firearm, whether or not that is actually plain enough on the current form, and we'll talk about that here in a minute.

First of all, the registry, there is a public facing component, and then there is a law enforcement justice personnel facing component. There is very limited information that the public would be able to access on this, and they would need to be able to search it by just a couple of different things, maybe a name and a case number, things like that. However, the information that is going to be available to them is only available because the victim of that incident, the complainant or the applicant, has actively affirmatively given permission for that to go into that public facing registry; and that is for obviously victim safety, in small towns, but not necessarily in small towns.

If -- I mean, my last name is Piechowiak.

There's three of us in Bexar County. It's me, my husband, and my kid, and so if, you know, Piechowiak, Daniel, has a protective order against him it's pretty easy to figure out who is the victim in that case, and so -- or at least

the applicant in that case, and so he we have those kinds of issues, and we don't want to make -- we wanted to make sure that the victims are not -- this is not another obstacle for them to try to seek assistance from the system, and so that's kind of why that's there.

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So what the result of that is going to be, that there is going to be not complete records on every single protective order is going to be available to the public, but every single protective order after

September 1 of 2020 will be entered into this registry for purposes of -- for law enforcement, for prosecutors, who currently don't have direct access to this information.

What I really, really like most about it is it will include an image of the actual order, and if anyone here has ever actually seen a hit off of TCIC, it's horrible to read. It makes absolutely no sense and oftentimes it's incomplete. So this would be something that law enforcement would be able to check when they're in their car, and let's say they're — they need to make a traffic stop, and they will check to see like, okay, is there a protective order on this person and what does that order actually say, as opposed to just some of the kind of sporadic information that's currently in TCIC. The applications will be also entered into the system, but just very, very little information, not going to be

accessible to the public.

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Magistrates orders for emergency protection will be entered into the system, and those along with ex parte orders, temporary ex parte orders -- protective orders, will not be accessible to the public either. we have a very kind of a narrow classification of the types of orders that would be eligible to be accessible by the public, because the great majority of protective orders in Texas are magistrates' orders of emergency protection, usually about 60 percent, and so there's still going to be a bunch that are not out there, but because they're -- the due process that is given is a little bit more minimal. In magistrates' orders, they don't want to have it out there for the public to see, which I totally understand, but that will be, however, accessible to law enforcement, prosecutors, other users, potentially judges. We haven't a hundred percent figured out -- the bill doesn't say so directly, and my thought on that is most judges are going to have -- their clerk is going to have access to it because they're going to be the ones actually doing the data entry and can actually pull up that information for their judge. We have a few, like JPs, and muni court judges in very small jurisdiction that maybe they also act as their own clerk, and so that may be an exception, but we're still kind of on the seeing where we

are on that.

The -- let me see here. I want to make sure I've gotten everything for the highlights here. I did a little handout just about the current databases. I wanted to talk a little bit about the Brady Act. The Brady Act is basically -- it's many, many things, but one of the things it does, is the federal -- lays out the federal requirements for someone to not be able to possess a firearm; and so whenever something gets entered, like a protective order gets entered into the system, there is this little tiny, itty bitty, if you look at the protective order data entry form, I would say it's probably about -- it's right under the protective order conditions, and it says "Brady indicator."

Number one, I hate how it's written because it says, "No, respondent is not disqualified." It kind of reminds me of, yes, we have no bananas, or "Yes, the respondent is disqualified." So the yes is what says that this person cannot have a firearm. The problem with this Brady indicator is in 2015 the government accountability office on the fed side did -- they weren't just on Texas. They did it for all states. They ran all protective orders that were actively in that system for like that one year period of 2015, and only about 10 percent of the Texas protective orders had this Brady indicator attached

to it.

While not all protective orders in Texas would qualify for this federal prohibition, because it's a very narrow type of protective order with narrow -- a much narrower list of relationships it would cover, I guarantee you it's more than 10 percent. About in 2014, we headed up a project where we just -- and I harassed people in this room -- wanting to know anybody that lives, breathes, touches, looks at, has anything to do with protective orders. We did a study, and I went and talked to people in person, we did a survey, and I called people. We talked to as many people as we could from the judges all the way down, survivors, to law enforcement, to the poor clerk at the police department that is stuck doing the data entry, to clerks who are having to chase down information because they want to pass this information on.

We were able to highlight some of the problems, and some of those things have actually been fixed in legislation in recent sessions, but we still have some other issues. One of the groups that I talked to specifically was the Texas Criminal Justice Information Users Group, and these are the folks that do a lot of training for the communications folks in law enforcement that do the actual data entry, like dispatchers, things like that; and the discussion that we had was if they

don't know specifically that this is -- whether or not this is a Brady indicated case or not, they just enter unknown; and that's where that technically 10 percent have an actual Brady disqualifier attached to it. And so I -- it's also just to kind of give you an idea of something that I think would be beneficial, that as we are looking at the registry and the mandate for -- for y'all is to -- there's a specific form that allows the -- would allow the applicant to consent to have public access or to withdraw consent for public access, and that those forms would be promulgated through the Supreme Court.

But what Mr. Orsinger and I got to talking about and what we have been talking about and I have been talking about with all of the people that have been having issues, is if this is an opportunity to take the existing -- something like the existing form, make it a little more or a lot more user-friendly, but also include that sample checklist that I included in -- that we included in your materials that helps determine what the Brady indicator actually -- the questions that needs to be asked to determine if there is a Brady indicator. And what I love about this, I stole it shamelessly from Nebraska, but the other thing I love about it is one of the premier protective order experts in Texas that worked for Texas Council on Family Violence, she actually is the

one who gave input on this list.

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She has now since moved to Cleveland, why would she want to like go live with her husband who got transferred to Cleveland, but she's a huge, huge resource and a great expert on this stuff, and I love the actual checklist because it has specific yes/no answers that need to be figured out; and if everything is a yes on that one, including the narrow definition of the relationships, was there due process, was there hearing, what does it -- what does this order prohibit, all of those things are a determination, and then -- then that is what will -- the information that would say, yes, we need to put this as a Brady indicated case; and we could include something along those lines in a form that -- that can be used both by law enforcement for TCIC data entry purposes and also by the courts to be able to make sure that all the information for both the registry and the TCIC system has everything it needs to have, then I think that that would streamline some things, especially if we can include this Brady indicator stuff because we know that there is more that should not have firearms than what are indicated in the system currently.

Mandatory would be fantastic in lots of ways. Who would fill out that form is going to depend on a couple of different things. What would probably be most

helpful is if there is a section of that form that is for sure filled out by the applicant; and that's going to be the same things that are in the application, addresses, phone numbers, all of the information about the respondent that's important to have; but there's other parts in the TCIC, current TCIC data entry form that they have no business filling out, things like the protective order conditions.

I sometimes will have officers just pass
this to a victim at a scene and they want to apply for a
magistrate's order of emergency protection, and the poor
victim is like checking off like it's a Christmas list,
and that's not what this is for. It's supposed to be a
guide of what the actual order says so that the data entry
person can get it into the system, and so I think if we
had portions of it that were sectioned off, you know, for
court use only for those certain things to be done,
sectioned off for the applicant or their attorney or their
advocate to make sure that all of the pertinent
demographic information is in there, to get -- it gets
entered, I think that those things are things that are
potentially good to do.

The biggest issue right now is even though we have this form promulgated by DPS, it is not mandatory. In fact, there are not too many procedures about how this

information is gathered and forwarded that would make sure that there is some consistency across the board. So that's kind of what we're looking at as far as any type of a form based upon -- and having the opportunity to do this as part of the registry forms. Certainly we want to make sure that it's included in the protective order registry -- I'm sorry, protective order application kit, and have the option in the actual application protective order kit talk about -- about specifically explaining to victims, applicants, exactly what this consent looks like, what that will be, what that won't be, what the public will have access to or not have access to, only if they agree.

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We know that certainly someone who is going through this and they're applying at the time, they may not be in any kind of condition to actually make that big of a decision, but we need to make sure, and part of what I will be doing is I'm helping on the subject matter expert on the registry. But then I will be -- so y'all will be seeing me again, lucky you -- doing the training of all of the different players in this; and that's part of the mandate under the bill, is for the training to happen and that's probably going to be me. And so, but we want to make sure that the applicants are very aware of exactly what their rights are, that they are not required

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to make it accessible to the public, but they are welcome
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   to.
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                  I'm trying to think of what else
   specifically that I missed. I'm sure there's something.
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   Does anybody have any questions, or, Mr. Orsinger, is
   there anything that I talked about, or did I miss
   something big?
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Maybe if you could just
  briefly explain the NCIC and the TCIC.
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Yes.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And then there's another --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey, Richard, Rusty had
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  his hand up.
                Rusty, did you have a question?
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                 MR. HARDIN:
                             Yeah.
                                     I've been looking
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   through it trying to see, is there any procedure in the
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   act for removal of it, if, in fact, it was found to
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  wrongfully been granted?
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: And that is what -- there
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   is nothing specifically in the act. That is something
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   that we are already talking about, because for sure what
   it talks about, that it will be -- if it's vacated or if
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   it expired, that there's a note in the record. However,
   certainly we know -- maybe sometimes they're vacated
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  because maybe an applicant came back and said we worked
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   this out, we don't want this order anymore.
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probably needs to be there but showed that it was vacated for that reason, but if it's vacated because, let's say, the ex parte order is granted but then by the time they get to the hearing the judge determines like there is not enough here to do a protective order and then -- and then what we were talking about, and Mr. Orsinger, on the phone we were talking about this the other day, was that specifically in the order to say "and to order removal from the protective order registry." So that that TxPO is no longer there either, and of course if it's on appeal 10 11 or it's found somewhere up the chain that it shouldn't have been filed -- I mean, it shouldn't have been granted, 12 same thing. 13 And so there's no specifics in the bill for 14 that, but that is definitely something that we are wanting 15 to make sure there is a mechanism for. It has to get done 16 pretty much within about 24 hours, which is going to be kind of crazy, but it's going to make it so that it 18 doesn't just kind of lay around and it was vacated two 19 weeks ago and it's still languishing in the system. 20 21 That's the goal. Yes, sir. MR. ORSINGER: Chip? 22 23 Yeah, I'm sorry. Go ahead. THE COURT: Yeah. One of my concerns to 2.4 MR. ORSINGER: 25 follow-up, Rusty, is ex parte orders that are not --

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they're either abandoned or there's no protective order
   granted after a fact hearing --
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                 MR. HARDIN: Yeah, that's my concern.
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Exactly.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: -- which suggests -- yeah.
   Which suggests a possibility that the evidence that was
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   support of the ex parte order does not stand up in court.
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And the statute I believe
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  provides that the public registry will not reflect an
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   ex parte order.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
                                          Well, it's not
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   going to reflect an ex parte order on the public side, but
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   it will be included on the justice personnel side, but,
   again, I think it's really important that once that
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   determination is made that it's something that should not
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   have been granted, then for sure then having a mechanism
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   for the removal, but the only thing that's going to be out
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   to the public is going to be actually issued protective
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   orders under the Family Code. And that's it.
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                 Not the ex parte orders, not the
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  magistrates' orders of emergency protection, but we
   definitely want to get those vacated orders that either,
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   like I said, maybe applicant didn't show up and abandoned
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   the case, then, okay, there was no hearing really so we
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need to take that out, kind of thing, and so we're looking
  at a mechanism to do that, but it is absolutely -- that's
  one of the first things we started talking about at our
   kick-off meeting, is to make sure that we figure out a way
   to get that done.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: How do you determine that an
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   order is an ex parte order? You. Your agency. You said
   that --
                                  My agency?
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
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                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 You said that your agency
  will not report or keep a record of an ex parte order.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: How do you determine that an
14
  order was ex parte?
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Well, see, and that is --
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  that is another thing that this form needs to be adjusted.
   Right now it doesn't really talk about what kind of an
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   order is this. What we would want to do is have a spot on
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   the -- on that order say is this an ex parte order, is
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   this a magistrate's order, is this a permanent order. And
   actually, the folks who actually will be entering that are
   the clerks -- are the clerks' offices, and we'll be doing
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   lots and lots of training on exactly which ones need to go
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   and which ones don't.
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MR. MUNZINGER: Do you understand that the only orders that are to be entered in your registry are those issued pursuant to Chapters 83 and 85 of the Family Code and 17.292 of the CCP? 5 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Yes, I am aware, but that is something that is going to be only for justice 6 personnel who have access, restricted access, not for the public to be able to see. 9 MR. MUNZINGER: My concern is for the parties to a divorce case where -- and I don't do this 10 11 kind of work, but in the old days if you filed a petition for divorce, you asked the judge for an order saying keep the guy from coming around the house and hollering --13 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Sure. 14 MR. MUNZINGER: -- and so forth, and that's 15 16 what I envision as an exparte order that routinely issued, and the possibility of injuring someone's 17 reputation or having some adverse inference drawn against 18 you for having your name in this registry trouble me 19 because of that reason. 20 21 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right. MR. MUNZINGER: And I don't know what you 22 have that you are doing to protect people whose 23 reputations and lives can be affected by an improper, 24 25 unjustified entry into your system of an order that is

routine and sought out of spite or something instead of fear for violence. That concerns me.

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MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right, and I -- and I certainly understand, and that is not something we want to happen either, and again, that's been noted. We are just barely into this process, and we want to make sure that we build in those kind of safeguards, but also if there is an order that is like that, that was done routinely, if it's still an order then that's fine, but if it's a situation where it is later on determined to have not been a valid order, then that's when we would want to answer Mr. Hardin's question, to be able to get it removed as soon as that legal determination has been made, and then we would get notice of that, and then ultimately -- and there's requirements for the clerks to notify OCA to do that, and that it's not a valid order and we're going to put it in place.

Any ideas about how to do that and especially under what circumstances, this is my call out to all of the experts in the room who know way more about the family side of the world than I do. Any suggestions, ideas, thoughts, whatever. I brought business cards.

I -- anything that you can send to us, because this is the time to be addressing those things.

MR. LOW: Let me ask one question.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy, then Rusty.
1
                                                        Speak
  up, Buddy.
2
                           There is a statute, like somebody
3
                 MR. LOW:
  has been indicted and it goes on your record. You can
  file a suit, give notice to the police, and a lot of
  people for removal. I mean, is there any type thing you
  have for removal of your name on that?
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Oh, and that's one of the
8
   things that we're talking about. We don't have anything
   specifically in the bill, but that's something we want to
10
11
  do.
12
                 MR. LOW: Well, that statute gives a
  quideline of how an indictment removed. You might read
13
   that statute. I haven't been charged, so I haven't had to
  use it --
15
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
16
                 MR. LOW: -- but I'm familiar with it.
17
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
18
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 Chip?
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have equipment failure
20
  over here.
21
               Rusty.
                 MR. HARDIN: You might look along with what
22
   Buddy is saying, you might look at the criminal statute
23
   that allows you to file for expunction.
2.4
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                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
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MR. HARDIN: And whatever you do here
  allowed that -- make clear that that statute can be used
   for a particular protective order under some
   circumstances.
5
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
 6
                 MR. HARDIN: You have to figure out the
   deal. My concern here is every time we for a very, very
  nobel reason for a very legitimate problem, we forget
   about that 5 or 10 percent that should have never been
   applied to, and that's more than 15 or 20 --
10
11
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Whatever it is, yes.
                 MR. HARDIN: And that's my concern here.
12
  For instance, in Harris County, if somebody is charged
13
  with any type of domestic violence case --
14
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 Uh-huh.
15
                 MR. HARDIN: -- they will not be given a
16
  bond until a protective order has been entered.
  automatic. So only an allegation gets a protective order,
18
  and that protective order stays throughout the period of
19
   time that case pends. It may be in effect for a year, two
20
21
  years, even longer --
22
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
                 MR. HARDIN: -- and it was not entered based
23
   on any evidence, only based on the allegation.
24
25
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Right.
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MR. HARDIN: So as you're drafting this, if you could keep that in mind it would be helpful.

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Absolutely, sir, and

2.4

actually, I'm glad y'all mentioned the expunction aspect of it because part of what we have hired -- I think we've hired this person, but it's the person who actually works on the expunction issues, and they will also be the ones that will be assisting with this as well, to make sure we're checking and doing and staying on top of it.

MR. HARDIN: Right. If it's a procedure where the lawyer when it's concluded or it's determined to be invalid, has statutorily shown that he can invoke that expunction statute.

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right, and that -- and that is definitely something that we want to make sure is included, and then ultimately you're right, put into the statute.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: Richard Orsinger, could you tell me briefly what Chapters 83 and 85, what are the conditions precedent to the entry of such an order like this? Because in my experience many years ago it was routine for the wife's lawyer who filed a divorce case to seek an ex parte order, and they were routinely granted.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, let me comment that

there was a problem in *U.S. vs. Emerson* case where there
was a routine temporary orders issued in a divorce case
out of the family law practice manual with like 50
different paragraphs about not protecting -- not
destroying evidence, about protecting community property,
and in there, you were not supposed -- It's just very
vague language about not to threaten or demean the other
party.

Well, in that *U.S. vs. Emerson* prosecution, that's standard TRO that was issued or temporary orders issued in almost every divorce case that followed the form book, which is most of them. The federal government indicted the husband for possessing a firearm in violation of that orde, under the then violence of women -- Violence Against Women's Act, and that particular case gained notoriety because it was a ruling by the Fifth Circuit about the right to keep and bear arms. But it shows the difficulty in allowing sweeping with too broad a brush about what constitutes an order that should trigger a forfeiture of the right to keep and bear arms.

So I think that this bill is designed to limit to the chapter on family protective orders, and I don't have the Family Code language in front of me, although I can look it up here in a minute, but I believe you have to show that there was not only a violent act,

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but also a prospect of future violence.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Exactly, exactly.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER: And so we're not talking
 3
   about a generic prohibition against committing future
              I think there needs to be evidence that some
   event occurred --
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  That is correct.
7
8
                 MR. ORSINGER: -- and not only that an event
   occurred, but that there is a prospect of future violence;
10
   am I right?
                                  That is correct.
11
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                                    That's
   why it's very narrowly tailored to those two things --
   it's the ex parte order that says, okay, while we're
13
  waiting for a hearing, we have shown -- there's a showing
  that there's been violence and there's a prospect of
15
  violence in the future, and then once it becomes -- and if
16
   it becomes permanent order after hearing, that's Chapter
17
   85.
18
                                So you can see that that's an
                 MR. ORSINGER:
19
20
   important safeguard that's built in compared to the old
   days in Emerson where it's just a generic statement about
21
   don't threaten the other party suddenly became the
   foundation of a federal indictment.
23
                 MR. MUNZINGER: And that's the very problem
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  here. You have nonjudicial people who are making the
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decision as to whether or not someone is or isn't on a
   registry, and whether they're on a registry has an
   enormous potential for harm to that person's life, without
  protection, the protection of -- and I mean -- do not mean
  to demean clerks, but they aren't judicial officials, and
   they are not weighing the effect on people's reputations
  and lives of the entry into a government database. Good
   God, to get Sears to correct your account when Sears
   existed you had to move Mount Etna, you had to fight tooth
10
   and toenail to get a dadgum computer changed for a
11
  10-dollar item. What are you going to do with government
   to get them to change something for God sakes that was
   inadvertently put in there. This has a lot of risk, in my
13
   opinion, to innocent people, and it's very troubling.
14
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 Might I respond, sir?
15
                                 I'm not arguing with you.
16
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Oh, I know you're not, but
17
18
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 I'm just very serious about
19
20
   things.
21
                 THE REPORTER:
                                Wait, wait, wait.
                                 I talk this way in my sleep.
22
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  So do I.
23
                              Even here. Even here.
24
                 MR. HUGHES:
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
25
                                 It is --
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MR. HARDIN: Can we have an amen?

2.4

MR. MUNZINGER: It is a free society that people's reputations and lives can be so terribly impacted by a clerk's decision that it can have enormous effects not only on their criminal liability, their right to exercise possession of a gun, but other rights and their reputations. Why can't I subpoena this registry and use it in a trial? Why can't I get this registry and use it as evidence that this fellow is prone to violence or hot tempered or whatever it might be? There are all kinds of problems with this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Sharena.

MS. GILLILAND: Just as a practical matter, I think one thing that would help the clerks in thinking about designing these forms, if you had something similar to our criminal judgments that certain information has to be on there, because the clerks use that on the criminal side to report convictions in the CJIS database. If you had something where the prosecutor or the magistrate or the judge is checking "This is pursuant to Family Code 85," and kind of a summary of what's in the order, I think that would help in the data entry into the database.

I know the clerks struggle when you have to take what's in this order and summarize it down into a database. Things like recording for NIC somebody that

can't have a handgun, and you see some of the things that happen out there with shootings, that's something I know in our office we're so concerned about. We don't want to be the office that misses that checkmark. On the same token, I don't want to be the office putting somebody's name in a database that says he's prone to family violence if it shouldn't be there.

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.

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MS. GILLILAND: So anything that we could have that goes through the process kind of summarizing things of, yes, it needs to go in or it's pursuant to whatever would help at that clerk staff level to be able to properly enter the information. I also think at this point in promulgating forms and thinking about forms, if we could put a little meat into it on the applicant's completing some of this information, we get stuck in between the courts and law enforcement that there's not enough information provided to fully put into TCIC to make it effective; and the clerks find themselves hunting down attorneys, hunting down applicants, saying please give us something -- law enforcement is in the same situation -please give us something to put into the system to make this an effective order, and because they're not required to provide that --

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.

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1
                 MS. GILLILAND:
                                 -- we can -- we can reach
2
   out --
3
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 All day long.
                 MS. GILLILAND: -- and if we don't get it,
 4
   it's just not an effective database, whether on the TCIC
   side or the OCA database.
7
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 Right.
                                          If I can tag onto
   that and also address a little bit about what you said,
8
   that is kind of the biggest issue it has been for trying
  to have the consistency, number one, of being able to get
10
11
   this kind across the board the same way; and I think a
   form that is required as part of the filing at the very
   beginning is what's very, very helpful.
13
                 Just to circle back on yours, Mr. Munzinger,
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   I understand, and I absolutely agree, and this is the
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   conversations we're having as well. However, the orders
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   that are going to be included in this registry, especially
   that's going to be public facing, those are already public
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   record, and they are after an order and after the judge
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20
   has had a hearing or it's an agreed order.
21
   applications are not going to be out there for the public
   to see.
2.2
23
                 Law enforcement may be able to see it, but
   it's going to note that this is just an application, and I
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   guarantee you we're all very much aware of, okay, we know
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that there are enough folks out in the world that file
  applications for protective orders that shouldn't file
   them, but as far as just kind of having these kind of
  nebulous sort of allegations on this website that people
  can decide to poke around in at 3:00 o'clock in the
  morning when they're board, that's not going to be the
   case, and the clerks are very -- I have not had -- and
   I've had lots of conversations with clerks also, but very,
   very interested in making sure that what is going in is
   accurate and timely, but think we just need to kind of the
10
11
  mechanism to kind of make that happen, but your concern
   is -- we all have that concern, and that's what we're
   trying to figure out.
13
                          So --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           And, Sharena, you
14
   and Nancy didn't take his comments personally, did you?
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                 MS. GILLILAND:
                                 Oh, no.
16
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
17
                                 Thank you.
                 MS. GILLILAND: He talks like that all the
18
  time.
19
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I thought they
   were terribly insulting, but Skip has been waiting
21
   patiently with his hand up for at least 20 minutes.
23
                 MR. WATSON: No, no, no.
                                           I'm just trying to
   figure out what precisely what we're doing.
2.4
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   understand it, the bill has been passed. These nice
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people are trying to implement it, and we're trying to
  help refine the forms, et cetera, et cetera, so that they
  do their job, but do the least damage possible in doing
   that job; and to do that, to help the forms discriminate,
   I'm sorry, but, Richard, I need a kind of elementary
   school language to understand what an application for a
   protective order under Chapter 82 is versus a protective
   order issued under Chapters 83 and 85.
9
                 I had no idea we had multiple chapters of
  protective orders, and clearly they're different, and I
10
  would just like some basic information about what kind of
11
   species of animal each of these application versus orders
12
   is, and I don't have a clue. I mean, I swore I would
13
14 never do another family law case 35 years ago, and that is
   one oath I have kept, so I don't know.
15
                 MR. ORSINGER: But I think it would be
16
   helpful to the committee to do a memo about that. We're
  not asked to come up with any language or approve any
18
   language today.
19
                 MR. WATSON:
20
                              I know.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is high level
21
   comments.
22
                 MR. ORSINGER:
23
                                Yeah.
                 MR. WATSON: I know. I'm just trying to
2.4
25
   figure out what we're talking about.
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MR. ORSINGER: Well, it's a valid point, and so we'll spend some time preparing the context. It didn't seem like -- it seemed like that was premature today.

MR. WATSON: Okay.

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MR. ORSINGER: Because we don't -- this is more of like an information, like, guys, this project is underway now. It's going to be coming back here before too long, and you're going to have to look at it. One of the important things to me about that everyone should be aware is the -- while the bill just says design a registry, there is also a very, very important public need to get this information up the food chain to the right agencies, which are not only statewide but nationwide and which are specified in the NICS, the national instant crime background check system, and in order for that to make it all the way to the top, we've got to have the information they want in their databases. And so it seems to me like this is the perfect opportunity when we're designing a form for our registry to go ahead and be sure that we have got the information to get into the TCIC, which gets to the NCIC, which gets to the NICS.

If we don't do it now, it will probably continue to be just a mess where 10 percent of the forms are filled out and people aren't even using the only one form promulgated by the DPS. So it does seem to me that

we ought to use this opportunity to make a form that's useful all the way up to the top, but it's still being talked about. It hadn't been designed yet, and there are going to have to be some DPS people to sit down at the table and --

MS. PIECHOWIAK: And that's kind of the next thing that we're working on. We have people that we are bugging to come be part of the users group or part of the advisory group, as we're putting together this — this thing from the beginning as part of the planning process, because there is just so many different components that we want to make sure we have all of that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip just wanted the ABC's of a protective order. Roger.

MR. HUGHES: Well, I see the need for having some procedure to get your order about you off -- off the list if you don't think it's appropriate, and some people have talked about analogizing it to expungement. Well, having recently done an expungement case, I had a couple of questions. The first one is, who are going to be the stakeholders about applying to get your name off the list? I mean, is this going to be a court procedure; and if so, who is going to be the defendant? Because in an expungement proceeding, you file an application to expunge, there are several different government agencies

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that have to be notified, and every last one of them gets
  to come in and say "no." And not only that, every last
  one of them, if they don't show up and say "no" get to
  file a bill of review.
5
                 So, in other words, if you don't get all of
  these agencies lined up, your expungement petition could
6
  be opposed and you don't know it's safe, if you get a
   favorable ruling, until after the bill of review,
8
   expedited appeal, whatever you call it, six-month appeal,
10
  has run.
11
                 So that's one thing that has to be done.
   The other thing of it is -- and I say that, because I see
   that this registry is going to be curated by the
13
  Department of Public Safety.
14
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 Actually, OCA.
15
                 MR. HUGHES: Oh, okay.
16
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: We're getting their
17
   cooperation and help, but yes.
18
                 MR. HUGHES: Well, I know that DPS is very
19
20
   interested in these expungement issue precisely because
   they're always very concerned who gets to have guns, and
21
   they're real concerned when people with arrest records and
   criminal histories are suddenly able to get -- want to get
23
   firearms because of expungement orders.
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                 The other thing of it is if you're going to
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analogize it to expungement, my impression -- and that's
  an unstudied one -- is that the expungement statute is
  kind of like the U.S. tax code. Every tax question is
   answered, "Taxpayer owes more money." Every expungement
  issue seems to be answered, "No, you don't get it," and
  that's my personal impression. So I'm going to say we
  need to sort of decide at the outset how we want to slant
  the -- the procedures, whether we want to draw it narrowly
   so that you -- the answer to most legal question is going
  to be "No, you don't get your name off the list," or do we
10
11
   want to draw it broadly to give some liberality to it, and
  that's just purely an observation.
12
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: That's a great suggestion.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard, these protective
14
   orders are -- they're not -- they're not broadened to say,
15
   "John Smith, you know, you're violent. Don't be violent
16
   anymore." It's "John Smith, don't be violent towards Mary
17
   Jones."
18
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Yeah, I agree.
19
   targeted to the applicant and members of the family.
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Who is this?
21
                 MR. ORSINGER: Do you agree with that?
22
23
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Yes, absolutely.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So they're the subject of
24
25
   the protective order?
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MR. ORSINGER: Right. So it wouldn't be a broad-based -- I mean, the court has the power to make a broad-based surrender all of your firearms or, you know, unload them and put them in a gun safe, and they do that sometimes --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So --6 MR. ORSINGER: -- but this particular thing 7 is designed to adjudicate the claim that this particular 8 victim was a victim of family violence, but I think it also -- protection extends to anyone in the family, even 10 11 if they weren't the target of the violence. Do you agree with that or not, Kim? 12 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Usually, it's to the people 13 14 within the household, but they do everything they can to have those people named. Also protected parties named, 15 also certain locations. You know, if we have a 16 magistrate's order, it's actually certain locations, but if they decide they want -- they need to get together and 18 talk, they can meet at the McDonald's and do it. Whereas, 19 the permanent protective order might be no contact 20 whatsoever, but all of those are very, very specifically 21 delineated in the order. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So the subjects of the protective orders will be named, like "Mary Jones." 24

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Yes.

25

"Johnny Jones." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 1 MS. PIECHOWIAK: That's correct. 2 "Billy Jones." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 3 MR. ORSINGER: But the anticipation is, is 4 5 that the registry will not reflect the victims or the applicant's names, correct? MS. PIECHOWIAK: That is correct. This is 7 only going to be respondent's information that's in there, 8 and it's going to be very, very narrow, and it's not going to be for applications or ex parte orders or magistrates' 10 11 orders. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, why is it just the 12 respondent? What's the basis for saying that? 13 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Well, there is a privacy 14 There is a safety issue, and having -- we already issue. 15 have a lot of folks -- while we do have a percentage of 16 folks who seek protective orders that probably don't 17 deserve a protective order, we have a whole lot more out 18 there that probably should get a protective order, but 19 20 they are already scared to come do it. And so in order to keep safety to the forefront, because if we're doing 21 something that's not safe, then we should not be doing it, I don't care what any of us -- our jobs are here, but it 23 comes down to making sure that those -- those applicants 2.4 25 are safe and feel like, okay, I'm going to not be the

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object of harassment, ridicule based upon I'm showing up
   in this public database.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But, Kim, doesn't the
3
   statute say that the registry has to include the name of a
  person who the subject of the protective order?
5
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Subject of the protective
 6
7
   order is the respondent.
8
                 MR. ORSINGER: In fact, the statute says --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Y'all just said a minute
9
  ago it was the Jones family.
10
11
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Look, the name of this --
   generally, the subject of the protective order is the
  person who is being told not to do something.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, not necessarily.
14
  mean, the person that's being told not to do something to
15
   somebody else, they're both subjects of the protective
16
  order.
17
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right, but my understanding
18
  as far as when I talk to folks who do this on a regular --
19
   on a very regular basis, generally, the subject of the
20
21
   protective order is -- is meant to mean respondent.
   wish it did say "respondent." That would have made it a
  much, much cleaner statute.
23
                                   Well, whoever did the
2.4
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
25
   summary said "respondent." That's what got me thinking
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about it.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: I did the summary.
                                                      I did
2
3
  the summary.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Well, and, you
   know, maybe there's legislative history, but the text of
5
   the statute says --
7
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- "the name of a person
8
   who is the subject of the protective order."
10
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And we have to implement
  the text --
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- unless there's some
14
15 reason not to.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: I believe in the history
16
  there is, but I will double check and see what I can find
  out for sure, but that -- during the hearings, during the
18
   discussions of the wording of the order, I mean, of the
  bill, we were involved. We didn't -- we weren't the ones
20
  starting it, but we were involved, and we were asked about
21
  that in the -- and the implication for everybody was that
   that is the respondent, but you're right, it's not what's
23
  actually said in the actual -- and I didn't write the
24
  bill, so --
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MR. ORSINGER: Well, it seems to me that
  somebody should request an attorney general opinion on
        I don't have the standing to do that, but do the
   sponsors of the bill have a standing, members of the
  Legislature have a standing? I don't know if OCA has the
  standing to request an AG opinion, but somebody ought
  to -- they do? Somebody ought to request an AG opinion,
   and it will tell us at least what the state's official
  position is on whether the -- whether the --
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You see the problem?
11
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                The word you used was --
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Subject.
12
                 MR. ORSINGER: The person who is the subject
13
  of.
14
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    "The name of a person who
15
  is the subject of the protective order." That's what the
16
  statute says.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. I think there's room
18
  for disagreement.
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, there's not because
20
   I asked my leading questions of you, and you-all agreed
21
  that the Jones family was the subject of the protective
   order.
23
                                No, I didn't. I can tell you
2.4
                 MR. ORSINGER:
25
   if that proposition is right, there's going to be a lot of
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upset --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    I'm just saying.
 2
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                -- so we better get it
 3
   correct.
 4
5
                 MS. PHILLIPS: But if it's not in the order,
   this TCIC, right, where -- which is where the data will be
6
   uploaded, this form has protected personal data.
8
                 MR. ORSINGER: This is not public.
                 MS. PHILLIPS:
                                Okay.
9
10
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                The DPS form is just for the
   criminal side and then certain members of the -- of the
11
   judicial -- judicial branch, or maybe not any. Maybe it's
12
   only law enforcement has access to this.
13
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: The court will have access
14
  to it, but it's not going to be part of a -- it's not part
15
   of a public record; and, in fact, last session, any -- any
16
   information about specifically a victim's location,
17
   address, personal information, the court can actually
18
   order that there be a separate record that has that
19
   information redacted that would be public, and the full
20
   information is only accessible to the court and to law
21
   enforcement.
2.2
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                            Justice Gray.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Observation, question,
2.4
25
   and then a couple of topics, but my observation is that if
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I understand this correctly, that Monica would not have
  been protected under this statute that bears her name
   unless the victims of the prior protective orders had
   opted for public --
5
                 MR. ORSINGER: Correct.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: You are correct, sir.
 6
7
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay. You just said
   that courts would have access. I was looking at 72.155 in
   the memo at (c), and I didn't see anything about a court
   having access. It was all law enforcement of some nature.
10
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Of --
11
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It may be somewhere
12
  else, but I --
13
                                 Specifically -- well, okay,
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
14
  the court has access as part of their -- their court file
15
  of that TCIC data entry form, but as far as having access
16
   to the registry, yes, courts are noticeably not on there,
   and we were trying to figure out if that was the intent or
18
  was it a situation where -- because if an authorized user
19
   who is going to be the clerk of that court who does the
20
   data entry, then they would be able to share that
21
   information with the court.
23
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      They would have that
   one entry, but they're not authorized to access --
24
25
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Sure, they would be.
                                                        The
```

authorized user has access to look up and say, hey, does this person have a protective order someplace else as well.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Seems to be in violation of the statute, but I will leave that to the expert.

MS. PIECHOWIAK: Okay.

6

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that process.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: At the last JCIT meeting, which I'm not on the committee but I went, they were talking about a term. I think the term was "integrated," and it was talking about courts being integrated with the e-filing system; and it seems to me that if we promulgate the form for the application and that application is e-filed, why can we not craft that application in a format in which the information will automatically feed into the registry; and on the other end of that equation, if we promulgate the form for the protective order and the orders are integrated with the e-filing system and the court's individual web page, why can it not automatically populate the registry as well? MS. PIECHOWIAK: And -- and that's a valid question, and those are all questions that they are looking at how they want to make sure this information is

integrated, but like I said, we are very, very early in

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
1
                                      Okay.
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: And that would certainly be
2
  ideal if we could do that, and so I will make sure that
   those concerns are addressed, but we've been talking about
   that as well.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      Okay.
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Additional questions?
7
  the source -- I've got one. Is the -- are there public
8
   documents that are the source of the data for this -- for
10 this that are then converted into nonpublic because of
11
   72.155 and other provisions of the statute?
                                               In other
  words, if I file an application for protective order --
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- with the court, and
14
  that's a court document, and that's public, right?
15
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If a judge grants it,
17
  that's an order of the court, and that's public.
18
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
19
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So those two things we
   know are public, but are there documents that go into the
21
   registry that then because they're in the registry you
   can't see them, you can't get them?
23
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                 No.
                                       I don't believe so.
2.4
25
   think it's -- this is just to make this be a registry that
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people can look up without having to know what county they
2 need to go to look up a protective order and go dig around
  in the, you know, clerk's office, but --
                 MR. ORSINGER: Chip, let me say that the
 4
5
  public --
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You just cut her off.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, I'm sorry.
7
8
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: No, go ahead.
                 MR. ORSINGER: The information that is
9
  public at the courthouse --
10
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
                 MR. ORSINGER: -- some of that will be in
12
  the registry --
13
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  Sure.
14
                 MR. ORSINGER: -- but not available to the
15
16 public --
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: -- through the registry, but
18
   it's always available at the courthouse.
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: At the courthouse.
20
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right.
21
22
                 MR. ORSINGER: So, yes, this registry is
23 narrower in terms of what you can get off this website, it
   is narrower than what you can get at the courthouse.
24
25
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Right. It is.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's the point I was
1
   trying to make.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER: I know that. I know that.
 3
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK:
                                  That is correct.
5
                 MR. ORSINGER: But the Legislature made that
   decision.
6
7
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, no. I just
  wanted to know if that was a fact.
8
9
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And, see, the point I
  was trying to make is that it may be at the courthouse and
10
  it may be in this registry, but it's all going to be on
11
  re:SearchTX once the court gets inverse integrated with
   the e-system, and so much of this seems redundant, highly
13
14 redundant, other than getting the information so that it
   feeds up into the databases that are needed for the
15
  protective orders.
16
                 That's why I was wondering if it could be
17
  automated, because it's already going to be there. If we
18
   do our job right in promulgating the form for the
19
   application and the form for the order, all of the
20
   information necessary to fill out one of these information
21
   sheets is just going to fall out in the lap of whoever has
   to do the entry, and I would say that needs to be an
23
   electronic, not a person.
2.4
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good point. All right.
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Other -- other comments for Kim.
                 MS. HOBBS: Hey, this is Lisa on the phone,
2
   can y'all hear me?
3
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Yes.
5
                 THE COURT:
                             We can hear you.
                 MS. HOBBS:
                             I just want to put on the record
 6
   that I think bills like this are a violation of the
   separation of branches of government. This is by its
   nature a law enforcement problem, and I'm not saying that
   the judiciary doesn't need to give law enforcement
10
11
   information that they need to do to do their job, but I
   feel strongly that OCA is becoming an arm of things that
12
   are outside of the judiciary and what our -- what our
13
14 branch of government is meant to be, and I put -- I put it
   as an "our" because I relate to it, having been the
15
   general counsel of the Texas Supreme Court, but this is
16
   very problematic that we -- that OCA has been the one
   charged with keeping this registry. It's one thing to ask
18
   for information from the judiciary that the law
19
20
   enforcement agency could use to do their job better, but
   it's not the judiciary's role to be the keeper of
21
   information and the liability that might come along with
   what we do or do not do.
23
                  And I -- and I apologize that I didn't
24
25
   realize this is on the forefront until this week, but I'm
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really bothered by it, and it goes to a lot of things.
  Like the judiciary is getting more involved in
  quardianships and now protective orders and other things,
   and OCA can be a data driven entity of the judiciary, and
  that role is very important, and it serves a real function
   to let the policy makers and the executive branch of the
   government take the role of doing their job better, but
  when the legislative branch asks the judiciary to be the
   actual repository of this information, I feel like that's
   a real separation of powers problem, and it bothers me,
10
11
   and so I -- I just want to put that on the record.
                 I've been texting with David Slayton a
12
   little bit, and he tells me it's more nuance than I
13
   appreciate, and I will continue to study it, but I just
   wanted -- before this conversation closed, I wanted to put
15
  that out there that I think this is a real separation of
16
  powers problem, and it bothers me immensely.
17
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      Amen.
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have another --
19
20
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                The dog agrees, too.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have another former
21
   rules attorney here. Come on, Kennon.
                 MS. WOOTEN: My statement is much less
23
   insightful perhaps, but it pertains to the meaning of
24
25
   "subject to the order," that phrase. If you look in
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Chapter 85 of the Family Code, which is referenced in the
2 memo from Richard Orsinger, you'll see the phrase "subject
  of the order" used in section 85.024 in a way that makes
  it clear that the person subject of the order is, in fact,
  the person who has been found to have engaged in family
  violence, so that might provide guidance moving forward.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else?
7
8
  Kim, and Susan, and Robert, if we break for lunch now, is
   that okay?
10
                 MR. LEVY:
                            Sure.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Take up your topic right
12 after lunch at 1:15?
                 MR. LEVY: Sounds great.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay. Anything else?
14
  Kim, thank you so much for being here and --
15
                 MS. PIECHOWIAK: Thank you for having me.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- for listening to us,
17
  and if there's nothing else, we'll recess for lunch and be
18
  back at 1:15.
19
20
                 (Recess from 12:15 p.m. to 1:13 p.m.)
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Is everybody back?
21
   Let's get back on the record and turn our attention to
   registration of in-house counsel, and Robert and Kim and
23
   Susan. And I don't know if Allen Cook is here.
2.4
25
                 MR. LEVY: Allen is not.
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MS. HENRICKS: No, he's not.

2.4

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: He won't be here. All right. Good. Well, Robert, take it away.

MR. LEVY: Sure. Thank you. This proposal was submitted by the Board of Law Examiners to the Supreme Court to provide a procedure for the registration of in-house counsel who are licensed in other states or other countries. Currently, if a lawyer who is licensed in the state comes to Texas to work for a corporation, there is no specific requirement or procedure for that lawyer to do anything, to seek admission to the Texas bar, and there's no registration requirement.

Most of the states have provision, many of which are obligatory, that an out-of-state lawyer has to register as in-house counsel if they're coming from another state, but in Texas we do not have that, and this is obviously of interest to corporations like my corporation and Kim's because we have lawyers who frequently come from elsewhere to either work for us or to work for a temporary period of time in one of our Texas offices. And the purpose or goal of this proposed rule, which is listed as Rule 23, although it actually would be Rule 24. There's a -- Rule 23 has already been taken, but this proposed rule would provide a procedure for lawyers outside of Texas to register.

The questions, though, and one of the issues that we explored in our memo to the committee are some of the challenges or issues about adopting a rule like this, and I think both Kim and I recommend that a rule be adopted, because it will be very beneficial, but I wanted to make sure we talked about some of the issues that are triggered by the proposal, and the memo outlines them.

One of the first question is that where a rule would be adopted providing for the registration of lawyers that are not licensed in Texas, but there's no requirement that that take place. As I understand it, that to establish a requirement would require either change in Texas law, the State Bar Act, or a disciplinary rule or arguably if there was an ethics opinion on this point, but right now there's no explicit obligation for a lawyer who is licensed in another jurisdiction to become licensed in Texas to work for a corporation.

And I've noted some of the provisions about what you can do in the process, that if you want to become licensed in Texas you can sit for the Texas bar, or you can waive into the bar if you've met five of seven years of continuous practice, and then the board then will review applicants with all of their background information and go into extensive vetting to validate that that lawyer has met those requirements and otherwise is in good

standing, and there's also a procedure for foreign attorneys to become certified in Texas. That's a specific provision under the bar act.

2.4

The -- one of the other issues to consider, or as I noted, that this would bring us somewhat in line with where most of the other states are, and there's also an ABA rule that -- or a model rule on this topic. The other key issues I just wanted to raise as talking points is that the -- there's some questions about would this rule apply to individuals who are contractors for corporations, and is it -- is it a requirement that you be employed by a corporation versus being a contractor, and there are situations where lawyers will -- will become contractors for a corporations. In fact, in some cases lawyers who retire will sometimes come back later on on a contract basis, and the question is would this registration process be applicable.

As a side note, one of the advantages for the registration process as contemplated by the rule is that a lawyer who registers under this rule can use the time period of registration to meet the continuous practicing requirement, and the rule contemplates that you could then apply to waive into the bar when you have had three out of five years of continuous practice versus the current five out of seven years, which you would need to

meet if you were coming from another state.

2.4

Another question, as you'll note, under the proposed -- proposed rule, there is a provision that carves out certain activities that you are not supposed to be able to engage in. That's under section (2)(b), and it's under (2)(b)(4), which talks about that you would not be able to prepare any legal instrument affecting title to real property, including deed, deed of trust, note, mortgage, or transfer or release of lien, and that's based upon Texas Government Code, section 83.001. The provision about that code actually says that a lawyer -- only a lawyer can earn a fee and be paid for those specific services in Texas, and that's the reason that the rule exempts it or carves it out from the practice permissible to a registered out-of-state lawyer.

The question that I would propose is that that's really not necessary under this circumstance because the individual is not earning a fee for those services. The individual is performing their work for their company that they are working for and the -- I don't think that the carve out is needed to make this rule consistent with the Texas Government Code provision.

Another significant question that I wanted to bring to everyone's attention and get input on is section (3), the disclosure provision. The Rule as

drafted suggests that a registered out-of-state lawyer must disclose that they are not licensed in Texas in any communication to anyone other than that individual's employer or company, so that any time they communicated, whether it was by letter or e-mail or instant message or chat or even in a telephone call or a face-to-face discussion, the way the draft rule is set out that that requires them to say, "By the way, I'm not a Texas lawyer." I think that and in talking -- and I apologize, 10 I didn't introduce Susan Henricks, who is the executive director of the Board of Law Examiners whose office 11 prepared the draft. We think we agreed that that language 12 might be over broad, but the question is, is the 13 communication issue even necessary. Does a registered 14 out-of-state lawyer need to communicate their lack of 15 Texas licensure in any communications, whether they're 16 written or otherwise. So I would appreciate input on that 17 as well. 18 In conclusion, I guess the other point is 19 20

that in talking to Susan and Allen Cook, who is the general counsel, the goal is to get input from the committee. We already know that there are some provisions that might need to be changed, and you'll note in the proposed rule that there was a potential implementation that would take place in December. That obviously is --

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is not going to happen. This draft was actually prepared
   sometime ago, and so it's obvious that the actual
   implementation date would be pushed off, and so we're
  hopeful to get input and guidance from this committee and
  then Susan and her team will prepare an updated version.
  And, Kim, any other comments?
                 MS. PHILLIPS: No. I think that covers it,
7
8
  other than I think, number two, the tweaking of the
   definition of what's a registered in-house lawyer to
   specifically include foreign jurisdictions, because it was
10
11
   interesting when I raised this with a number of my
  colleagues --
12
                 MS. BARON:
                             Hard to hear you down here.
13
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We cannot hear
14
  you at all.
15
                 MS. PHILLIPS: Just clarifying who is --
16
   what is registered in-house counsel to specifically
   include foreign, like non-U.S. lawyers. So there are some
18
   rules that specify the district D.C. and U.S. territories
19
   and foreign countries, so I think that clarification, that
20
   explicit clarification would be helpful.
21
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other
   comments? Professor Carlson.
23
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So --
2.4
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And then Buddy.
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PROFESSOR CARLSON: Two things.
                                                  One, I
1
  guess you were wanting -- you're proposing this because
  it's not clear right now --
                 MR. LEVY: Right.
5
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: -- what out-of-state
   licensed attorneys coming in to work for an entity need to
6
  do in Texas.
                 MR. LEVY: Correct. And Susan can elaborate
8
9
   on that as well.
10
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                               Yes.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Secondly, and would that
11
  -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.
12
                 MS. HENRICKS: No, that's fine.
13
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And, secondly, would
14
  this include litigation, or are we talking transactional
15
16 or anything?
                 MR. LEVY: As contemplated, it would include
17
   lawyers that are -- that are working for a corporation,
18
   and as drafted it would include a lawyer who is in the
19
   litigation practice. That is I think a fair question in
20
   terms of if a lawyer wanted to appear in court on behalf
21
  of a client for which that lawyer works, would that lawyer
   still have to apply under the Texas rules for pro hac vice
23
2.4
   status.
25
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                If I can answer that, the way
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we drafted the rule if you look at (2)(b), it does say that a registered in-house counsel could not appear in court or sign pleadings, but and they wouldn't be eligible for pro hac vice because you must be a nonresident to qualify for pro hac vice. So if they wanted to appear in court for the corporation, they would need to get a full Texas license to do that, which is the way it is now. 7 8 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Thank you. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy. 10 MR. LOW: Yeah, Robert, isn't it usually the 11 lawyer only does work for the company he works for? And I know it's a pretty simple procedure. I've got a case in 12 Connecticut, had some in Oklahoma and in other states, and 13 I get permission and approval for that particular case. 14 Why couldn't they get specific approval from the 15 Supreme Court of Texas as long as they're members in 16 standing of some other state and so forth and have a 17 simple procedure instead of just handling one case, doing 18 legal work for one company. 19 Well, Buddy, that's what this 20 MR. LEVY: 21 process would provide, that you're being authorized to do your job. 22 I know, but it looks like it could 23 MR. LOW: I don't have to fill out many things other 2.4 be shortened. 25 than -- I can't even remember what it is, but that I'm a

member of the bar and so forth, and I can go to Oklahoma, and I can -- it's very uncomplicated, and it doesn't seem to have all of the stuff that this does. I just wonder if that would be a simpler and shorter way to do it and get approval from the Supreme Court. 6 MR. LEVY: I think -- I don't disagree with 7 you in principle. I think this is the way to effect that. If the question is should these rules require all of the process steps that are included, and this is kind of the -- as I see it, the bridge between what you're talking 10 11 about and the full waiving into the bar, which does involve a lot more due diligence and process. Okay. I mean, the simpler MR. LOW: 13 something can be done and accomplishes the objective is 14 something I believe in. That's all. 15 MS. HENRICKS: Well, we're certainly open to 16 suggestions about how we might simplify the process. states do require this type of -- some kind of 18 registration or regulation of out-of-state lawyers who 19 20 come into the state and practice for a corporation, which is different from the pro hac vice. 21 I understand it's different and 22 MR. LOW: not just for one case, but I have to certify that I'll be 23 bound by the rules and I don't remember what all, but it's 24 very easy, and I just read a few things, sign my name and 25

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I'm there. And I don't -- I haven't studied this,
   don't -- it just looks more complicated than the procedure
   I'm familiar with in practicing in another state.
                 MS. HENRICKS: It is a little more.
                                                      Uh-huh.
5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Richard.
                 MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to ask a -- several
 6
   questions and points. First of all, without this is there
7
   a danger that these lawyers are practicing law in Texas
  without a license?
10
                 MS. HENRICKS: Well, I would -- the main
11
  thing is it's just unclear. From our perspective, we have
  out-of-state lawyers who come into the state, and they
12
   call our office and say, okay, what do I need to do to be
13
   allowed to work as an in-house counsel in Texas, and we
   say, well, there's really -- you don't have to do
15
  anything, there's no law on this.
16
                 MR. ORSINGER: And there's no ethics opinion
17
   or court ruling or lawsuit that's threatening? This is --
18
   this is just needed, but it's not in response to a
19
20
  particular threat?
                 MS. HENRICKS:
21
                                No.
                 MR. LEVY: And I looked at that issue,
22
  Richard.
             I didn't do exhaustive research, but there are a
23
   few, and I've alluded to the ethics opinions, but they all
2.4
   are on the periphery of the issue. They don't provide an
25
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explicit requirement. My view, if I was advising somebody coming from out of state, I would say the better part -you know, the more conservative approach would be to, at least right now, to become licensed in Texas because of the uncertainty, but there is no explicit prohibition right now. 7 MR. ORSINGER: So on page one, paragraph (1) (a) (2) is a provision that the attorney in this status 8 will be -- receive compensation for legal services on behalf of the business organization. Now then, I would 10 have thought that they wouldn't receive compensation for 11 legal services. I thought they would get a salary as a 12 W-2 employee. Does this -- is this intended to allow an 13 attorney to be in-house counsel but to bill for legal 14 services like a lawyer would? 15 MS. HENRICKS: I think -- I don't think it 16 would prohibit that. 17 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So that's getting more 18 into the nature of independent law practice than it is 19 being an employee of a corporation where my job is to give 20 legal advice. Is that inadvertent, or is it intended that 21 lawyers who are out-of-state lawyers could say, "I'm registering as in-house counsel, but I have my own law 23 office or my own law firm, and I'm going to bill them for 24 25 the time that I spend"? Is it intended that they be

allowed to do that?

2.4

MS. HENRICKS: I think that's a question that Richard raised about could they be in essence independent contractors working exclusively for their corporate employer. Obviously they wouldn't be working for any other employer or have any other clients.

MR. LEVY: But I think what Richard's point and it gets to a good issue, and that is you wouldn't want a situation where an out-of-state company decided to hire a bunch of lawyers to practice law here and say they're working for us as a corporation, and -- and they're authorized to do it under this registration process, but I think that the general principle is that they are employees of the company that they are working exclusively for and not providing legal services as part of what that company does. They are providing advice to the company that's doing what it does, which is not legal work necessarily.

MS. HENRICKS: And I wouldn't be surprised if there are lawyers doing that now.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, this authorizes it, and, you know, if you're -- my concept of an in-house counsel is that you're an employee, just like the head of HR or the CEO or the head of the engineering division, and you're giving legal advice to your employer, but if you

are allowed to bill for legal services as a nonemployee, in my opinion you're engaged in the practice of law, so but anyway, I just make that point, and I'm not sure that I like that.

On the second page, paragraph (2)(a), I'm a

little concerned about the idea that providing legal services to a single business organization. Because a lot of businesses that I run into, in the family law context anyway, there are multiple businesses that are interrelated, and I don't know exactly what the definition of "single business" is going to be in this context, but a limited partnership always has a general partner and at least one limited partner. And a lot of companies have a hierarchical organization, like for JP Morgan and Chase Bank are independent banks that are owned by the same holding company, so I think you guys need to be careful about this use of the word "single business organization."

I agree somebody shouldn't open up an in-house counsel shop and represent 15 different corporations, because then they're just practicing law, but I think you should be careful about the use of the word "single" or the definition of "business organization" because, in fact, many businesses are a cluster of businesses that are being managed by a management

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structure.
                 MR. LEVY: Sure. We talk about that,
2
  Richard.
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                I think that's addressed with
   the definition. We tried to address it there, on one --
 6
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                I'll go back and look at
7
   that.
                           We talked about that and -- and
8
                 MR. LEVY:
   the -- you point out something that's very appropriate in
   that it's not only who you work for, but you are providing
10
   advice to a family of companies that might be affiliated
11
   with your employee corporation, and so I think we'll work
   on making sure that's clear.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: So on (2)(a), compare (2)(a)
14
  to No. (5), (2)(a)(1). You're authorized to give legal
15
   advice to directors, officers, employees, and agents, and
16
   I get that, but then on (b)(5) you're not authorized to
17
   render to anyone except the business organization any
18
   service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge; and
19
   if you go back and read the definition of "business
20
   organization," it's all about entities; and to the limited
21
   extent that I've represented companies in ancillary
23
   litigation where their owner or CEO is in litigation, I
   usually take my marching orders from the board of
2.4
25
   directors, if the CEO is the one who is individually sued,
```

and I don't want to be representing a company and taking direction from the CEO that may be just supporting the CEO's interest and not the company's interest. Okay.

So in those situations I've given legal advice to members of the board of directors, and so I see a little tension here between giving legal advice in (2)(a)(2) to the directors and being prohibited from giving advice to anyone except the business organization, which is an entity, so it seems to me like you should reconcile those two concepts so that -- you know, so that it is clear that you can -- you can represent the entity within the scope of this rule by coordinating through the directors.

And then on page two, subdivision (2)(b), there's "appearing for a business organization in Texas courts," that's a prohibited, and my question is what about arbitrations? Because a heck of a lot of business litigation in this day and time is done in arbitration.

I'm not sure arbitration really has a forum. I mean, I guess if you're in a Texas office, you're arbitrating in Texas, but you may not be under Texas rules. You may be under commercial arbitration rules. Is there any thought or concern about discussing representing a company in arbitration, which may have been referred by a Texas court? Is that a

```
thought that's of any consequence to you-all?
                 MR. LEVY: It is of consequence, and I would
2
  suggest that there's a big difference between practicing
  in a Texas court versus practicing or representing your
  company in an arbitration, and that does happen.
  are many types of proceedings that take place in
  arbitration that they might be located in Texas or the
  arbitration might be somewhere else, but you're
  representing your Texas company, you're working on behalf
  of your Texas company, and I -- in that arbitration
10
11
  proceeding, and I think that that is an appropriate rule
   that a registered out-of-state lawyer should be able to
  engage in.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Well, do you have to be
14
  registered to -- if this is adopted, do you have to be
15
  registered in order to represent the entity in an
16
  arbitration or --
17
                 MR. LEVY: Well, this rule will not require
18
  you to be registered.
19
20
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Okay.
                 MR. LEVY: This only provides a procedure to
21
  be registered.
22
23
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Okay.
                           And that's one of those -- that
24
                 MR. LEVY:
25
   gap point that I pointed out initially. It certainly
```

```
provides you with a vehicle to have comfort that you're
  doing the right thing, but there's -- there's no specific
  sanction for not registering.
                 MR. ORSINGER: But if you do register,
 4
  you're prohibited from appearing in a Texas court as a
   legal representative, but you're not prohibited from
  participating in a Texas arbitration or an arbitration set
   up pursuant to a referral from a Texas court.
8
9
                 MR. LEVY: Correct.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And so that's conscious and
10
   intended? It's conscious and intended.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is now.
12
                 MR. LEVY: It is now.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                               It would be.
14
                 MR. LEVY: Not having drafted this, I can't
15
  speak to the intent --
16
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: Ah, okay.
                 MR. LEVY: -- but I think that's the right
18
  result.
19
20
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I'm sorry, Robert,
   you think that's the right result?
21
22
                 MR. LEVY: I think that's the right result.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Richard Munzinger.
23
                                 Several of my law partners
2.4
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
25
   are licensed in New Mexico and Texas, and the way the
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opening paragraph reads, "This rule requires attorneys
   licensed to practice in states other than Texas," it would
   require them to be registered, or if it isn't a
   requirement it certainly would authorize. It seems to me
   this needs to make it clear that you're talking about
   people who are not licensed in Texas as distinct from
   people who hold licensure in Texas and other states.
                 (Phone system message stating "There doesn't
8
                 appear to be any activity in this meeting.")
9
                 MR. ORSINGER: Be sure to write that down.
10
11
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Can I continue anyway, even
  though I'm not engaged in activity? I agree with
   Richard's concern about the definition of business
13
   organization except on a different point. It seems clear
14
   to me that business organization includes all parents,
15
   subsidiaries, et cetera, but it says "affiliates," and it
16
   doesn't define the word "affiliates," and I think it
17
   should.
            It's a very general word, and if the intent is
18
   that it means under the same or common control, it should
19
   so state, because I could be affiliated with you arguably
20
   by contract and not by control, so I think "affiliates"
21
   probably needs to be defined.
                 The rule forbids, as I read it, (2)(b), "No
23
  in-house counsel may appear in a Texas court for the
2.4
25
   business organization" as ultimately defined.
```

strictly forbidden, and I believe that's what you said. Does that apply to administrative agencies? We have a lot of, quote, "litigation," close quote, before administrative agencies in contested case hearings in any number of statutes under the State Office of Administrative Hearings; and if you intend to proscribe the practice in court, why would you not proscribe practice before those agencies, most of which -- that's --I'm not -- I'm not qualified to say that. Many of which adopt the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, sometimes 10 amending them to reduce the time limits and sometimes the 11 number of interrogatories and what have you, but most of 12 them apply -- they clearly apply Texas law, and most of 13 them apply Texas trial court nonjury procedures to them in 14 terms of discovery and otherwise. So you may want to look 15 into the question of whether or not you want this to apply 16 to practice before administrative agencies. And I don't 17 think I have anything else, and if I do, it's not 18 meaningful activity anyway so --19 20 MR. LEVY: Can I respond to that last point? It's a very good point. I would, again, suggest that the 21 best outcome would be not to limit an in-house counsel from appearing before an administrative agency, whether it 23 be state or local or even federal in Texas, because it's a 2.4 25 different type of process, and the rules that govern the

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administrative act that governs those proceedings are
   different in some cases, and in many cases somebody who is
  not a lawyer can appear in those proceedings on behalf of
   their company, and -- and there's no issue with that.
   I don't think that the requirement that you be licensed in
   Texas should apply to that type of proceeding.
                 MS. HENRICKS: And in that we did attempt to
7
  address that with (2)(a)(3), which says that that is an
8
   authorized activity.
10
                 MR. LEVY: Right, you did.
11
                 MS. HENRICKS: And -- and it's true, as you
   say, in my experience, you don't even really necessarily
   have to be a lawyer to appear. It's an area of
13
   uncertainty, about whether you have to be a lawyer to
  represent your company in an administrative proceeding.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Commissioner Sullivan,
16
  and then Levi.
17
                 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN:
                                           I'm looking at
18
  page two of the memo. Do I infer correctly that this is
19
   taken from a 2016 ABA model?
20
                 MR. LEVY: And that is the model rule for
21
   registration, but I think, as Susan indicated, they looked
   primarily to the California, New Jersey, New York, and
23
   Pennsylvania rules.
2.4
25
                 MS. HENRICKS: But we did look at the model
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rule, and there is a model rule.

2.4

out.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: And I'm just curious it would just be interesting to know to what extent we deviate and why and to know what the experience has been in those other states, because I think that might inform some of the choices that we make. We certainly might know the answers to some of these questions because some of the other states perhaps have been down these in their matters.

MS. HENRICKS: Well, I -- I have made some effort to speak with my counterparts in other states to see what experience they've had when they have implemented similar rules in the recent past; and they have said that, you know, the compliance is -- it's hard to know the degree of compliance; but they know that it's not complete, they know there are certainly in-house lawyers who are not registering; and that was the main perspective I was looking at. I'm not aware of any particular problems or difficulties that have arisen from the implementation of these registration procedures in other states, but I could ask some more questions about that.

MR. LEVY: And before we go on, I did want to mention one other point for -- that I failed to point

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Levi, had a --

Okay. Go ahead. 1 MR. LEVY: CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Several points ago. So 2 go ahead. 3 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Robert, you said at least twice that not requiring the registration before agencies was the right result and you said the same thing before an arbitration. Why is that the right result, and who is it right for? It doesn't seem right for the 8 taxpayers or citizens of Texas who could, at a minimum, extract a fee from Exxon and Shell and others to require 10 11 their out-of-state lawyers to appear before agencies and arbitrators. 12 Well, I think that the answer is MR. LEVY: 13 that if I am a corporation and I want to appear in an arbitration proceeding, frankly, I don't -- arguably, you 15 might not even need to be a licensed lawyer to participate 16 in that. 17 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 18 Well, may I interrupt just one second? 19 20 MR. LEVY: Sure. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I don't know where 21 that comes from, because -- and I've had this question as 23 an arbitrator. The rules -- there are rules, State Bar rules, that still apply to me as a sole arbitrator, and 2.4 you would be asking me to sanction the unauthorized 25

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practice of law.
                 MR. LEVY:
                           Well, I'll ask --
 2
                 MS. PHILLIPS:
                                (Inaudible)
 3
                 THE REPORTER:
                                I can't hear you.
5
                 MS. BARON:
                            Kim, you're really hard to hear.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Kim said that they
 6
   can draft their own rules in contract. That's true, but
7
8
   they don't trump state law.
                 MR. LEVY: So the question, Levi, is that if
9
  you are -- let's say you are an arbitrator and you're
10
11
   sitting in Texas, but you -- all of the parties are in
   another state. How does a Ohio lawyer appear before you
12
  in Texas?
13
                                         Well, okay, so it
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
14
  has happened, the question -- the question still gets
15
  asked, it's not answered, but we've got a number of
16
   questions that are on the table now, and I want to circle
17
   back to my question. Why is it the best result, and who
18
   is it exactly best for?
19
20
                 MR. LEVY:
                           So there are many situations
  where issues are adjudicated or arbitrated that are in
21
   very efficient proceedings that happen where you deal with
   issues over and over. In labor matters that's often the
23
  case or other types of proceedings where they don't
24
25
   involve the full process of that would typically be
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involved in a litigation proceeding. There might be
  summary proceedings. These are all done pursuant to
  agreement of both parties obviously, and to require a
  corporation in Texas or a corporate to hire a counsel if
  they don't have local Texas lawyers would create a
  significant burden on them that doesn't really advance any
  issue in terms of representing their interests. I would
  ask you, could a corporation appear pro se in an
  arbitration? I think the answer is yes. So how would
  they do that?
10
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: The answer is no.
11
                 MR. LEVY: Why is it no?
12
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Because it's the
13
14 unauthorized practice of law.
                 MR. LEVY: If a corporation want to
15
16 represent itself in -- in a arbitration, you're saying
  they can't?
17
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                        Okay.
                                                Excuse me, I
18
  misspoke.
             Well, I don't -- I don't know. Perhaps the
19
  others around the table are convinced. I'm not convinced
20
   that it's the right result, and I'm not sure who it's
21
   right for, and it also -- it denies an economic
   opportunity for Texas lawyers, so --
23
2.4
                 MR. LEVY:
                           And I appreciate that.
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Robert, just to follow on
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Levi's point for a minute, I think in California if you're
  arbitrating and a corporation hires an out-of-state lawyer
  to act as the counsel in the arbitration, the California
  bar requires you to fill out a form that says, you know,
5
   "I'm from Texas, but I'm going to be here in California
   representing ABC Company" --
7
                 MR. LEVY: Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- "and I've got local
8
   counsel, but he's not going to be participating in the
   arbitration."
10
11
                 MR. LEVY: I think California is very
   aggressive on that point.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
13
                 MR. LEVY: And I'm no expert, but I haven't
14
  come across that issue in other states.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you don't have to
16
   do anything else.
                 MR. LEVY: Right.
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And there doesn't appear
19
20
   to be any consequence, except I think you can pro hac in
21
   only so many times --
22
                 MR. LEVY: Before you have to --
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- and the bar says,
2.4
   well, wait a minute.
25
                 MR. LEVY:
                            Right.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- You've only pro hac'ed
  in once, but you've handled five arbitrations in the last
  12 months, so we're going to tell the judge not to let you
  in.
 4
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And there's a fee
5
6
  paid.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There is a fee paid.
7
                 MR. LEVY: Right, but that -- that rule
8
  would apply for an out -- an outside counsel. If you have
  co-counsel that is employed by the company you are
10
11
  representing, perhaps that rule would apply. I'm not
12 sure.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I don't know if it
13
14 would either.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Okay. One -- one
15
16 last point, I'm sorry.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're just trying to
17
  collect a little revenue here.
18
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Yes. And I'm
19
20
  looking out for local lawyers.
                 MR. LEVY: I understand. I'm a local
21
   lawyer, too.
22
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: But there's
23
  another -- there's another -- there's another point I
2.4
25
   think, that expressly in front of the agencies, let's
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say -- let's say Robert from Kentucky appears before some
   agency.
2
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Insurance commission.
 3
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         The insurance
 4
   commission, good point, Commissioner, and you express--
5
                 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: We don't have a
 6
   commission. We just have a department.
7
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Pardon me? And you
8
   expressly insult and offend Commissioner Sullivan.
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Easily done.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And before that
11
   agency has the opportunity to discipline you for such
   conduct, you're on Southwest Airlines back to Kentucky,
13
  never to appear in Texas again; and they have no -- you
   know, it just seems to me that's not the right result.
15
                           Well, and one of the issues about
                 MR. LEVY:
16
   the agency practice is more than in arbitrations, but
   companies are before administrative agencies all the time
18
   doing many, many things. They're dealing --
19
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Railroad Commission.
20
                 MR. LEVY: They're getting permits.
21
   They're -- they're talking to agency staff, there are
   filings, sometimes there are administrative proceedings,
23
   and this -- this is like the bread and butter of what some
2.4
25
   in-house counsel do, and, you know, it's -- the question
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there is why have in-house counsel, and I know that you
  might agree with also.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Levi's got an opinion on
3
   that.
 4
5
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                        Okay.
                                                So put me
   down as a "no" on this one, Chip.
6
7
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
                 MR. LEVY: One quick point, if I could, just
8
   one other issue to consider that as currently proposed the
   lawyers who are registered or licensed in other states who
10
   register under this provision would be required to meet
11
  the Texas CLE standards, 15 hours a year, three hours of
12
   ethics, even if their home state does not require that
13
   level of CLE; and so a question is, should we just require
   the lawyer to continue to be in good standing under their
15
   local bar and meeting the CLE requirements there? Or even
16
   if they're not as extensive as Texas?
17
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Orsinger. Do you
18
19 have an answer on that question?
20
                 MR. ORSINGER: No. No, I have a new point.
21
   Okay. So --
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody want to speak to
  that question?
23
                                Well, part of our reasoning
2.4
                 MS. HENRICKS:
25
   on that was that we were going -- we do have the provision
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that would allow three years of experience as a registered
  in-house counsel in Texas to qualify them for admission
  without examination instead of having five of the last
   seven years. So the thought was that if they're in Texas
   and they're paying dues to the State Bar and they're
   getting Texas CLE or at least enough CLE to meet our
   requirement, then that would support or it would justify
   giving them that extra dispensation.
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that makes sense.
   I should know this, but do we let -- do we waive in
10
11
   anybody from any state if they have, you know, five years
  experience or --
12
                                If they meet the other
                 MS. HENRICKS:
13
  requirements. For example, they have to have J.D. from an
14
   approved school, which is an ABA school, is the primary
15
  other requirement.
                       Yes.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So even California or
17
  Florida, we'll let them in?
18
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                Yes.
19
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Even though they won't
  let us in.
21
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                Lots of them. Yes.
22
                                                     Yes.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Levi, you got an opinion
            Never mind.
                          Richard.
2.4
   on that?
25
                 MR. ORSINGER: So I'm looking at (2)(a)(2)
```

that they're authorized to negotiate and document matters for the business organization and comparing that to (2) (b) (4), which prohibits preparing legal instruments affecting title to real property, and I realize that this expressly compensates negotiating and drafting contracts that do not constitute an instrument affecting title to land, right? 7 8 MS. HENRICKS: Yes. 9 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So what's really -what this really represents is there are certain aspects 10 11 of what we would all think in practicing law that will be allowed for this one client, the employer, and then there 12 are a few areas of practicing law that will not be 13 allowed, like appearing in court like a licensed lawyer, or filing real estate documents like a licensed lawyer. 15 So what's happened is that we've -- it's a limited 16 permission to perform legal services for your employer, 17 except for a couple of things that we've decided are too 18 important to allow a nonlicensed out-of-state lawyer to 19 do, which would be courtroom activity and real estate. 20 Is that basically what's happened here? 21 22 MS. HENRICKS: That's what it says, yes, but we talked about that perhaps the rationale for the real 23 estate restriction, which is based on this provision in 2.4

the Government Code, might not really be necessary because

25

```
they're not doing it for separate compensation but just as
   an employee of their corporate entity.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, do you think -- I mean,
3
   I assumed all of these years that the restriction relating
   to real estate had to do with a concern for messing up
   legal title.
                 MR. LEVY: No, it's back to Levi's concern.
7
8
   It's a protective provision --
9
                 MR. ORSINGER: It's a revenue for lawyers.
10
                 MR. LEVY: -- that requires you to be a
11
   lawyer. Now, the argument would be that only lawyers are
   qualified to do that work, but -- but it protects the
   lawyer revenue stream.
13
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                               Yeah, I think a lot of it had
14
  to do with title companies.
15
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                I remember, because they --
16
   there was a fight over whether they could do deeds --
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                Right.
18
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                               -- and they were cut back to
19
20
  just earnest money contracts. They can do earnest money
21
   contracts now, can't they?
22
                 MS. HENRICKS: Well, that's agents.
                                                       Real
   estate agents can do earnest money contracts.
23
2.4
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                I see.
25
                 MS. HENRICKS: And but I think title
```

```
companies have to employ a lawyer to prepare these
   documents.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
3
                               Yeah.
                 MS. HENRICKS: And there I think maybe at
 4
   one time there was some lack of clarity about that and
  then the statute came out of that.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace.
7
8
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Okay. Well, I
   quess I was going to ask the question, but what you're
  just saying, I suppose I understand, (2)(b)(4) then
10
  specifically excludes the matters set out in section
11
   83.001 relating to a transaction for the lease, sale, or
   transfer of any mineral interest.
13
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                That's right.
14
                 MR. ORSINGER: Mineral.
15
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: So you need to be
16
  a lawyer to do mineral leases and --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There's nothing going on
18
  in this meeting.
19
                 MR. LEVY: Well, like a land man is not a
20
   lawyer, but they certainly engage in that activity.
21
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE:
22
                                           Yeah.
                 MR. LEVY: One of the concerns also about
23
   this --
2.4
25
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                I think there's an exemption
```

```
for them in the statute.
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, but does
2
   that mean, okay, so a nonlawyer can prepare a lease?
                           Well, except --
                 MR. LEVY:
5
                 MS. HENRICKS: Not for compensation.
                 MR. LEVY: Not under this language that's in
 6
   the Government Code. The additional concern is that we
7
  would have lawyers who quite frequently would work on
   things like a joint operating agreement, which could
   include provisions related to who owns the property and --
10
11
   and provisions in that contract that would arguably affect
   real property and is a contracted legal instrument, and if
   that contract talks about ownership rights, would that be
13
  inconsistent with this provision. And so either this
14
  provision needs to be more clearly drafted or in my view
15
  it just should be taken out.
16
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, that's --
17
  because when I read (4), that's what I wondered, was does
18
   that apply to mineral leases, mineral deeds?
19
20
                 MR. LEVY: That's the uncertainty, and it
   needs to be clarified.
21
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: We need a little
22
   more uncertainty in the area of mineral leases. We don't
23
   litigate that enough.
24
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's always been what
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I've said.
               Skip, and then Justice Christopher.
                 MR. WATSON: Robert, I missed something at
2
   the beginning. Is the -- the impetus of this is primarily
  uncertainty of just not knowing where these people fall?
5
                 MR. LEVY: I think, yeah, as Susan
   described, they get calls frequently from lawyers who move
   to Texas to work for a company, and they ask, "What do I
   need to do, " and the answer is, "Well, nothing, we think."
   I think, is that fair?
10
                 MS. HENRICKS: Yes.
                                      That's --
                 MR. WATSON: Okay.
11
                 MS. HENRICKS: That's the way we --
12
                 MR. LEVY: So the board is saying \ I'm not
13
14 real comfortable about that.
                 MR. WATSON: That's where I'm going.
15
  understand it, there have been no ethics opinions and no
16
   disciplinary proceedings in this area, correct?
                 MR. LEVY: Not that I've seen, but I've not
18
  done an exhaustive search.
19
20
                 MS. PHILLIPS: But nobody wants to be the
   first one.
21
22
                 MR. WATSON: No, I understand that, but as I
   look at how detailed this is and then I see that I think
23
  you said there are no sanctions for not registering; is
25
   that correct?
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MR. LEVY: The way that it's drafted there are no sanctions, and I don't know how this rule could impose sanctions. So I'm trying to figure out MR. WATSON: exactly how this advances the ball. I mean, it does give, 5 you know, the -- the Board of Law Examiners or whomever a way to answer the question when the phone rings, but to me if there are no DR's, DR violations, no ethics opinions, it doesn't look like there's been a lot of even smoke, let 10 alone fire. 11 MR. LEVY: Well, there are questions. mean, this issue comes up. Kim was pointing out that they were discussing this just recently, and we've had -- we 13 asked the same question, what do we do, and if we have a 14 lawyer let's say who is coming in for a two-year 15 It doesn't make sense for them to sit for the assignment. 16 bar or even go through the process so --MR. WATSON: You've answered it. 18 MR. LEVY: -- we want to make sure they're 19 20 in the right place. 21 MR. WATSON: But if it is that important, then why isn't there enforcement? Let's say that a lawyer does come in, register under this and yet drafts a lease 23 that turns out to, heaven forbid, violate the rule against 2.4 perpetuities. You know, what happens, other than a civil 25

action? MR. LEVY: So I don't know how we could --2 if a lawyer chooses not to register under that rubric, if this rule passes, I don't see how we could have an enforcement mechanism because there is no ethic rule, disciplinary rule, nor is the statute clear that you require registration. If you do register under this provision, you are obligated to follow the terms of this registration rule; and if you violate that, I think the sanction would be your registration is revoked. So there 10 is that limited sanction, but you also obligate yourself 11 in effect, under the Texas disciplinary rules, so maybe you could be sanctioned in a disciplinary proceeding, but 13 I'm not sure how that would work, because you're not a 14 Texas lawyer. 15 MR. WATSON: Yeah, that's -- that's -- you 16 put your finger on the part that I'm having trouble finessing here. 18 MS. HENRICKS: The intention was that they 19 could be subject to discipline under the disciplinary 20 rules. 21 22 MR. LEVY: Okay. MR. WATSON: And it would help if something 23 said that. 2.4 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it does say that.

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MS. WOOTEN: Yeah, it does say that.
1
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It says they will follow
2
   the disciplinary rules in (2)(a).
3
                             Well, I understand that.
                 MR. WATSON:
5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or (4)(a).
                 MR. WATSON: But what happens if you don't,
 6
   I mean, is this aspirational, or is this --
7
                 MR. LEVY:
                            It is.
8
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    No, I agree.
9
10
                 MR. LEVY:
                           I think that's right.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher has
  been waiting to say something.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, can you
13
   explain how much harder it is to actually apply to waive
   into the bar versus this in-house registration?
15
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                The -- well, some people who
16
  would qualify for this registration would not qualify for
  admission without examination, either because they
18
   don't -- they can't meet the lawful practice experience
19
   requirement or because this would also apply to people who
20
   did -- who went to foreign law schools and maybe are
21
   licensed in a foreign country.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
23
                                               Okay, but
  taking away the foreign law school aspect, what -- I mean,
2.4
25
   if I have practiced five out of seven years, what is
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required for me to become a full member of the Texas bar
  that would -- that differs from this?
                 MS. HENRICKS: You also would have to have a
3
  satisfactory MPRE score. Most people have taken the MPRE.
  I have not, but most recently licensed lawyers have taken
  the MPRE, and you have to meet the law study requirement,
   which generally requires you to have a J.D. from an ABA
  approved law school, and there are many lawyers
  practicing, especially in California who have not obtained
  a J.D. from an ABA school. They would be allowed to
10
  register, but they wouldn't be allowed to obtain a license
11
  without examination.
                 MR. LEVY: And -- and if I could add, in
13
14 talking to my colleagues who are not licensed in Texas
  originally, the process for waiving in is -- is pretty
15
  detailed and --
16
                 MR. HARDIN: I think it's over now, isn't
17
  it?
18
                 MR. LEVY:
                           What was that?
19
                 MR. HARDIN: The waiving in now is over,
20
   isn't it, as of December 1st?
21
                 MR. LEVY: You're talking about -- that's
22
  the bar exam issue.
23
24
                 MR. HARDIN:
                              Okay.
25
                 MR. LEVY: And that will be much easier,
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but --MS. HENRICKS: But we're still accepting 2 applications for admission without examination. MR. LEVY: And but so the issue about the 4 MPRE, a colleague of mine did not take the MPRE, and so he's going to have to now sit for that exam and being a lawyer for 35 years, which is not the end of the world, but -- but it does make the process more difficult, and proving up your status of practicing five out of seven years can be also very challenging, because you have to --10 they're very careful about proving that you've done that, 11 and you can't just say it. You have to demonstrate that 12 you have done that. 13 MS. HENRICKS: If you're self-employed it 14 can be difficult. If you have been employed with a 15 corporation and can readily show that you've been fully 16 licensed and a full-time employee of a corporation or a 17 law firm then it's not so difficult. It's mainly for 18 people who are solos or a small firm. 19 20 MR. LEVY: Right. And I've -- and one of my 21 colleagues had been a contractor actually to Exxon-Mobil for many, many years, and they had to work through a number of hoops to meet that requirement. 23 2.4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Levi. 25 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Susan, I apologize,

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I must have been distracted when you were introduced.
  You're with the State Bar?
                 MS. HENRICKS: I'm the executive director of
3
   the Board of Law Examiners. We are the ones who qualify
5
   the applicants for admission.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So don't make her mad.
 6
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And --
7
8
                 MS. HENRICKS: No, you're already licensed.
   I don't have anything to say about it. That's the Chief
   Disciplinary Counsel.
10
11
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: So is it the opinion
  of the Board of Law Examiners that an out-of-state lawyer
   appearing before an agency or appearing in an arbitration
13
   seated in Texas is not required to be a Texas licensed --
14
   a licensed -- licensed -- a licensed Texas attorney?
15
                 MS. HENRICKS: You're asking me if the board
16
   agreed that this proposed rule would allow for that if
   they're registered?
18
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: No, that's not
19
20
   exactly my question.
                 MS. HENRICKS:
21
                               Okay.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Let me see if I
22
   can't express it a bit clearer. Is it the board's opinion
23
   or your opinion that if I'm a Kentucky lawyer I can appear
24
25
   before the Railroad Commission and not be licensed in
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Texas, irrespective of this registration stuff?
                 MS. HENRICKS: My board has never discussed
2
  that issue and has never come to any conclusion or opinion
   on it. In my personal experience, I was a board certified
   administrative lawyer and practiced in the state for 30
           I think they probably can do that. There's not
   really any law or rule that I know of that specifically
  prohibits it.
8
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   When you say, "They can
   do it," the Kentucky lawyers --
10
                 MS. HENRICKS: Yes.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- can come down.
12
                 MS. HENRICKS: I've seen them do it, yes.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   En masse.
14
                 MS. HENRICKS: And I have researched that
15
  question, and it wasn't clear to me that they couldn't do
  it.
17
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         Okay. So Rule 8.03,
18
  reporting professional misconduct, not in that -- those
19
   rules, but in these rules --
20
                 MR. LEVY: Disciplinary rules.
21
                 MS. HENRICKS:
22
                                Okay.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Disciplinary rules,
23
  which requires each of us who's licensed in Texas to
2.4
25
   report misconduct of another lawyer, and it doesn't say a
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Texas lawyer, of another lawyer whose conduct has violated
  the rules, is not -- is not triggered or implicated if I
  appear in an agency proceeding with a Kentucky lawyer not
  licensed in Texas.
5
                 MS. HENRICKS: I've never considered that
6
   question.
7
                 MR. LEVY: You might need counsel to
8
  represent you.
9
                 MR. WATSON: That's right. This is a trick
   question.
10
11
                 MS. HENRICKS: I'm not going to answer it.
12
                 MS. WOOTEN: Wise woman.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace.
13
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: On the last page,
14
  paragraph 7, continuing legal education requirements, it
15
  says, "In-house counsel should comply with all continuing
16
   legal education requirements applicable to members of the
  bar" is that -- what bar is that?
18
                 MS. HENRICKS: The State Bar.
19
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Texas State Bar?
20
                 MS. HENRICKS: Yes.
21
22
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Okay. How would
   they do -- I mean, if they've got to have 15 hours of CLE
23
24 here, do they have to get those 15 hours before they can
25
   exhibit -- be registered? You understand what I'm saying?
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MS. HENRICKS:
                                     No. They would just as
1
                                No.
  an ongoing requirement. Just like all other lawyers.
2
3
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What would they put down?
                 MR. LEVY: Would they have a bar number? Or
 4
  what number would they put down?
5
6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What bar number do they
7
  put down?
                 MS. HENRICKS: No, they wouldn't get a bar
8
  number, so the State Bar would have to address that
   question.
10
11
                 MR. ORSINGER: We just have to trust these
  Kentucky lawyers.
12
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, I don't
13
  know, I think you mentioned this earlier, but to me, it
   would seem to make more sense to just require them that
15
  they meet the CLE requirements of whatever state they are
16
  licensed in.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, how is it going to --
18
   the 15 hours of Louisiana law isn't going to help you a
19
20
   lot in Texas, is it?
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, no, but --
21
                 MS. HENRICKS: I imagine that the CLE that
22
   they got in Louisiana might be accepted by the Texas MCLE
23
   department.
24
25
                 MR. LEVY: It often is, if you go to
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national conferences.
                 MS. HENRICKS: Yeah, it is. If -- they look
2
  more at the provider than the topic, I think.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.
5
                 MR. MUNZINGER: The question that was just
   asked reveals the ambiguity of section (7), "to members of
6
   the bar." Why would you say "to members of the State Bar
   of Texas" if that's the bar that applies?
8
                 MR. LEVY: Yeah, that should be.
9
10
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                               That's a good idea.
11
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 That was meaningful
12
   activity.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Professor Carlson.
13
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: You may have already
14
   addressed this, and I apologize. What was your thought
15
  process with making this permissive as opposed to
16
   mandatory, and did you give any thoughts to reciprocity?
                 MS. HENRICKS: Well, we -- I think it would
18
  be hard to enforce. And, in fact, we would have no means
19
   to enforce it whatsoever, meaning the Board of Law
20
   Examiners. We wouldn't have the means to do that at all.
21
   In many states that have these types of rules, there is
   no -- it's not mandatory. It's really just permissive,
23
   and so we just took that approach as being we thought an
24
   appropriate first step at regulating this particular area,
25
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and as far as the reciprocity goes, are you talking about
  admission without examination?
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah, Chip was saying he
3
   can't go to Florida and do what this would allow him to
   do, would allow Florida lawyers to do here.
                 MS. HENRICKS: Well, they're allowed to do
 6
   that now if they meet the requirements for being admitted
7
  with or without examination, we do that, and with the
   advent of the Uniform Bar Examination, which we're going
  to start taking those applications next month.
10
  neither Florida nor California gives the Uniform Bar
11
   Examination right now, but most states do, and so we are
   going to have a lot more lawyers who will qualify for
13
  admission in Texas with those UBE scores.
14
                           And, professor, I could not -- as
15
                 MR. LEVY:
  I was looking at the proposed rule, I felt like it would
16
   be a problem to require this in a rule, a State Bar
17
   rule -- or a Board of Law Examiners rule when there is a
18
   State Bar Act that provides for licensure and/or the
19
20
   disciplinary rules that have a different approval process.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Professor Carlson.
21
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Has this been vetted
22
   with the State Bar of Texas?
23
                            Susan, have you?
2.4
                 MR. LEVY:
25
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                I'm sorry. What was the
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question?
                 MR. LEVY: Has this been discussed with the
2
  bar?
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                I have talked to Trey Apffel
  about it. He was supportive of the idea. It hasn't gone
   any father than that.
                                     Thank you.
7
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                           Yeah, Kennon.
8
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
9
                 MS. WOOTEN: A question regarding the
  registration process is whether it's intended to condone
10
11
  the in-house non-Texas attorney and his or her dealings
  with litigation, and the reason it comes to mind is
  because I look at the authored activities under (a) (1),
13
14 and I was just thinking about whether it would allow, for
   example, the in-house counsel to talk with a legal expert
15
   involved with litigation. And so that, really, the
16
   question is -- is whether it should pick up basically any
17
   activity the in-house counsel may engage in litigation
18
  process or not?
19
                 MR. LEVY:
                           Well --
20
                 MS. HENRICKS: I -- I don't think there's
21
   anything that would prevent an in-house counsel now from
   speaking to an expert. I think there are, you know, as
23
  you know, a host of issues for the litigation counsel
2.4
25
   about that, but these, it's not intended to address any of
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that.
                 MS. WOOTEN: Okay. Is the intent -- I
2
  guess, the question more directly, is the intent to allow
   the in-house counsel to be involved with litigation in
5
   Texas?
6
                 MS. HENRICKS: Well, they obviously might
   give legal advice to their employer or the directors or
7
   officers about the litigation, but it does say down in the
   unauthorized activities, as we've already talked about,
   that they could not appear in Texas courts in person or by
10
   signing pleadings, so that would be the limitation on it.
11
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                              Uh-huh.
12
                 MS. HENRICKS: If they want to do that then
13
  you get a full license.
14
                           And currently --
                 MR. LEVY:
15
                 MS. WOOTEN: Or pro hac vice.
16
                 MS. HENRICKS: They don't qualify, because
17
   they live in Texas.
18
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                             Uh-huh.
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Scott.
20
                 MR. STOLLEY: Yeah. One of the things that
21
   this group does a good job of is getting consultation and
   buy-in from different constituencies that have an interest
23
   in the issue, and somebody just mentioned the State Bar of
24
25
           I've recently served on the board of directors of
   Texas.
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the State Bar, so it occurs to me that it probably would
  be a good idea to run this by the State Bar board of
   directors, because I think you would want to get that
   constituency to buy in on this if you want to enact it.
5
                 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I echo that.
                                               I ditto that.
                 MS. PHILLIPS: If it's not enacted, then
 6
   people will just not register at all, so you won't have
   any -- there will be no -- you won't know one way or the
   other.
          Right?
10
                 MS. HENRICKS: And that's the way it is now.
11
  Yes.
                 MR. STOLLEY:
12
                               And that -- that may persuade
   the State Bar board to get behind this.
13
                 MS. WOOTEN: And I'll add just for the
14
  record that part of what we do at my firm is counsel
15
  people on ethical considerations before litigation arises,
   before people get in trouble, et cetera, and this is a
   question that comes up.
18
                 MS. HENRICKS:
                                Uh-huh.
19
                 MS. WOOTEN: So just because we're not
20
21
   seeing it in professional ethics committee opinions
  doesn't mean that it's not very much on the minds of
   people, and I think the definition of practice of law
23
  being as vague as it is in 81.101 is something that merits
24
25
   concern for people not wanting to cross the line in Texas.
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MS. HENRICKS:
                                That's what we hear, yeah.
1
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That really raises a good
2
   question, what has this come up and this is -- this
  purports to be Rule 23 of the rules governing the
   admission to the State Bar of Texas. Is that a rule that
   the Supreme Court promulgates, or is it a rule that the
  bar promulgates?
8
                 MS. HENRICKS: It's a Supreme Court rule,
   and it would actually be 24 because since we drafted this
10
   rule --
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Right.
                 MS. HENRICKS: -- there's been a 23.
12
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           Okay.
13
                                                  So we
                                   Justice Gray.
14 haven't wasted our time, good.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It seems to me that
15
  we're dealing in an area where there's a lot of
16
   uncertainty and that this may bring some certainty, so it
17
   seems like a worthwhile endeavor. The focus, however, has
18
  been on those attorneys that are residing or relocating to
19
   Texas, and we live in a society now where there's a lot of
20
   travel involved, and it would seem to me that the same
21
   concerns would exist if any lawyer were coming to Texas to
   work with their client, their employer, say a -- I'm more
23
   familiar with the big eight accounting firms, many of
24
25
   which -- well, now it's the big four or three or
```

something. MR. ORSINGER: Three, yeah. 2 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: The ones that -- are we 3 down to three now? Okay. There were eight involved when 5 I was. 6 MR. ORSINGER: I remember. We lost one of them here in Houston. 7 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And they had a -- New 8 York was their home office, but lots of offices in Texas, 10 and their in-house counsel would come to Texas and work 11 with us on litigation here and, you know, work directly with -- and I really want to get away from the litigation but focus on other things, partnership, internal issues, 13 their own leases where they were negotiating for multiple floors of, you know, an office tower, those things where 15 their counsel are coming here and avoiding an argument 16 that they are providing the unauthorized practice of law 17 in Texas. So I -- I don't fully understand why we are 18 only striving to protect those who reside or relocate 19 20 here, and I see Robert has an answer to that part of it. MR. LEVY: Well, I think that goes to the 21 same issue that when Levi goes to New York City for deposition, he's not doing anything to seek New York's 23 imprimatur to appear in that state to conduct legal work 24 on behalf of his Louisiana client. That's an interesting 25

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issue, and there are also tax implications with that as
  well, but I think it's a little bit beyond what this is
  trying to accomplish.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay. The -- then I'll
  boil it down to go from the macro to the extreme micro.
  Under (b) (2) -- I'm sorry under (2) (b) (1), it says
   "appearing for the business organization in Texas courts."
   I'm assuming that's going to include federal courts in
  Texas, and it would seem to me to be "appearing for the
  business organization in a court in Texas" would be a
10
11
  better way to phrase that. It's a gnat.
                 Also, as a gnat on section 4 on
12
  registration, (a)(2)(c), the registration has to say
13
   something about "is not subject to a disciplinary
14
  proceeding." The way the disciplinary proceedings work,
15
  at least in Texas, you may or may not know that you are
16
   subject to a disciplinary proceeding, so I would suggest
17
  that that phrase say "is not aware of a pending
18
   disciplinary proceeding."
19
20
                 And then on section 4(a)(2)(4), it says
   "submit an application to register." I would say "a fully
21
   completed application" so that they can't leave things
   out. I have some more gnats, but I figure I'll stop with
23
   those two.
2.4
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Those are good gnats.
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Gnats flying all around. What else? Jane got it.
  Although she didn't appreciate it. All right. Any other
   comments about this rule? Alistair, is that your hand
   going up?
5
                 MR. DAWSON:
                             Nope.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace.
 6
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, if we're
7
  going to -- if there's going to be a provision that they
8
   comply with the State Bar of Texas CLE requirements, how
   is that going to be -- how are we going to know if they do
10
         I mean, if I don't comply I get a notice that your
11
   license is suspended or going to be, but I don't know how
   this would -- what would be plugged in with the CLE system
13
   to keep track of that, but something would need to be
15
   done.
                 MS. HENRICKS: Right, we haven't gone that
16
   far with it, but if they're going to be -- they're going
   to be registered with the State Bar and paying dues to the
18
   State Bar, so I think the State Bar could be responsible
19
   with that, and in speaking with Trey, he didn't see any
20
   issues with that.
21
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything else?
  Well, thanks for that. Thanks very much for that.
23
   If there are any more revisions or comments or input from
24
   the State Bar or anything else with respect to this
25
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proposed rule, contact Jackie or Martha or Paulene, and do it as timely as you can, and then we'll consider this rule submitted to the Court, and it will not be back on the agenda unless somebody needs it to be. 5 So moving -- moving right along, the next item on our agenda is the parental leave continuance rule, 6 and Professor Carlson and Tom Riney are the experts on this. 8 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Kennon is going to take 9 the lead on this section. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Kennon is going to 11 12 take the lead. Okay. So the materials include MS. WOOTEN: 13 three different documents for consideration. One is for 14 background purposes, and it's the letter from Randy 15 Sorrels to Jackie dated October 23rd, 2018, which is in 16 the record so that you-all know why the court rules committee ultimately proposed revisions to Rule 253 of the 18 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to address parental leave 19 continuances, and that is the second item in the packet of 20 materials. It's the court rules committee's proposal. 21 The third and final item in the materials 22 today is the American Bar Association's reports to the 23 House of Delegates on Resolution 101B, and this resolution 24

came out not long after the court rules committee had

25

completed its work on the continuance provision, so we wanted you-all to have that as well so you have a complete picture.

And on that note of providing a complete picture, I will state for the record that to our knowledge as of today you have just a few jurisdictions with rules on place -- in place, excuse me. Florida, North Carolina, and then in Texas we have one standing order in Harris County that is put out by Judge Sandill of the 127th District Court in Harris County. So this is an area without a whole lot of precedent, but it has a lot of attention on it. If you are on any social media platforms you may have seen some of that, and you can also get a feel for the attention on this particular area if you read through the resolution from the American Bar Association.

2.4

So going back to the first document, the letter dated October 23rd, 2018, you can see that Randy asked for consideration of implementing a statewide policy pertaining to maternity and adoption issues that arise in the litigation setting, and he specifically asked the court rules committee to look into developing and drafting a policy to address some of the issues parents face in an upcoming birth or adoption of a child. So Giana Ortiz was the chair of the court rules committee who took the lead in getting this proposal down on the books, and as you can

see, it entails amending existing Rule 253 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to add a subpart (a) and leaving intact the existing language of Rule 253, which is now in subpart (b) of the rule.

2.2

And then walking through at a high level the proposal, you'll see that there are a few things that stand out. One, it's meant to apply to people regardless of their gender, so it's males and females alike. Two, that consistent with Randy Sorrels suggestion it addresses both birth and adoption. And three, there are basically three categories of lawyers who would be governed by this particular rule. Bless you. One is the lead attorney who has been on the case for more than 10 days prior to the date that the suit is set for trial. Two is the lead attorney who comes in within that 10-day period, and the third and final category is an attorney other than a lead attorney who is involved in the case and working it up in a meaningful way.

So one thing we wanted to do today as a subcommittee is just go through some kind of high level kind of policy issues that we grappled with at the subcommittee level. One of those is whether we need a particular provision for parental leave continuances as opposed to just having what we have on the books now for continuances. So that's one big issue.

Another big issue is whether the rule that's proposed should have different categories of treatment for different types of lawyers, as opposed to just saying for all lawyers across the board if you're going to seek a continuance you get it in the absence of a substantial prejudice to the other side, for example, and then the third issue that's been discussed in the subcommittee level that we wanted full committee feedback on is how soon should somebody have to seek this continuance when 10 they're involved in a case and know that they might need 11 time due to parenting responsibilities. In looking at the proposal now, you'll see 12 that in subpart (a) (1) there's a reasonable time 13 requirement that's been proposed. This is one of the 14 things that was discussed at the subcommittee level, which 15 is perhaps needing to be more concrete, so we would like 16 the full committee feedback on that point. And Professor 17 Carlson may have additional big picture items she wants us 18 to consider, so I'll turn it over to her. 19 20 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I did speak with, I 21 think, Jackie, you were on the phone. MS. DAUMERIE: 22 Yes. PROFESSOR CARLSON: We spoke with the --23 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We can't hear 2.4 25 you.

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I'm sorry. Jackie and I
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
  had a phone conference with the attorneys in Florida.
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                 MS. DAUMERIE: Yes, and a group called
  Mother's Esquire. Yes.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the president of
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   that group.
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                 MS. DAUMERIE:
                                Right.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And they were kind of
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   explaining the Florida process, how this came to be, and
   apparently -- correct me if I'm wrong, apparently this did
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  not bode well with the rules committee to begin with.
                 MS. DAUMERIE: Yes. Their group that's like
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   SCAC was opposed to this sort of rule, but the State Bar
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14 was very much for it, and the court asked them to -- I
   quess they had oral arguments recently. I'm not sure
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  they've actually passed a rule yet.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, I had the
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   impression they had.
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                 MS. DAUMERIE: I think they just had oral
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  arguments in August, but I can check.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They had an argument
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  about the rule?
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes. Because I asked
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   the lawyer several times on the phone, "You had oral
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   arguments?" They said, "Yes the Supreme Court ordered us
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to oral arguments about the rule." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 2 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Did the committee 3 think about or look at a leave requirement like -- I mean, a leave like this in connection with anything under the Family and Medical Leave Act, rather than parental, solely parental leave? 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: We did not. We did not 8 look beyond the face of this, and we've only --10 Justice Bland, we've only had one phone conference of the subcommittee. Most of the subcommittee liked the idea of 11 it. Some felt very negative about it because it could be 12 subject to misuse, like we see potentially with the 13 legislative continuance, and then of course, the devil is 14 in the details. So before we got too far into the weeds 15 we thought let's hear back from our committee, just on the 16 big picture, high level, what do you think. Do you think it's a good idea, bad idea. 18 MS. WOOTEN: And one thing I'll note in 19 terms of potential abuse is that there is a different 20 treatment for the lead attorney who has come in within 10 21 days of the date the suit is set for trial, and that's mirrored in part after what we see in the legislative 23 continuance rule, which is Rule 254 of the Texas Rules of 2.4 25 Civil Procedure, and it's designed to get at that

possibility that someone might game the system by getting somebody on the case at the last minute who could be used to justify a continuance. MR. GILSTRAP: Can't imagine. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace. HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Yeah, I think 6 there's real problems with the 10-day rule, but also the lead attorney. The lead attorney, first of all, the Texas 8 rule, Rule 8, defines lead, if no one else is designated it's the attorney whose name first appears on the 10 pleadings, so down at the clerk's office it's going to 11 show that as lead attorney. Other attorneys come and go sometimes --13 MS. WOOTEN: Right. 14 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: -- and my 15 experience is they very seldom change lead attorney, so 16 defining what the lead attorney is sometimes is not going to be easy in a case, you know, where there may be a 18 number of attorneys. 19 And I will say that the intent 20 MS. WOOTEN: at the court rules committee level was for the lead 21 attorney to be as it is defined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and that led to a discussion of the 23 reality that in many cases the lead attorney may not be 2.4 25 the attorney who is actually working up that case for

trial, which is why there's the separate provision in the rule for attorneys other than lead attorney.

HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Or the lead attorney may leave that firm and withdraw, and nobody else says, "I'm now lead attorney."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, right. Yeah, Frank, go ahead. And then Justice Christopher.

MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I'm not sure whether this is a problem in search of a solution or a solution in search of a problem. I certainly -- we're all for the idea of family leave, but, you know, I mean, if you -- anyone who's been through a difficult litigation where the other side is continuing to avoid trial and you've got a provision that says, you know, you could have a lead attorney who has got a two-month-old child and you get a continuance, no -- no -- no discretion on the part of the court. That's going to be abused.

At the -- I think the question -- and something obviously that's bothersome about this in that it privileges birth of a child over other family emergencies, like death of a child. That's just as traumatic, even worse, why that, and why -- why attorneys and not parties? I mean, the defendant -- the defendant just had a baby. Well, you don't get the automatic continuance, but the lawyer would. I guess you want to

ask is -- you know, is there evidence? Does anyone have any experience on this? Are there judges who are abusing this?

Association's committee they say there's anecdotal evidence across the country concerning incidences where continuances are denied for pregnancy or birth-related issues. When you read the report you find that there was one high profile case in Georgia in an immigration court where the mother wound up taking the newborn child to court, and that obviously got on the internet. There's also some reports that some things have happened in New Hampshire, and that's it. I guess, you know, what's driving this is the popularity of parental leave. If you'll look at the language, the judge here in Houston was inspired to adopt a standing rule. Well, inspiration is not a very good reason to adopt rules.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It depends on your perspective.

MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I mean, it may be something — it may be a proper thing when you're passing legislation, it may be a proper thing where you're a judge deciding a case, but we're talking about the Rules of Civil Procedure. I'm all against racial discrimination. We don't have a rule in this provision prohibiting that in

the rules because we don't need it. We don't need something -- do we need this? The State Bar rules committee says that they're adopting -- they want this because they are committed to the concept of parental Well, that's etiology. Committed to the concept is not a good reason to adopt a rule. Is there a problem? Does anybody have any anecdotal information? Do we need Why not just keep Rule 2-5 -- was it 254 or 253 8 that deals with it as a matter of discretion. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I was going to ask if 11 anybody was opposed to this thing? But thanks for --Justice Christopher, and then Tom, and then Kennon. 12 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I -- I 13 believe that most trial judges grant continuances if asked 14 in connection with parental leave, but I assume that 15 there's always some outlier out there somewhere, and 16 that's why people want the rule. But I -- you know, if --17 if we do it for parental leave, well, what about death of 18 a child, what about death of a parent, I mean, how many 19 20 things are we going to add in that it's an automatic continuance. 21 As to the text of the rule itself, I do not 22 imagine a scenario where companies are going to bring on a 23 pregnant woman to get a continuance. I just don't see it 2.4 25 happening, so I just wouldn't worry about the timing of

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when they filed the motion for continuance.
                                                If you want
  to put it in there, I would make it more than 10 days, if
  you really are worried about this -- this, you know,
   influx of pregnant women to get continuances.
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                 MS. BARON:
                             They need more --
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I just don't
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   see it happening, and then with respect to the nonlead
  attorney, just put them in the regular continuance rule,
   this whole shifting burden and back and forth, just put
  them in the regular continuance rule.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The problem, though, is
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  this is not -- this is gender neutral, so the company
  doesn't run in the pregnant woman. They run in the spouse
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  of the pregnant woman who --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, you know
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  what, if we want to prevent abuse, we need to make sure
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  that that spouse doesn't go to work for three months.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: We can't say he can't go.
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19
  Okay.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: If he gets a
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   continuance, he can't go to work for three months.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Tom.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's how to
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   stop that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Tom, Kennon, and then
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Rusty.

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MR. RINEY: Like Lisa this morning, I think I'm pro-parent, and I think my track record on being pro-family is pretty good, but I see a lot of problems with this rule. I was on the subcommittee, and I expressed many of the concerns that have already been summarized. Any time we adopt a specific rule for a specific situation, there are going to be consequences, and we need to think about those consequences. If I've got a case, if I'm defending a case that I don't want to go to trial on, and Perdue's representing a widow in a wrongful death case with minor children, and I bring in an associate and all of the sudden he's lead counsel because his wife's pregnant, I suspect that Perdue's client is not going to think this is a pro-parent policy.

And it says it's a three-month continuance, but in a lot of cases, particularly in my part of the world where a judge may have multiple counties, the next time we get a trial setting may be six months, and it may be eight months, it may be longer, and I have seen in a case -- and listen, I wasn't complaining because I was new to the case, too. I thought it was just fine, but one of the defendants hired lead counsel. The case was already set for trial. She came in to court and said, "That's right near my due date. We're going to have to put it

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off," and it moved the trial off six months, at least,
   over the objection of the plaintiffs and the intervenors,
  and right after the continuance was granted, we never saw
  her again, never at a hearing, never at a deposition, and
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   so, it can --
                 (Phone system message stating "There doesn't
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                 appear to be any activity in this meeting.")
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                 MR. RINEY: Now, we get into Munzinger's
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   category.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's go.
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                 MR. RINEY: Part of the problem is it does
   impose upon judicial discretion. Some examples been
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   given, but I just wrote down three. Suppose that one of
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   the lawyers has a child in Amarillo that's been diagnosed
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  with cancer and that needs to come to M.D. Anderson for
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  three months. They don't get an automatic continuance.
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   can't imagine the judge denying it, but I can't imagine a
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   judge doing it under most circumstances.
                                             Suppose that
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   someone had an elderly parent who was living alone and had
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   a severe illness and needed help. It's putting priority
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   in a specific category while ignoring others and
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   presumably giving it a higher level of importance.
                  What if the lawyer has just had an
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  intervention and needs to go to rehab, well, that wouldn't
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   be automatic, but that associate that I bring in whose
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wife's pregnant is automatic. I don't think it's good to take that kind of discretion away from our trial judges, and I think there may have been abuses. I don't question that there may have been. I think the evidence is pretty slim, but we can't make a rule taking away the judge's discretion for every situation, and I can go on and on and on with the examples of how it can be abused.

I think that we have to leave some of this to the discretion of the trial judge, and I agree with Frank. Let's not create a new set of problems when we haven't really established what it is, the problem is that we're trying to solve here.

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Then Rusty, then CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Kennon. 14 Roger.

MS. WOOTEN: A few things. One, we did get an additional example of a problem occurring in Texas courts, specifically in I think it was Collin County where a woman who came to a firm and was put on a case and was pregnant five months before the setting, sought a continuance and didn't get it from the judge, and she was told by the judge that someone else in her office could try the case.

So there's more information here that I can provide, but I'm telling you about this now so you will understand it's not just one concrete example, and I will say as a woman that we are not always going to come forward and complain, so the fact that we don't have a whole lot of concrete examples of this being a problem, doesn't mean that there hadn't been problems, and so I throw that out there because I think it's a reality that women confront particularly in some big firm law practices.

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The second thing I wanted to note is that some of the language in the court rules committee proposal comes from the Florida rule that is quoted, and that's on page five of the ABA resolution, in case you wanted to see where the language originated, and that's more specifically about the burden shifting, and it perhaps is too complicated and it doesn't need to be there, but it does have some -- some grounding in that Florida rule 16 language.

And the third thing that I wanted to point out in here is if anyone wants to see Judge Sandill's standing order, it's also quoted on page five of the ABA resolution.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Rusty.

MR. HARDIN: I have a hard time figuring out how people are really going to manipulate this. It seems to me the only -- and therefore, I think we may be overdoing the concerns about any abuse. If a woman is

pregnant and she is not the lead counsel but she's made the lead counsel or if the man's wife is pregnant and he's not the lead counsel and he's made the lead counsel, it seems that lead counsel changing to manipulate it can be done in the statute. You have to be lead counsel within 90 days before you're asking for a continuance or some period of time so that it's clear that somebody can't mess with changing of lead counsel. Otherwise, going out and finding a man or a woman who are about to have a child in their relationship in order to get a continuance seems to me to be a pretty big challenge.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You really need the continuance.

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MR. HARDIN: If you really want to try to manipulate, you're going to have to work at it. And we lived through the legislative continuance, used to drive me crazy when a lawyer would show up and then we would never see him or her again after they got the continuance. I realize lawyers are going to sort of do this, but when I think of all the damage the Legislature does to the jurisprudence of this state and yet we have let the members of that Legislature automatically get a continuance, it seems to me having a child and having both parents involved trumps it by a bunch. So I think we're exaggerating the problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger, and then Judge Wallace.

MR. HUGHES: Well, three things. I think most of the pushback coming here, I think the first pushback is we've all seen how the legislative continuance gets abused, and yet it's still with us. Why is it still with us? Because we know what the Legislature would do if we abolished the rule. Okay. Isn't that -- I mean, if we could get rid of this rule, it -- we would, but we know how the legislators would react. I mean, we've already seen what they do to the rules when they don't trust us. Think what would happen if we got rid of the legislative continuance, which leads me to my second point about why I think there's perhaps some pushback on this.

What I noticed, I read the book called "Half The Sky," which was a reference to a Chinese statement that women hold up half the sky, and it was a pointed analysis of what happens when women in third world countries suddenly get political economic power, and since we are seeing today is more and more women take the bench and also enter the profession, we are seeing certain issues become important that weren't important before.

Why? Because there were no women to advocate for them in any position of authority, and one of them is child care and health care.

I don't want to have to explain to the public why it is we have given the legislators a freebie chip to throw down so they know they can be hired and they can be paid fat fees so that they can bail a client out to keep them from going to trial, but God bless a woman gets pregnant, and she's thrown in the hopper with everyone else to see if she can get a continuance or not. And it's only going to take a couple before it's going to make us all look bad. So those are my two first points. Because that -- I mean, it's only going to take a couple of cases, and everybody is going to look at us, what are you doing, y'all are a bunch of neanderthals down there.

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Now, the other thing is this: My suggestion -- I mean, I think the rule is a little overly complex, and maybe it would be better just to tweak it to give, you know, lead counsel for more time and then everyone else goes into the general rule. I suggest a comment and the comment be that issues of pregnancy and adoption be taken into account when we set cases for trial. It would be really interesting if we had judges going, oh, yeah, I know about the parental leave, but here's what we're going to do. We're going to set it one week before your due date or your wife's due date, and we'll just -- we're just going to have a little note posted in the file that it will get continued if there's a

delivery before then, and it's like what do you do?

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I mean, I think there should be something -especially because most cases, most trials -- I mean, I don't know how it works everywhere else, but in many counties the judge doesn't set it for trial. You go back and you talk to a court coordinator. Sometimes it's a woman, but sometimes it's a guy. It would be nice to have a comment to put in front of them saying you're going to have to consider Ms. so-and-so's due date when you set this case for trial so we don't end up setting it right at the time around her due date. And that would be my only addition to the rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay, thanks. Judge 14 Wallace.

HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: I was just going to say somebody asked -- I think Frank -- about how big a problem it is. In 10 years on the bench, I've never seen a contested motion for a continuance over a family leave matter. I've seen a few agreed, and Tarrant County is a pretty good place to practice law, so that may not be the end all, so in that sense, but I can understand why we may need to have a rule, okay, but if you're going to have a rule, don't put something in it where the trial judge has no discretion either for a lead attorney or nonlead attorney.

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I mean, every time the Legislature says
  something that one side will be awarded attorney's fees,
  Rule 91a, anti-SLAPP cases, all the time you see them
   where some of those are close questions and you say I wish
   I didn't have to do this, but you do. So, I mean, if
   somebody is abusing the 10-day rule or whatever, give the
   judge at least the discretion somehow to apply some test
   that, no, huh-uh, that's not going to work.
   didn't want to go to trial, I bet he can find somebody in
   Jackson Walker who either was pregnant or has a pregnant
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   spouse. I'm not saying he's going to do it, and I doubt
   that that would be widely abused, but just leave some
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   discretion in there would be my suggestion.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Who was next?
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  Well, Alistair, we haven't heard from you today.
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                 MR. DAWSON:
                             Right. So I'm on the
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   subcommittee and when we first started talking about this,
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   as much as I never like to disagree with Tom Riney --
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         Speak up.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Oh, me?
                                       I've never been
   accused of that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           Believe it or not.
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                 MR. DAWSON: I think this is a no-brainer to
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  pass this rule. You know, I worry about sexist judges who
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   are not going to grant continuances to women who are
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pregnant. I've never been pregnant, but I understand it's a very challenging time in a woman's life, and, you know, there's a lot of emotional issues, there's a lot of stress. I worry about judges who want to deny continuances in hopes that it will encourage the parties to settle, and I just think as a practical matter if a woman knows if -- and I know it applies to men as well, but in my mind this is primarily -- my comments are primarily directed about female attorneys.

If she knows when she gets pregnant that she has a right to get a continuance, it takes one issue off the table that she doesn't have to worry about, and to me that's hugely advantageous, and I recognize that there are -- with all of our rules there is potential for abuses, but I just sort of weigh the benefits and the negatives and the benefits far outweigh the potential downside in my judgment.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Evan, did you have your hand up? Yeah.

MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. I also support the rule, and I think there are a couple of values that maybe transcend the specific case of are we going to see abuse here, are we going to have a quicker trial or delay there. One of them, though, is that if there is abuse of the sort that has been identified, as rare as I think it will be,

it will -- that cynicism of using a very well-intended rule in order to achieve a result that really doesn't have anything to do with the underlying value will harm the value, will harm the rule. And so I wonder if one thing that the rule could do to discourage further what I expect would be a rare thing but could happen, there are attorneys that have been known from time to time to do things that might not seem entirely proper, would be to simply require the certification that as the norm as extensions of time that it's not for purposes of delay, and I think at least some people, even if the person would be brought in, oh, new trial, might not think much of it necessarily, but if they have to sign that certification, it might discourage someone from asking or agreeing to be used in that way, and the reason for it is not, again, because I think that's a frequent occurrence. signal to people we take this seriously and it would be very egregious to abuse something so valuable that has this larger transcendent value for the law, which is to say that we value people who are lawyers but are going through what indeed are very challenging times in life. It's hard enough, young women in particular, who are in litigation at this particular time in finding what's an increasingly path towards partnership, for example, and the knowledge that you're going to be out of

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commission for a significant time, even though the law says you're not supposed to be treated any differently, it's more than possible that they themselves will opt out of certain roles out of deference to clients or others, knowing what's coming or that partners in firms, supervisors in other organizations, will even subconsciously limit opportunities.

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And so to me this is a way that the Court could signal to clients, to firms, to prior generations that indeed this is a part of life that we anticipate and we welcome and we encourage and it should, at this point at least, maybe in, you know, a certain period of time like Justice O'Connor said about affirmative action, maybe we won't need it in 25 years, but I think we do still need it if only for the signaling value, even if there aren't that many judges who will deny it today. I think I've seen with my own eyes the challenge continues to exist, and it is a worthwhile thing for the Court to take a modest step that encourages people to have children without thinking that there's going to be a penalty for themselves or their client for perhaps counter-balanced with that simple statement that assures themselves and others that they are doing it for that reason and not something else, thus preserving public confidence in the Court's rule is doing what it says it's doing and not

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doing something else like the accusations that have been
  made about the legislative continuance, so I think on
  balance, it's more than worth the cost that articulate may
  be real, but the benefits would more than outweigh.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, and thanks, Evan.
   On your idea of a certificate, I was -- I was thinking
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   about that myself and wondering if in addition to the
  usual language, this is not sought for purposes of delay,
   et cetera, whether we might consider the lawyer saying, "I
   certify I am the lead lawyer in this case and will be the
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   lead lawyer at the resetting."
                 MR. HARDIN: I think the second half is
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   important, too.
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                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE:
                                           Yeah.
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                 MR. HARDIN: The second half of what you
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  just said is important, "and will be."
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
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                 MR. HARDIN: Not only I am, but will be.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, because that will
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   avoid the scamming. Commissioner Sullivan, and then Judge
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   Wallace.
             I think.
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                 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN:
                                           I was going to
   endorse the Hardin Doctrine. I do think in practice this
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   is going to be fairly difficult to manipulate with one
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   significant exception, which I think is what is being
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alluded to by most people, and that is the suggestion that you would move to substitute counsel or designate new lead counsel for the purpose of manipulating, and I would think that maybe there we need to specifically say, "My motion to substitute counsel will not be used -- nothing about this will be used for the purpose of delay," and if you found out that someone's spouse was pregnant or whatever and that was known at the time that, you know, you moved to substitute or that you requested designation of new lead counsel, that might be grounds to strike the designation or to deny the motion. Anyway, that plus perhaps your suggestion that this is someone who intends to remain as lead counsel would, I think, obviate a lot of the problems.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace.

HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Well, I was thinking the sort of the same line, like a vacation letter, you know. I am -- "for purposes of parental leave I will be unavailable," if you want to set a number of days or whatever, whether it be in the form of a motion or notice. If the trial hadn't been set, you could almost just say they give notice, and the trial cannot be set during that period of time. They're going to have notice quite a ways ahead, right? It's not something that's going to happen 10 days before trial. That may not be

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good, but I agree, and maybe -- maybe the answer is, is to
  give -- have them represent that they will be lead counsel
  and then if somebody comes in to substitute as lead
  counsel, maybe there is where the court ought to have
   discretion to say, no, you know, you're not coming in,
  unless you want to represent you're not going to ask for a
  continuance or something.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Yep.
                                          Kennon, then
  Richard Orsinger, then Levi, and then Richard Munzinger,
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   and then Justice Christopher, and then Buddy.
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  anybody will write that down for me.
                 MS. WOOTEN: I wish you had asked before you
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  started identifying people. I've already forgotten.
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Can I have leave to
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  go?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do you want to yield to
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  Levi?
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                 MS. WOOTEN: I will yield to Levi.
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I generally support
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  the rule, but I have personal experience that there are
   lawyers, for example, like Bobby Meadows, who cannot try a
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   case without the substantial participation of other
   lawyers to assist him, so I don't -- I don't think it
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   ought to say "lead attorney." It ought to be any --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody assisting
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Meadows?

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HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: -- any lawyer who will attest that they have substantially participated and that they expect to substantially participate when the case is tried. Because, I mean, Bobby is out flying to California and surfing, and he's got other lawyers substantially participating getting the case ready, and I don't mean that as a slur. I mean, that's great, but I mean, he doesn't try a case by himself. There's a lot of lawyers who get the case ready, and so there ought to be lawyers who are substantially participating as those words are ordinarily understood.

So you don't subscribe to CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 14 the one riot, one ranger approach? Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Several points, Chip. First of all, everyone is talking about how it's gender neutral, and I see that it says regardless of applicant's gender, but the phrase "in connection with the birth or adoption of a child by an applicant," to me arguably means adoption by an applicant, but it can't mean birth by an applicant if they're not the mother. So I don't know if anyone wants to look more closely at that language.

Three months, I want to echo what Tom Riney A three-month continuance could easily be a six-month or a nine-month continuance, so let's not fool

ourselves. We may be using up the better part of a year. At the end of section (a), the only exemption to the mandatory grant is juvenile proceedings under Chapter 54 or child protective proceedings under 262, but family, I mean, the family violence orders or protective orders under Chapter 82 and 85 probably belong on that list, and there may be others. I think we should -- if we're going to have a mandatory continuance rule, let's be sure that everything that is really, really important is added to this list of exceptions where it becomes discretionary.

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I can tell you just from personal experience in San Antonio that we had a county court at law judge who was receiving -- a verdict was -- a jury was out deliberating a verdict when -- let's see, I think after the trial started there was a legislator, maybe it was slightly before the 10 days. Anyway, the court of appeals issued a mandamus while the jury was out. She went ahead and took the jury verdict but kept it sealed, and then they filed -- the court of appeals filed a show cause order against her to show cause why she shouldn't be held in contempt for disregarding the mandamus order by receiving the verdict, and she was unable to defend it.

I mean, her explanation was, you know, I wanted to finish the trial and we sealed the verdict and everything, and I was in the courtroom. They held her in

contempt. This is an all female appellate court. They held her in contempt, and they put her in handcuffs, and they took her away to the Bexar County jail, and that was a big cause locally, and she was a well-known judge about family violence, and this was a family violence criminal prosecution. The only time that a sitting judge went to jail as far as I know in the history of Texas, and I was a witness to it.

But my point is that family violence is as important as child protection, and it's as important as juvenile prosecutions, I think, and there may be some others that we need to think through, if there is going to be a mandatory rule with no discretion whether there's more areas than just those two.

within a reasonable time after the later of learning of the basis for it or learning of the setting. Well, that works if you're already hired in the case when you find out there's going to be a birth event, but for those who get hired in 11 days before trial, they can't comply with (a) (1) so I'm going to assume that (a) (1) doesn't apply to somebody that got hired in after they found out that there was going to be a birth, and I think we need to be careful about how (a) (1) is handled, either -- either it should be said it applies only to someone in the cases where they're

already hired, or we ought to somehow recognize the fact that people are going to get hired in after the deadline in (a)(1) has expired.

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Number two, 10 days is way too short. I mean, try to convince me why somebody hired 11 days before trial is going to be the lead lawyer, I don't believe it. If it's a complicated case, you've got to be in the case for more than 11 days in order to take over and try it. So it seems to me that this ought to be moved back a more reasonable time, whether that's 30 days or whether that's more than 30 days.

Carrying on to subdivision (a)(2) in the second sentence, in cases where an attorney is employed within 10 days of the date set for trial then it's discretionary. Well, but they could have previously been employed but not designated as lead counsel. So if they are employed or designated as lead attorney within 10 days then you ought to have discretion, not just hired, because you could have somebody that's been hired for longer than -- and you could designate them at the last minute.

I agree with the comment that was made, I forget, several comments at the end about a representation, but I would suggest that representation be that this lead attorney will remain lead attorney when the case is tried, because that's where the rubber meets the

road, not just that they're lead attorney now but that they're really going to be around on the back end of this mandatory. And then if they withdraw or are replaced or fired or send another lawyer, then somebody ought to be paying some money in the form of sanctions because of a misrepresentation, and that ought to be -- have to do with the future.

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Then on subdivision (3) on the next page, this is where you have assisting lawyers, and the only way you're allowed -- it becomes discretionary if you can make a prima facie showing of substantial precedence resulting from the continuance. So I would question -raise for thought whether the prima facie showing should be focused on substantial prejudice or whether it ought to be whether the associate attorneys or the affiliate attorneys importance to the case. Could it be -- could it be allowable for someone to challenge the presumption or even the nondiscretionary rule by saying that this attorney has never appeared in the case before or they've never spoken out in court. We've had three or four or five, 10 hearings. They never handled a single hearing or they've never signed a pleading or whatever. The question is, is the only prima facie showing that gives the court discretion prejudice to the defendant, or can you challenge the legitimacy of the -- of the other party's

designation of this assisting lawyer as being so important to the case that the continuance should be mandatory. So anyway, those are just some thoughts.

MR. MUNZINGER: I was just going to comment e judge's suggestion that you know when a baby is

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. Munzinger.

on the judge's suggestion that you know when a baby is coming, you can write a letter in advance and set the dates out and what have you, and I don't know how adoptions work. I don't know that you can predict the date of an adoption. My understanding is you get a telephone call and say, "We've got a baby, you qualify, come pick it up," and -- or her up or him up or whatever they say, and so whoever ends up drafting the final version of the rule needs to keep that distinction in mind if the rule is going to apply to natural birth and adoption.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I would get rid of the timing requirements as to, you know, you have to do it as soon as you knew you're pregnant. I would get rid of all of that, and I would model it on the legislative continuance, which if you will remember quit being a problem after they required the Legislature -- legislator to say that it is his intent or her intent to actively participate in the preparation or presentation of

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the case and that the attorney has not taken the case for
   the purpose of obtaining a continuance under this section.
   It seems to me if, you know, that's good enough for a
   legislative continuance to avoid playing games, it should
  be good enough for a parental leave continuance to avoid
   playing games, and I wouldn't make the distinction between
   lead and nonlead attorney for the reasons that everyone
  has talked about.
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                                   Okay. Buddy had his hand
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
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  up.
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                 MR. LOW:
                           Chip, I've listened to a lot of
  talk about this.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Go ahead, Buddy.
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                           I say I've listened to a lot of
                 MR. LOW:
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   this, and I've not heard one word about somebody that this
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   happened to that got -- didn't get a continuance.
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   one. And I'm impressed with what Frank said about further
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   family matters are just as important and if we stress this
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   and Randy didn't cite to any cases in this.
                                                 I mean, it's
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   a -- we're honoring family and so forth, and I understand
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   that, but just to name that as one, I'm against it.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. All right. Kennon
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   didn't say just one word.
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                 MR. LOW:
                           What --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    She had an example that
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she used maybe 20 words, but -
MR. LOW: Well, that must have been when no activity was going on.

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MS. WOOTEN: Perhaps I should have spoken louder. There is a concrete example that I provided, and there's also one in the ABA resolution.

MR. LOW: Well, that's not the only time I've missed something. Okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sharena.

MS. GILLILAND: I think it's great as a profession that we're talking about this, but I would rather see going the direction of things that generally qualify under the Family Medical Leave Act having some priority or something. To Judge Wallace's point, I think most judges try to be sensitive of these things, and most attorneys are professionals. I can tell you when I was pregnant with my first child, we were quickly approaching a trial date, and I was not the, quote, "lead attorney." I was the associate doing all the grunt work, and our strategy was just don't pop before the -- before the trial date. And I think when you get to so many details about this lead attorney and I swear I'll be the lead attorney and I won't be, I would rather just see a general policy from the profession -- I mean, from the bench that says we value family issues, whether that's childbirth or care of

a critically ill family member and to be professionals and be courteous and let the judges have some discretion to ask questions, are we doing this just to delay and get an easy continuance or is there something real happening with the attorneys on this case.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Skip.

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MR. WATSON: Well, I just want to echo what Judge Christopher said. I agree with as we get down to it that we probably shouldn't be trying to say X number of days. We probably -- I mean, I don't know how many of you have read the record of the lawyer who came in even 30 days before trial, brand new to try it, but they ain't pretty. I mean, it's an appellate lawyer's annuity when it happens.

I just think that kind of thing needs to come out, and I also think that it should be anybody who's critical to the presentation of the case, and just, you know, give the judge the discretion to decide, but everybody knows that the big cases today are done by groups, and -- and key members are indispensable when you get right down to the presentation of the DNA expert, who may not be the lead counsel's witness, and we all know -- we've all been there when it was a two-lawyer case and the young lawyer was the one that worked it up and the old lawyer took it home over the weekend and read the file and

was going to try it, but the young lawyer better be there whispering in his ear and passing him notes or it's not going to be pretty. I just say anybody who's critical to the case and get rid of the time limits and leave that to discretion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Elaine, Professor Carlson, and then Kennon.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: I just had a couple of general responses. One is you really can't trigger anything from -- well, you could, but it would not be a good idea to trigger, well, do this within so many days of when you know you're pregnant, because a lot of people don't reveal they're pregnant for fear of miscarriage. And to give you another story, I had a colleague who had a former colleague who had a miscarriage and was denied a continuance the next day, here, in Houston; and I also want to say that there is a large effect on young women, like Kennon, because I'm not young anymore, when you have worked up a case but you're not the lead attorney, and that's probably going to be the scenario, and now you're off the case because you couldn't get a continuance and now when you come back that's not your case anymore. that's not your business.

There is about 50 percent of the associates who are women and about 10 percent of women are share

equity partners. So having said that, I have always been offended by Rule 253, that lawyers are fungible and if you can't be there get somebody else, and I do agree with the comments that there should be a basis for encouraging judges — and most judges do the right thing, but for like death of a family member or for having to care for an emergency situation, things of that nature, and Hurricane Harvey and things like that. I don't like Rule 253 at all. I think it's insulting to the practice to say if you can't come, send somebody else, and I don't know why it says that. I guess lawyers were making up reasons for continuances. I don't know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, yeah, I don't -- I don't care for that rule either, or that concept either, but and I've never been a judge, but I have worked for a judge and, you know, getting cases set for trial and getting them heard when all of these different things are going on, it's not -- it's not just the parental leave stuff. I mean, it's a witness can't get here or there are a million things and it's hard for a court to manage its docket. Now, having said that, I think this is a good idea myself personally, and I wonder, maybe Jackie and Kennon and Professor Carlson, what -- what's the opposition in Florida? Like they're going to have an oral argument about it?

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MS. DAUMERIE:
                                They already did.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They did?
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                 MS. DAUMERIE:
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Was it -- was it -- were
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   they goofing or did they really --
                 MS. DAUMERIE: No, I think their rules
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   committee was really opposed to it, and it's for a lot of
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   the reasons that were discussed here, putting the
   attorneys' needs over that of the client or witnesses,
  putting having a child over the death of a child, all of
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  those things were brought up before them.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But they did it in an
  advocacy setting?
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                 MS. DAUMERIE:
                                Yeah.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes. With briefs.
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                 MS. DAUMERIE: You can watch it.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: With briefs?
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                 MS. DAUMERIE: Yes, you can watch it.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Yeah, I think we should have
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   oral argument.
                 MS. DAUMERIE: They don't have a rule yet,
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   just for the record.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They don't have a rule.
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                 MR. DAWSON:
                              Right.
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                 MS. WOOTEN:
                              It says the discussion on the
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rule started in 2017.
                 MS. DAUMERIE:
                                Yes
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                 MS. WOOTEN: So it has been a long --
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Gestation period.
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                 MS. WOOTEN: Yeah, long gestation.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank, and then Eduardo.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, obviously Rule 253 is
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  not very good, and it may be time to rewrite it. The --
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   the notion of Roger's argument is that one good abuse
   deserves another, but --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Is that your argument?
                 MR. GILSTRAP: That's the way it struck me.
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                 MS. BARON: Frank, can you speak up?
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                                What? I'm sorry.
                 MR. GILSTRAP:
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Can't hear
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  you.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: I'm sorry. The provision
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  that involving substantial participation is totally
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   unenforceable. You know, I'm going to be involved,
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   substantially involved, six months from now or a year from
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   now, and you show up in court you haven't done it. Oh,
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   well, I'm still involved. It's totally unenforceable.
   Look, if you want -- if you're concerned about optics,
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  rewrite the rule, put all of this stuff in here that --
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   that -- that judges should consider.
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MR. LOW: 1 Right. MR. GILSTRAP: So you can emphasize it. 2 Emphasize it in judge school, but at the end of the day do not put a provision in there that gives the defendant an absolute right to game the system because I promise you, there are not only lawyers, there are litigants who are very smart and very unscrupulous and would give anything in the world to put off the case, and they will find a way to do it if you give them an absolute right to get out of 10 trial. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Eduardo, and then Kennon. 11 12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, so I'm -- I'm real glad that we're discussing this. I think it's extremely 13 important for the future of the practice of law. Just for 14 your information I got some statistics yesterday from 15 University of Texas School of Law because I'm going to be 16 giving a speech about stuff, and 42 percent of last year's 17 grads at the University of Texas were women, and I think 18 this is an important issue that we need to be prepared 19 for, and I'm glad that we're discussing this and that 20 we're moving forward in -- in a positive way to address a 21 significant segment of our legal profession in the coming

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks. Kennon.

years.

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MS. WOOTEN: It strikes me that one of the

reasons to treat parenthood differently from some other things is that parenthood is perceived as a choice. And when you're --

MR. LOW: Can't hear, Kennon.

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MS. WOOTEN: It strikes me that one of the reasons to treat parenthood as some -- as different from other things like death of a child, for example, is that parenthood is perceived as a choice, and so people sometimes think you're choosing your family over your profession, and there is a stigma associated with that in some firms. That's the reality, whether we want to confront it or not, it's the truth, and so to me that gives rise to a justification to have a rule perhaps that addresses parenthood, even though it doesn't address every other situation, and I say that in part because we do have rules that are broader in scope that can address those other situations, so it's not as though without addressing them they're left untouched.

The question just comes, I think, to us whether we might need a rule like this to help reduce the stigma associated with becoming a parent, and I, for one, think it's very good that men are recognized as part of the parenting team in this rule because there's a shortage of that in our law and in our firm practices.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Wallace.

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HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Okay.
                                                  One thing I
  just thought of --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You want discretion,
   right?
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                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE:
                                           Well, yeah, but
  you know, you might also have some kind of a rule where
  the default result is a continuance of some amount of
   time; and if that's not the case, the judge has to make
   maybe some specific findings as to why not. That's just
   off the top of my head.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Without regard to
   the specifics because we've talked about a lot of
   different things and a lot of different problems in the
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  rule as drafted, I want to vote in a second after we hear
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   from Levi about who's in favor of the concept in the rule
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  without the specifics, and who's against it, just to give
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  the Court a sense of what this committee thinks, but,
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   Levi, what do you --
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         I just wonder why
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   the subcommittee did not bring us a companion rule on
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   appellate deadlines because the same issues happen there,
   and, you know, there are courts, even in this city, that
   are hostile to requests for extensions of time.
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                 MS. WOOTEN: Also, the subcommittee at this
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   juncture hasn't brought any proposals. The thought was
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that we need to get feedback generally from this committee
  before drafting anything, but that's a good point that we
  should consider appellate procedures.
                 MS. DAUMERIE: I'll just add that
  North Carolina, who does have the rule, has an appellate
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   rule.
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                              Ah.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, this draft here,
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   this is not the subcommittee's work product.
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                 MS. WOOTEN: No, this is the court rules,
  State Bar court rules committee.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: State Bar court rules,
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  okay. Good.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Point of clarification,
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  Mr. Chair, what we're voting on is just the concept?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Concept.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Not this particular rule, but
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  just do you want a rule that allows for this continuance,
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   or are you opposed to parental leave in general?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, come on.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: We don't need to take that
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  vote.
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                                That's the problem.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP:
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  making rules based on we're committed to the concept, and
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we can all vote and feel good, so what? But tell me what the concept is. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy, what do you have 3 to say? 4 5 MR. LOW: And Roger made a suggestion about a footnote, judges shall put priorities or anything, I 6 mean, is -- is -- what was your suggestion? 8 MR. HUGHES: My comment was that if it's -that as a companion to this other rule, which I still advocate, we have a comment that when cases are set 10 consideration be given to pregnancy or adoption. 11 12 mean --MR. LOW: Yeah. 13 MR. HUGHES: -- if you've got a lead counsel 14 and you know she's pregnant, why set the case on her due 15 And -- and you might say, well, who's going to do 16 that, but you know somebody's going, "It's a crowded date. We're on a rocket docket around here. We'll set it and if 18 it comes up or comes out, we'll give you a continuance." 19 Why should -- why should counsel have to wait until her 20 due date or his wife's due date to find out if he's going 21 to get a continuance on a case? You know, that just seems to me senseless, and it would be very helpful when you're 23 talking to court coordinators or clerks, who are the ones 2.4 25 who really -- who often are the ones who set trial dates

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here in Texas.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank, I didn't -- I
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  didn't catch Alistair's last clause, his smart-ass clause,
  when I agreed with him. So we're voting on a rule for
  parental leave or absence of counsel as grounds for
   continuance in trial. Now, whether we like the concept or
   whether, as some have expressed, we don't think that's
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   appropriate.
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                 MR. RINEY: It should be mandatory.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: You don't think it's
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   appropriate grounds for a continuance?
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: To have a rule.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: To have a rule.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: To have a rule.
                                                     We are
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  voting on whether people support -- like some people in
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16 Florida -- were they the appellants or the appellees?
                 MS. DAUMERIE: I don't know that they refer
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  to them like that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: A rule for parental leave
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  or absence of counsel as grounds for continuance of trial.
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   Everybody in favor of that, raise your hand. Everybody in
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   favor of that, raise your hand.
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                 MR. MEADOWS: This is a mandatory
   continuance?
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                 MS. WOOTEN: No, just having a rule.
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MR. GILSTRAP:
                                Do we need a rule?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Everybody opposed?
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   Okay.
                 MR. LOW:
                           I'm further removed from being
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   involved in this.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey, don't you want the
   election results here? The result is 20 in favor, 5
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  against, and for the record, the Chair voted on this in
   favor. So I don't often vote, but I voted on this one.
   So we could take a break now if we wanted to before we go
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  onto the next one. So we'll be back at 20 after.
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                 (Recess from 3:24 p.m. to 3:43 p.m.)
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Motions for
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  rehearing in the court of appeals, and Pam, you got this
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   one or are you --
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                 MS. BARON: It's me this time.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Somebody get the
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18 microphone over by Pam.
                 All right.
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                             Okay. This is Rule 49.
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                 MS. BARON:
   involves motion for rehearing after a court of appeals has
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   issued its opinion in a case, in a civil case. There are
   two different nonexclusive avenues for asking for
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  rehearing in the court of appeals. First is to ask the
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  panel that decided the opinion, the three judges that
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decided the opinion, to rehear it and that takes a majority of the panel to grant rehearing.

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not talking about en banc today because Justice

Christopher asked us not to, but en banc has a different standard, and I just want to tell you this so you know.

It is not favored, and it issues only -- it can be granted only to ensure that the court's decisions are consistent to maintain uniformity of courts' opinions or in extraordinary circumstances. So it's very rare and should rarely be granted.

The issue we're facing is the current Rule 49.3 provides that panel rehearing -- and we are only talking about panel rehearing today, not en banc -- may be granted by a majority of justices who participated in the decision, otherwise it must be denied; and as you know in the last election cycle, we had tremendous turnover in some of the appellate courts; and the result was that when parties came and asked for rehearing, there was no longer a majority of the panel members who participated in the decision; and so all of these motions for rehearing that were filed were required under the rule to be denied.

To my knowledge we've never had a lot of complaints about this rule in the past. It's been in place since 1986, but in this particular language only

since 1993, and as a result there were a lot of complaints because people were basically being denied panel rehearing and could only seek en banc consideration, which was probably not going to happen. So even if there was a mistake in the opinion, it couldn't be corrected.

Both Justice Christopher and the court rules State Bar committee sent proposals into the Texas Supreme Court. Those were referred to our committee, and those are the two proposals that we're going to be talking about today. They are attached to your September 2nd memo. They do differ in their approaches, and let me just set them out briefly for you.

Justice Christopher's proposal would be that in the event that a majority of the justices who participated in the decision in the case are no longer on the court and a remaining justice who was -- who authored or joined the majority believes that the opinion should be revised in light of the motion for rehearing, then that justice can ask for two new justices to review the motion, and the new justices can then decide the motion by majority.

The key elements of that proposal are listed on page two of the memo. There must be only one justice left, so if you have three panels, if you still have two panel members or you end up with zero panel members, her

change would not apply. That justice must have been in the majority or the author, and only that justice can ask for additional justices to be involved in rehearing. It was unclear from her proposal to us, and I guess we could ask her since she's sitting next to me, how the justices to be added to the panel would be selected. We decided that maybe the use of the word "new" just means that the justice filling that particular justice position number would step in. And I think, as I said before, two members remain, then those two will decide rehearing and no justices would be added, and if no members then it has to be denied.

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The State Bar court rules committee took a slightly different approach, and their approach would basically be there will always be three justices sitting on rehearing. So if one or more justices cannot participate, the chief justice will ensure that sufficient are added so that it can be decided. The key elements there are on page three of our memo. There must be two or fewer justices. The court will always ensure that there are three, and the chief justice will determine how that assignment is made.

Our subcommittee identified what we thought were three issues for discussion. Do we -- should we change the rule to address the situation when one or more

members of the original panel are no longer sitting on the court, and then if so, under what circumstances would we suggest that extra justice can be assigned. Should it be in all cases, whether we're short three, or should it be two or fewer, or should it be when there's only one and that one was in majority and so on and so forth. So there are a lot of variations on what the rule could provide on that. And third, if additional panel members are to be added, how is that to be accomplished? Do you just put in the new slot justice, do you do it by random draw, do you let the chief justice appoint.

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So those are complicated questions. Our subcommittee has been completely stressed out for -- or I have been by this because all of these questions are very politically fraught, and some of the considerations are is what weight do we give the original opinion. Right now the rule seems to give dignity to the original opinion over rehearing, and then what kind of procedure looks fair or is fair in adding additional panel members on rehearing.

So those are kind of the issues. We are not coming to you with a particular recommendation on any of these rules. We really wanted to hear the discussion of this group first before we came up with specific language or specific recommendation between the two proposals. I

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know that Kennon is here, and she was on the court rules
  committee that wrote this. Justice Christopher is here.
   Cindy Kent had been very involved in the court rules
   subcommittee, but she said that Kennon could adequately
   represent their views.
5
                 So I open it up for discussion I guess.
 6
7
  think the first question is do we want to make a change,
  and if so, do we want to ensure three justices in all
   cases, or do we want to have some kind of scale for two or
10
  more?
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
                                           Kennon.
                 MS. WOOTEN: I'm going to hold my tongue
12
   until others speak up.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Whoa.
                                           Anybody have
14
  comments? Professor Carlson.
15
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I have a question.
16
  percentage roughly of cases do motions for rehearing are
  granted?
18
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Well, I did
19
20
   a -- a quick Westlaw search, and I -- I'm not vouching for
21
   its complete accuracy, but in the past three years, the
  Fourteenth Court had withdrawn an opinion and issued a new
   opinion on panel rehearing approximately 28 times.
23
  First Court had done it approximately 47 times, and the
24
25
  Fifth Court had done it 12 times.
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PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay.

2.4

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Over a three-year period. So not huge, but, you know, a number of cases, and I'm not saying that the result changed, just the opinion changed.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Thank you.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So I'll give you just a little -- little background on why I -- I've set out to write this rule and why I wanted it to be a limited rule rather than a complete panel rehearing rule. So a case came in that -- that we got -- a rehearing came in on a case where two judges were gone, and I was the remaining panel member, and the panel motion -- the rehearing motion says, "You forgot to address this very important subpoint," and I'm looking back at the opinion, and yep, sure enough, we had forgotten to address this very important subpoint. So what was I going to do with a missed point? All right. I mean, we got the main brief, but it was a subpoint, and it was an important subpoint, but in my opinion it didn't meet the criteria for en banc reconsideration. All right.

So -- but if -- and I hadn't worked through this subpoint in my head yet in terms of the results. If it should have caused a different result, you know, I felt that it was being unfair to the litigants. Okay. This --

this subpoint. So I -- we sort of kept it -- we kept the en banc motion pending for a long time while I worked through it, did the research on the point. I ultimately ended up not asking for en banc, but I did -- and I know this has no precedential value. I did an opinion concurring in the denial of en banc where I addressed the point. All right. So that the -- the lawyers at least knew that one judge had looked at the -- at the point and addressed it, and they could use that when they went up to the Supreme Court.

So to me that would have been a really good one to be able to get two new panel members on, corrected at the panel level, because in my mind it didn't meet the en banc criteria. If I had gotten to the point where I thought it was going to reverse the decision of the panel, I might have tried to argue, yes, it really was en banc worthy at that point, but I didn't have to get to that in my head because I decided that it -- you know, I was going to handle it that way. So, you know, things like that happen, and so I thought about, well, under what sort of situation would I want to create a rule to be able to address that, and I came up with the limited review.

And my idea was, one remaining judge, looks at the panel rehearing, says, yeah, you know, we missed something or the opinion misstates something. It doesn't

really meet en banc criteria. I would like to get two other judges to decide the matter with me, and I don't -- I don't put any restrictions on how the other judges -- you know, if we ended up reversing the case because of the missed point we end up reversing the case. If I end up being in the dissent because the new panel members thought, you know, something different made, that was fine. You know, I thought it would be a complete do over with two new -- with a full panel.

The reason why I'm against a complete redo for all panel rehearing motions is that it does require a lot of work to review a panel rehearing motion, if you were not on the original case. So to adequately rule, in my opinion, on a panel rehearing motion when you were not originally on the panel, you would have to read all of the briefings, all of the briefs, the opinion, the motion, you know, maybe even do some record checking yourself to, you know, come to a conclusion on that panel rehearing motion. When you are already on the panel and the panel rehearing motion comes in, you have done all of that work, so it's a simpler process.

Now, I was in the trial court, and I recognize that in the trial court when a new judge comes in, you know, they ask all the time for rehearings of what the old trial judge did. Old judge -- old trial judge

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denied a motion for summary judgment, let's see what the
  new trial judge thinks about it. You know, old trial
  judge granted a summary judgment. Let's file a motion for
  rehearing on it and see if we can get it changed, and
  there's no limit obviously in the -- in the trial court,
   although as a older -- I was taught as a young judge don't
   start rehearing what the old judge did. When I became an
   old judge and new judges came in, I told them the same
   thing, don't start doing it because, you know, it will
   just be a floodgate and you'll have to rehear that your
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11
   predecessor did in the last six months. So, I mean, I can
   understand the court rules committee's desire to have it
   for all panel rehearing motions. I just think it would be
13
   quite a lot of work put on the appellate court if we did
   that.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay. Any other
16
  comments?
17
                              I will speak just a little bit.
18
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, Kennon will speak
19
20
   now.
                              I will speak.
21
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                                             In terms of the
   court rules committee thought process on having the chief
   justice involved, there was recognition that that could
23
   entail some politics, but also recognition that existing
24
25
   Rules of Appellate Procedure give to the chief justice of
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the courts of appeals some power to deal with things when there's a lack of consensus, for example. So you already have in the existing rules provisions that give the chief justice power, and so we didn't feel like giving the chief justice power to do something here was just so political and fraught with peril that it ought not be considered.

And in terms of -- of having the three justices participate, the thought process, to my recollection, was we want the parties moving through the system in the wake of change to have the same right that any other parties would have in the absence of that change in composition of court, so it was desired to be as fair as possible. I will say that I don't recall a discussion about just how much work that might entail. It's a very practical, real consideration to be -- to be taken into account. It was more focused on what's equitable and who should be making the decision after there is a change in composition of the court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah,

20 Professor Hoffman.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So my instinct is with Tracy on the sort of more limited review, but in the event that the Court is more inclined to the court rules committee, I think my instinct is it's a mistake to give that to the chief justice. The optics of it by themselves

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seem to counsel more in favor of just doing a wheel.
                 MS. WOOTEN: A wheel, can you explain what
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  you mean?
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN:
                                     So, in other words,
  however the judges are assigned on any court is a random
5
  process, and it seems to me you would want to follow that
   same random process if only for the optics of -- of it
   rather than giving that to the chief judge, particularly
   in the case when there's a rehearing issue, so it's
   already controversial.
10
11
                 MS. WOOTEN: And that is refreshing my
  memory of additional discussion about different courts of
   appeals having different procedures internally for
13
  assigning cases.
14
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
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                 MS. WOOTEN: And when drafting we were
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   trying to think of something that could be done across the
   board in light of the reality that we have different
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  practices now in the Texas courts of appeals.
19
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Like Tracy's comment
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  much earlier today that there are all sorts of topics that
21
  perhaps should be on our agenda.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
23
                                               Well, I mean,
  and, you know, I thought about, well, we could say -- you
24
25
   know, because we all run on a place number, and so if
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place five is defeated, new place five gets substituted in on -- on the decision, subject to any potential conflicts of interest that place five has, you know, with respect to That's how we do it internally at the that case. Fourteenth Court. I'm telling you a big secret, but -and I think anybody who had cases pending that got the new reassignment notice, they could have easily put two and two together that place five old is now place five new in 8 terms of resetting the case, but I don't think that all courts of appeals set the same way, and some of them do 10 give more power to the chief justice, and some of them do 11 have sort of an ability to choose their case, too, so 12 everybody is a little different. 13

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: This sounds like the next John Grisham novel, the cases of significant import right at the point of an election, the party who's lost is now funding the judge who is going to replace the -- you know.

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that -- that, I mean, an allegation of that has happened certainly in Harris County at the trial court level, that, you know, a particular lawyer was very unhappy with a judge's ruling and defeated that judge, because there were a series of cases involving that lawyer in that judge's court, so that the judge was going to be continuing to,

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you know, rule against that lawyer.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I think I once sat
2
   on that court.
3
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               What?
5
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I think I once sat
   on that court.
6
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You might
7
8
  have.
                              Hey, you might have.
9
                 MR. DAWSON:
10
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You might
11
  have.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Pam.
12
                 MS. BARON: You should also remember that
13
14 this rule is written not just for change in personnel
15 because of an election. It would also include retiring
  judges, death of a sitting judge, or situations where
16
   there may be an appointment there might be a delay. The
   position might not be filled, so you might not be able to
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   fill the vacancy with the new person in that place, so it
19
   does get a little complicated when you think of it in
20
   terms of a rule that involves any kind of change in
21
   personnel of the panel.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray, did you
  have your hand up? You did?
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25
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      I did. May I speak?
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You may speak.

Permission granted.

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: To echo what the two of them just said, they both took points that I was going to try to make, one about the position. That came about in about 2002 or '03 where we got position assign -- 2003 we got position assignments on the courts. If you do it by position assignments, the beauty of it is immediately upon the election of the replacement, the appointment of the replacement, or the fact that there is no replacement, you know who your panel is; and if you're trying to counsel your client in October, November, December, about whether or not to spend the money to do a motion for rehearing or a petition for review then you already know who the panel is, you can do your risk analysis potentials and run it, and so there is a high level of predictability of who that panel is going to be. It may not be any more predictable about what the result is going to be. There in all probability will be less, and it can be done with a fairly simple tweak to the existing rule, and there is no -- even though as the chief I could reach out and say that's a good rule, I like to take the guesswork out of it and just make it happen, and this is not just a big court issue.

It happens every time a judge is replaced on any court for any reason, and so the three judge court, we

just -- at the same time they were going through an election process, we had a judge retire and a new appointment, so we struggled with these same issues, and fortunately our retiring judge was able to continue to sit on the rehearings, and so we didn't have that problem as a problem, but I would favor a tweak, and I'll read the language if anybody is interested about how you could simply make it about the positions that were on the court that decided the case would be the ones who decided the motion for rehearing. So --

hand up.

MR. MUNZINGER: The El Paso court of appeals only has three justices. One just retired because of health reasons, and she has been replaced, but the rule contemplates the original panel handling the motion for rehearing, so the replacement judge can't act on that panel that's considering a pending motion for rehearing. If you had two judges, or a disqualification or something else, whoever is drafting the rule needs to bear in mind that not all courts have panels from which a justice may be selected to sit, and the chief justice may be sick, and you may have to go outside the court of appeals to get your panel.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Orsinger, and then
1
   Justice Gray.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Let him respond.
 3
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Justice Gray, go ahead.
5
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      In fact, I authored an
  El Paso opinion that came out last week and have sat on
  another El Paso case, and that does create a problem from
  my proposal because I'm not in a position on the El Paso
8
   court. I'm sitting by assignment, so --
10
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, we now have three
11
  justices.
              The Governor appointed a new justice, but he
   can't participate in a motion for rehearing. I'm a party
   to a motion to rehearing that is pending before the two
13
  judge panel. It's not going to be a problem because there
   are two judges there and they can resolve it, and I don't
15
  think they would split, but they can resolve it, but it
16
   doesn't take too much to think about that one of them
17
   could leave or have a problem, disqualify or otherwise,
18
   and the idea that you can select somebody from a panel of
19
   10 judges in the Fourteenth District or First District or
20
   however many of you there are, doesn't apply to El Paso.
21
   That's my only point.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Any other comments?
  Richard Orsinger.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: So I just wanted to work
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through the mechanism a little bit of Justice Christopher's proposal. First of all, I'm a little concerned about the use of the word "the opinion being revised." I think we should say "a new opinion be issued," because if the -- both changes, it's really not a revision, if it's just clarifying some misstatement of a statement of the factual foundation, so I think we ought to put "issue a new opinion" or "new opinion be issued." 8 But a couple of the procedural things I want 9 to mention is that under Justice Christopher's proposal, 10 11 two justices could be granting the rehearing or denying it, so there's no quarantee that there's three, and so 12 that presents the question of a litigant losing a 13 potentially, or at least theoretically, valuable participation of a third justice through no fault of their 15 own, and so I think an argument could be made that it 16 should be a three judge decision, even if that does 17 increase the workload. 18 The second thing I note, and I believe I 19 understand the mechanism correctly, justices, is a 20 dissenter is not permitted to trigger the chief justice 21 replacing; and that troubles me, too, because even though the dissenter by definition was in a minority and it could 23 have been a concurring and dissenting, and I'm worried 24 25 about disempowering a justice whose judgment is of equal

importance as every other justice, but was outvoted or was outvoted on some issues and not other issues, because sometimes there -- there's concurrence on some points and dissent on another point. So I would be inclined to say that the dissenter should be empowered to trigger a full panel.

And then under subdivision (4), if no member of the original panel remains then your only recourse is en banc, and this troubles me, too, because a litigant has lost a valuable right of a panel rehearing because the standards for en banc rehearing are different and more limited, and so they've been deprived of a valuable procedural right through no fault of their own, just by happenstance, and in my -- my inclination is to say the litigant should have the full complement of rights no matter whether it was resignations, deaths, replacement by election, or whatever.

And then I am troubled, just like Lonny said, about the chief justice after a decision has come down being allowed to pick the replacements, knowing who was elected, knowing what they think, is too much power for the chief justice. I think it should be either required that the -- what Justice Gray called the position replacement, that if place three got replaced and was on that panel then the new place three judge is on that

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panel, or it ought to be random, but you shouldn't empower
  the chief justice to even have the possible choice of
  putting someone on a panel to achieve a certain result.
                 So having -- having said that, I'm not sure
5
  if any of the changes I propose are made to
   Justice Christopher's proposal, it becomes pretty close to
   the committee proposal, but I'm just really speaking as a
  principle, I hate to see litigants lose rights for events
   that have nothing to do with them and have to do with the
  workings of the judicial system.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why do you think the
11
  chief shouldn't be able to do it?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, of course, I practiced
13
  law in a day when we didn't have all completely neutral
14
           Yeah. And so there were --
   judges.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Theoretically they were.
16
                 MR. ORSINGER: There was lots of
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   controversy.
                There was even controversy about the
18
   reassignment of cases from one court of appeals to another
19
20
   court. There was some public reprimands I think from the
   judicial -- or at least there was some investigations.
21
   can tell you that I became aware of them, and sometimes
   was participating in the defense.
23
24
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Because of past
25
   experience --
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MR. ORSINGER: So what I'm saying is that we can't always count on having a completely neutral judiciary, and that's why we build neutrality into our system, so we don't -- as I understand it, most of the courts don't let the chief justice or some majority vote decide who's going to be on the panel. I think they do that by random. I think that's universal, but it may not be. No, it's not universal? Okay.

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Well, maybe I'm wrong. So maybe there ought to be some other changes I'm not aware of, but I would certainly say that a neutral process that doesn't allow a particular individual to attempt or have the even possibility of attempting or influencing the outcome of the decision would inspire more confidence in the neutrality of our judiciary. So random assignment to the panel or allowing the voters decide who's going to be in place three or place five to me is better than allowing the chief justice to decide that -- and this was a two to one vote, and I'm going to put this guy in here, and it's probably going to flip the other way. I'm not accusing anybody would do that, but since it's possible, it could happen, and in the past, it might have happened. think I'm in favor of a neutral process where all the litigants get all of their rights when something about the judiciary changes that's not their fault.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Kennon.

MS. WOOTEN: There's a provision that I hadn't really thought about before that you, Justice Christopher, may have considered, but it's 41.1(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and it states that "If after argument for any reason a member of the panel can't participate in deciding a case, the case may be decided by the two remaining justices."

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's only for oral argument cases.

MS. WOOTEN: Right, but I'm just wondering whether in light of what you said about all of the work required, if there's a consensus that we need three here or if this might be a circumstance where two would suffice.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I mean, I think two -- if two are still from the original panel, they can decide the motion for rehearing. I mean, and to me if you're going to open it up to a complete panel rehearing, I would just go with the three, because it's possible with two to have a split.

MS. WOOTEN: And when the two have a split, to your point, Richard Orsinger, in the existing rules, the chief justice of the court of appeals can designate another justice of the court to sit on the panel to

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consider the case. There are also other options in the
  rule, but one of them is to give the chief justice the
3
  power.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So if a dissenter --
  as a result of an election if we have two justices left
5
   and they're on opposite sides of the vote, then the chief
   justice is required to appoint a third justice; is that
8
   right?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
9
                                               No.
10
                 MS. WOOTEN:
                              This is --
11
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               No.
12 had oral argument and one judge is no longer available,
   then two judges can decide the case, but if they split
13
  then a third judge gets named to decide it.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, that's different from
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16 what you're left with is one who --
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: This is
17
  original decision.
18
                 MR. ORSINGER: -- voted in the majority, one
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20
  who voted in the dissent, and there's not a third, and
   that's not --
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                 MS. BARON: Yeah, this is original.
22
23
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Original.
                             Original vote before opinion,
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                 MS. BARON:
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  you can you bring in new members if there's a deadlock,
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and there are procedures in the rule that address how you
   do that, and there are three different ways of resolving
        The chief justice can appoint additional panel
  members, the court can take it en banc, or they can ask
  the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court to bring in
   somebody else, but there are no parallel provisions
  addressing rehearing.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: And if it's a three judge
   court, do we just automatically take the new judge and put
   them on, or do we say they can't come on, and we have to
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  stick with two?
11
                             Well, I think the rule says if
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                 MS. BARON:
   you don't have a majority of the original panel, rehearing
13
   is denied.
               That's how it's written right now.
14
                 MR. ORSINGER: So you're forced into a
15
  rehearing en banc, which has different grounds.
16
                 MS. BARON:
                            Correct.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: But that's only if you lose
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   two judges off of your three judge court.
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                 MS. BARON: Yes. If they split one/one on
21
   rehearing, though, I would assume the rehearing would be
   denied, right?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
23
                                               Yeah.
                 MS. BARON: Because you don't have a
24
25
   majority of the original panel voting for rehearing, so it
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is denied under the rule.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. I would -- regardless
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  of what we do in this other situation, I would think we
   should allow the third judge to participate or do
   something rather than just have a default denial because
   of someone retired, died, or there was an election.
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                 MS. BARON: You may have situations, though,
  other than elections where you don't have, especially on a
8
   small -- on seven of the courts have only three justices.
   If there is a delay in the appointment process, there
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11
  won't be a third judge available.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But, I mean,
12
   you know, just like Judge Gray helped out El Paso, that's
13
                  The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
  what happens.
   Court --
15
                 MS. BARON: Not on rehearing.
16
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, not on
17
   rehearing.
18
                 MS. BARON:
                             There's no provision in
19
20
   rehearing to do that, right?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
21
                                              Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. We done with this
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23
  rule?
                             Well, I would like -- I guess we
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                 MS. BARON:
25
  would like a sense of the committee, one, whether we want
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Two, if we do change it whether there
  to change it.
   should always be three panel members on rehearing or
  whether if there are two of the original panel still in
  place do we let it go, or whether we go with Justice
  Christopher's proposal, which is it only kicks in if
   there's only one justice who is in the majority that wants
  to do something, so --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: One or less, I would
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   think.
10
                 MS. BARON:
                             Huh?
                                   One or fewer.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: One or fewer.
11
                             I mean, if there's zero left, do
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                 MS. BARON:
  we -- right, do we want to have a whole new panel.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: Are you suggesting that if
14
  there's zero left, there's automatically the rehearing is
15
   denied without any judge looking at it?
16
                 MS. BARON: Correct, and that's actually
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  what just happened. If you look on your materials we
18
   attached, certainly in Dallas they denied a motion for
19
   extension of time to file panel rehearing because there
20
   was no longer a majority of justices from the original
21
   panel who had decided.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
23
                                Wow.
                            And it had to be denied, so --
24
                 MS. BARON:
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Munzinger.
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MR. MUNZINGER: I share Richard Orsinger's concern about the importance of a motion for rehearing. Appellate panels, the numbers that Judge Christopher found were not insubstantial where new opinions were issued. That isn't to say that they all were changed, but they may have been changed in a way that could affect whether the Supreme Court grants a petition, whether the jurisprudence of the state is sufficiently affected to get the Supreme Court's attention. I don't know, but we all know that appellate courts can make mistakes, can overlook a point, can do something else, and a motion for rehearing ought to have the same dignity, if at all possible, as the original briefing; and if it requires that -- I can see where two judges of a court could issue an opinion.

But to simply say, well, circumstances require that we overrule the motion for rehearing and there is no motion for rehearing, that doesn't sound right to me. I don't think that's justice to the parties, because right now our rules contemplate a motion for rehearing, a second chance for the judge to -- judges to make up their minds on the point, to brief it, and what have you. I agree with Richard. I think it's a real problem that you just can't just slough off a motion for rehearing because very often they're very important.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Pam says she wants

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guidance on a number of questions, one of which is the
   chief justice versus, you know, some other method of
   filling the vacancies.
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, the rules as they're
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  drafted say the chief justice. Does it mean the Chief
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   Justice of the Supreme Court, or the chief justice of the
   court of appeals?
8
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Court of appeals.
9
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, the chief justice of
  the court of appeals may or may not be appointed and may
10
11
  or may not have another panelist to appoint. That's my
   point about the court of appeals in El Paso. It's just a
   drafting problem where you have -- I don't know, did you
13
   say there were seven courts that had three justices only?
14
   That's a statewide problem.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Justice Gray.
16
  Chief Justice Gray's court.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There's actually only
18
   five that have three judges.
19
20
                 MS. BARON: Is that right?
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But who's counting.
21
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: But who's counting.
22
                            Well, I looked at -- I looked at
23
                 MS. BARON:
   all the places today on the internet, but maybe --
24
25
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There are five that
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have five, two that have four, two that have six, two that
  have seven, two that have nine, and one has 13.
                 MS. BARON: You probably know better than I
3
          I was just counting the justices on the websites,
   I do.
  and maybe they just didn't want to be on there.
   think -- Chip, if we could just take a vote, one, should
   we change the rule? First vote, yes or no. If we change
   it, second vote, should there be three justices for all
8
   panel rehearings or not?
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okav.
11
                 MS. BARON: And then once we get past that
  we can start -- if that doesn't pass, we can see how many
   fewer judges people are willing to accept.
13
                 THE COURT: All right. I think that's
14
         Let's start with number one. How many people are
15
   great.
  in favor of changing the rule?
16
                 Is your hand up, Pam?
17
                 MS. BARON:
                             No.
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay. How many people
19
20
   are against changing the rule?
21
                 Now, your hand's up. Nineteen to two in
   favor of changing the rule. Okay. Now, the second vote,
   Pam, is how many?
23
                             Should there be three justices
2.4
                 MS. BARON:
25
   sitting on panel rehearings in all cases.
```

```
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Should there be --
  everybody in favor of having three.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Can I add a friendly
3
   amendment?
5
                 MS. BARON: Yes.
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Probably.
7
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Unless there's only two
  judges living on the court. It needs to be worded so that
  if a judge dies and there's a motion for rehearing and
10 there's no appointment --
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, because we
11
  can always get Justice Hecht to appoint somebody. I mean,
   I think it should be all or nothing and not carve out --
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: No friendly.
14
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No friendly.
15
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: No friendly.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No friendly fire.
17
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: You've been unfriended.
18
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I think unfriended is
19
20
  the better expression.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Everybody in
21
  favor of three?
                 MS. BARON: In all cases.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In all cases.
24
25
                 Against three. Well, in a squeaker, 9 in
```

```
favor, 10 against. The prior vote, by the way, whether we
   should change the rule, 19 in favor, 2 against, the chair
  not voting in either instance. So what's our next vote,
  Pam?
5
                 MS. BARON: Okay. Assuming we don't have
  three in all cases, I would guess that people would say if
  we had zero or one, that, yes, we're going to add more.
  Well, you wouldn't. I wouldn't, but -- all right. Let's
8
   just start with if there are two, are we okay with letting
  those two decide it? Right?
10
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So how would you frame
              If you're in favor of, raise your hand. What's
   the vote?
   the "of"?
13
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Can I ask a question real
14
  quick, Chip?
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, sure. While she's
16
  thinking.
17
                MR. MUNZINGER: What happens if the two
18
  disagree and there's no majority opinion?
19
                 MS. BARON:
                             Then it's denied.
20
                                                That would be
21
  my feeling about that.
                 MR. YOUNG: But couldn't there be an
22
   intermediate where two could decide if they agreed, but
23
   then you would need the third if they disagree?
24
   vote was you have to have three no matter what.
25
```

```
MS. BARON: I don't want to draft that rule,
2
   so --
3
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think that gives under
   the circumstances some room to move.
                 MS. BARON: We could do that. I mean, I
5
  think that, you know, generally when you have a tie on a
   court and there's a motion pending, then that motion is
   denied. If there are -- you know, if the Supreme Court
8
   splits four/four on a case, then it is affirmed.
10
                 MR. YOUNG: Never reversed.
                 MS. BARON: Well, it doesn't have to be.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey, take your appellate
12
13 stuff outside. Don't be doing that.
                 MS. BARON: So let's just -- let's start
14
  with just -- we'll do this in two votes. One, you know,
15
  if there are -- I guess we've already decided that if two
16
  are left that they can decide it.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
18
                 MS. BARON: Because we rejected three in all
19
20
   cases.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
21
                 MS. BARON: So if there are two left and
22
   they disagree, do we think a third member needs to be
23
   appointed in that situation?
24
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. All in favor
```

```
of a third member being appointed if the two on the panel
  disagree, raise your hand.
3
                 All right. All opposed? Well, that one
  passed 12 to 9, the chair not voting. Any other voting
5
  you want to do?
 6
                 MS. BARON: Yes, let's keep going. So as we
   go down that decision tree, if the two disagree and the
7
   third needs to be appointed, how are we going to do that?
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whose going to appoint?
9
  All in favor of the chief justice appointing, raise your
10
11 hand.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Of the Texas
12
   Supreme Court or --
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, no. Of the court
14
  of appeals.
15
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
16
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: What's the
17
  alternative?
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That it's done by some
19
   other method.
20
                 MR. ORSINGER: Like a random method or
21
   something, or placement?
22
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Placement.
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: Placement.
24
25
                 THE COURT: Placement, wheel.
```

```
HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         Chief justice.
1
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There's lots of things.
 2
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:
                                         The clerk of the
 3
   Supreme Court using the wheel and putting the names of all
  judges in the wheel.
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You could do that, but
   there may not be any more. So everybody in favor of the
   chief justice of the court of appeals where the motion for
   rehearing has been filed appointing the missing judge
   or -- justice or justices, raise your hand.
10
11
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                               The problem is the chief
  justice is going to do it in every case unless there isn't
  one, but the question is whether it's random or whether
13
  it's discretionary.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    So you're against.
15
                 MR. ORSINGER: No.
                                     The chief justice has to
16
  do it, no matter what.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: No.
                                           It can be
18
  automatic.
19
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: That's what we're
20
21
  voting on.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's what we're voting
22
23
  on.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Automatic? Who has the power
2.4
25
  to appoint the other justice?
```

```
HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You're missing the
  point.
2
3
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're going to have a
   rule that says --
5
                 MR. WATSON: We're creating power.
 6
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: We could say
  Richard Orsinger has the power.
7
                 MR. ORSINGER: I don't get this. This is
8
  not making sense.
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's getting late, we're
11
   getting punchy. Everybody in favor of the chief justice
  appointing? Everybody against?
                 All right. One in favor, 21 against. All
13
14 right. You got any more votes you want to take?
                 MS. BARON:
                             Sure, we can vote until the cows
15
16 come home. All right. On if the chief justice doesn't
   appoint, our other alternatives are by place or by wheel.
  Right?
18
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: What was the second one?
19
                 MR. ORSINGER: Wheel, like random.
20
                 MS. BARON: By place or by random.
21
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Question.
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Levi.
23
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Will you clarify how
2.4
25
   the wheel is constituted?
```

```
MS. BARON: It would be whoever is not
  sitting on your panel that's sitting on your court.
2
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I think we're
3
  getting down into the weeds.
5
                 MS. BARON: I know. This rule is nothing
6
  but weeds.
                 MS. WOOTEN: I think we have visited the
7
  weeds.
8
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I know, but now the bugs
  are starting to -- the gnats are out.
10
11
                 MS. WOOTEN: The gnats.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't have any gnat
12
13
  spray.
                 MS. BARON: Do this one last vote.
14
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.
15
                 MR. LOW: One suggestion of the operating
16
  procedures of the Court, I mean, and that could be, I
   quess different for each court.
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: For each court, yeah.
19
                           That's one option. I'm not
20
                 MR. LOW:
  suggesting that at all. I just read it.
21
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not a bad idea, though.
   Justice Gray, what do you think?
23
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm sorry? I was asked
2.4
25
  a specific question here so --
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```
1
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Buddy.
                 MR. LOW:
                           The internal -- I don't know how
2
   to do the --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why don't we default to
5
   the internal operating procedures of the court?
                 MR. LOW: And each court has theirs.
 6
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Because we revoked all
7
8
   of ours, and we don't have any.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
9
                                    Okay.
10
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I mean, so they may not
  address the situation.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Evan.
12
                 MR. YOUNG: There are different
13
  circumstances, and sometimes it's because the justice has
   left the court, sometimes it's because the justice is on
15
  the court but might be recused, for example, so couldn't
  the option -- it doesn't have to be one or the other.
  could be if the reason for the justice who is on the panel
18
  can't sit for rehearing is because someone else now has
   that job, that could be the default, but if there's a
20
   different reason, the justice is recused, there is no
21
   replacement, et cetera, then why not use whatever method
   the court uses in case of recusal?
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
24
                                           Pam.
                             Well, I think the -- one of the
25
                 MS. BARON:
```

objectives here in not having the chief justice have the power to appoint is to have a neutral check in place, and if you default to internal rules or rules for recusal, that varies among our courts, and in many cases that does default back to the chief justice to do it, so you're back to what we just voted 21 to 1 against. So I think the options if we're going to try and do this in a neutral nonappointment by the chief justice way would either have to be by place number or by random draw of some sort. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, what's the argument 11 against place number, Richard? Do you have a problem with 12 that? MR. ORSINGER: No, I don't. In fact, you 13 know, that's the most democratic because basically unless 14 it's a retired judge, the sitting judge has been replaced 15 by a majority vote, or if it was retired, then the voters 16 had to choose between two or three candidates, and they 17 picked the one they wanted the most. So to me, the most 18 democratic -- and maybe that's not our goal here, but most 19 20 democratic thing is to let the people's choice take the 21 vote. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: He could be appointed, 23 too. 24 MR. ORSINGER: Now, we may not trust the 25 people's vote, in which event we shouldn't be electing

```
judges in the first place, which we may not be after the
  next session, but --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Evan Young.
 3
                 MR. YOUNG: That doesn't answer the
 4
   situation where that seat is occupied by somebody who's
  been recused. That's why I'm saying it can't be this "or"
  bring it up, this "and." So the seat, if that kind of
   answers the case, whether be appointment or by election,
   that's a neutral principle. Nobody can say that there's
   something that is improper about having that same seat in
10
   the case, but that isn't always going to answer it, and if
11
   that justice is there but cannot participate or there's
  nobody there so nobody can participate, then the choice
13
  would be either to do whatever the court's rules are for
14
   dealing with recusals, or I would be perfectly fine with
15
  it being a neutral random selection, but it can't be the
16
           That cannot be an answer because that will not
   place.
17
  address any number of circumstances. Like disability.
18
  Like the Governor not appointing somebody.
19
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           Empty place.
21
   Okay.
22
                 MS. BARON:
                             Okay. I guess the other
   question I have, can we vote on the Christopher approach?
23
   Do you want to vote on that?
2.4
25
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah.
                                                      It's
```

going down, but it's all right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Do you want 2 to articulate the Christopher approach? MS. BARON: There's no one better to do it than Justice Christopher. 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So we've 6 already decided two judges, we've voted the two judges can hear the rehearing motion that were on the original panel. So now we have to figure out what to do if there's one judge left or zero judges left, because I don't -- I don't 10 think we have votes on either one of those scenarios. 11 MS. BARON: Right, yes. 12 So my HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 13 14 suggestion on the one judge left is if -- if that judge was in the majority on the original opinion and that judge 15 can ask for the appointment of two new judges to hear the 16 panel rehearing. However we want to appoint it, it 17 doesn't really matter to me. I mean, I was envisioning, 18 you know, new places, but I can see that there could be 19 20 problems in some of the smaller courts that way. So if 21 there's only one judge left, the judge that is left gets to decide whether or not to ask for more judges for panel rehearing. 23 But that's only if they were 2.4 MR. ORSINGER: 25 in the majority?

```
HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
1
                                               Yes.
   That's -- and that's my original position.
2
                 MS. BARON: Are you willing to take the
3
   Orsinger amendment and let it just be --
 4
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
5
                 MS. BARON: -- any time that one judge.
 6
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
7
                                               Yes.
8
                 MS. BARON: And not make them be a majority.
9
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
10
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Oh, sure, you'll take
11 his friendly amendment and not mine.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Your friendly
12
  amendment was messing up the vote. I'll take his friendly
13
14 amendment. Yeah, so if there's one judge left, that judge
  gets to decide whether to ask for two new judges to be
15
  appointed for the rehearing.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. That's the
17
  Christopher proposal.
18
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                              Yes, as
19
  modified.
20
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody in favor of the
21
   Christopher proposal, raise your hand.
                 Wait a minute, you can't vote late.
23
  Everybody against the Christopher proposal. Nothing
24
  personal. All right. The Christopher proposal passes 16
25
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to 6, the chair not voting. This is more votes than we've
  ever taken on any rules.
3
                 MR. DAWSON: I move that we suspend the
   voting.
 4
5
                 MS. BARON:
                             Well, do we want to take one on
   if there's nobody left?
6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I wouldn't quit now.
7
                                                           Why
8
   quit now?
9
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: If there's no one else,
  turn off the lights.
10
                 MR. ORSINGER: It's a world record.
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've already broken the
12
  record so let's --
13
                             This is why the subcommittee --
                 MS. BARON:
14
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: This could be called
15
16 the Munzinger rule, which it's giving the litigants the
   rights they ought to have, irrespective of the --
17
   irrespective of the electorate.
18
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What -- how would
19
  you frame this vote, Tracy or Pam, or somebody?
20
                 MS. BARON: I guess it's if there's no
21
  members on the court do we just deny rehearing?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Is this qualified they have
23
   to join in the majority?
24
25
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                No.
                                                     No.
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```
MR. YOUNG: Zero of them are left.
1
                 MR. ORSINGER: Oh, no members left.
 2
3
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Nobody is
   left.
 4
5
                 MS. BARON:
                             Do you get a whole new panel.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No members on the panel.
 6
                 MS. BARON: You either get denied or you get
7
8
  a whole new panel, which --
9
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Or a whole new court
   in the case of a three member court.
10
11
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I think we already voted
  on this. Our very first vote was a vote that --
                 MS. BARON: You don't always get three.
13
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN:
                                     That we are not going to
14
   deny rehearing, which would be the effect of this.
15
                 MS. BARON:
                             Right.
16
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I think you already have
17
   our guidance on this.
18
                 MS. BARON:
                             Okay.
19
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Which is there should be
20
  some rehearing.
21
22
                 MR. ORSINGER: Can we take a vote anyway?
                             That means if you have one left,
23
                 MS. BARON:
  you get worse or better treatment than if you have zero
24
25
   left.
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```
HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, that's
   true.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER: Or if your justice is in the
3
   majority -- or the minority, dissent.
5
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Either way.
                 MS. BARON: Okay. That's fine.
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So you're going to
7
   rewrite this rule and bring it back to us?
8
                 MS. BARON: It will be about six pages long.
9
10
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.
12
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I thought I would
  provide the committee a little anecdotal levity here on --
13
  that actually shows that this has real world consequences
   under the existing rule. We have issued an opinion in
15
  four cases, and the litigant has now filed a motion to
16
   recuse all three judges in all four cases. So if we
17
  recuse ourselves under the existing rule, his motion for
18
   rehearing that is also pending will automatically be
19
   denied.
20
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Does he know that?
21
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Hell no, he doesn't
22
  know it.
23
                             Okay. What are we going to call
2.4
                 THE COURT:
   this game, court of appeals trivia?
25
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MR. ORSINGER:
                                Chip, I think that we should
  all recognize that we have had a record vote on a
  presentation from a subcommittee chair that was against
                And this is why. Because she's got to go
   any change.
   back and translate all of this into a new rule.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it's -- I feel
 6
   special, so based on what we've done today. Hey, Bill,
7
   can we knock the next one out in 20 minutes?
8
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Yes, we can.
9
10
                 THE COURT:
                             Let's do it.
11
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Last topic,
  mechanisms for obtaining a trial court ruling. To skip to
   the punch line, the subcommittee is requesting guidance on
13
   two points, and I'll circle back and explain it.
14
   points to think about as we go through this are, number
15
   one, do we want to target the specific circumstance
16
   that -- that was identified by Chief Justice Gray, and
17
   we'll unpack that a little bit, or do we want to address
18
   this more broadly for other circumstances in which there
19
   may be an inability to get a ruling. Question number one.
20
21
                 Question number two, guidance, a sense of
   the committee as a whole about how to approach that.
   We've sketched out some alternatives that were suggested.
23
   There may be others that the full committee has an idea of
2.4
25
   that we didn't think of, but those are the -- those are
```

the two things that we're going to ask for guidance for at the end of this discussion, but to get there, the specific circumstance that gave rise to this referral is -- is something that happens not infrequently in the courts of appeals, particularly in connection with a incarcerated litigant's petition for post-conviction DNA testing under Chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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2.4

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A request is made. Nothing happens. Petition for writ of mandamus is filed to compel a ruling. Petition denied because, A, it likely has multiple procedural deficiencies; B, there is a difficulty in demonstrating that the trial court has been made aware of the request for a ruling and still failed to act on it; and it comes up in this specific context because by definition you're talking about somebody who is incarcerated, who is likely doing things by mail, and cannot take other steps to demonstrate that the trial court has been made aware of this pending ruled on request and has failed to rule on it. Mandamus denied, or sometimes there are other approaches to this. Chief Justice Gray may want to elaborate on that, that will prompt a ruling, but even in the best case scenario, a mandamus had to be filed and court of appeals resources were used to compel a ruling, which is not a tremendously efficient or desirable way to go about things.

That was the specific circumstance that gave rise to this referral, but there are other circumstances. Justice Christopher has identified some -- I'm sure everybody in the room may have anecdotal experience with difficulties in other circumstances of how to get a ruling made, how to -- how to force that through appellate process when there is not -- there's not an ability to otherwise get the ruling made. So, again, the -- what this leads to is a threshold question that the subcommittee asked for guidance on. How big a bite do you 10 want us to take? Do we want to focus in on this 11 particular issue that's been identified with respect to Chapter 64 motions? Do we want to be more ambitious 13 and try to address other circumstances where there may be a failure to rule? 15 Relatedly, what is the sense of the committee as a whole about an approach to take to this? 17 18

If you go to page three of the memo, you'll see a couple of approaches sketched out that the subcommittee discussed. Potential ones. One is creating a universal request for a ruling form that when submitted would start the clock running. Another might be called administrative shaming, to require reporting and use that reporting perhaps to create a presumption after a set period of time that something has been denied by operation of law because

16

19

20

21

23

24

25

it's been pending a while. There may be collateral mechanisms involved, if there's a -- a continuing and manifest failure to rule on things. Perhaps that's something that gets elevated into some other kind of a process.

5

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25

Another approach, reliance, expanding what already appears in the rules in a number of respects in terms of denials by operation of law after X number of days, familiar to you through now motion for new trial that is not expressly ruled on. There are other examples of that. Do we want to expand that?

And then the last one is to look for administrative results, administrative approaches to this perhaps through a combination of reporting and getting the presiding administrative judges involved, if there is a continuing and manifest failure to rule on things.

So that's the preamble, but I'll certainly 18 ask Chief Justice Gray or Justice Christopher to add anything that I've glossed over.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It's just a frequent It's not just in the Chapter 64 stuff, but, you problem. know, we've had motions pending in trial courts that we've been asked to compel a ruling on that have been pending for four years in a trial court, and they are -- it just -- it happens, and the question is, how do you

```
balance the efficiencies of, yeah, every once in a while a
  trial judge is going to drop the ball on getting something
  ruled on versus having Guido show up at the judge's
   chambers with a copy of the motion saying, "My cousin
   that's in jail would sure appreciate a ruling."
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   "Ignore this baseball bat
6
   in my hand."
                Yeah, Frank.
7
                 MR. GILSTRAP: We're talking about all
8
   rulings, not just final judgment, including things like
   carrying the motion for summary judgment to trial,
10
11
   carrying evidentiary rulings to trial? That type of
   thing.
12
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Well, I think
13
  that's -- that's one of the things we want guidance on,
   which is there are some things that I think there can be a
15
  toleration of not having an immediate ruling on, but there
16
   are other things that need a ruling. And maybe we can
17
   discuss what -- what things really, really need a ruling
18
   and what things can be carried without prejudice to due
19
  process rights and things like that.
20
                 MR. GILSTRAP: Getting that definition would
21
  take an act of a genius.
23
                 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Well, the good news
   is Justice Christopher is on the case, so I think we're
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   good.
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Chip, maybe there should be --MR. LOW: there are other cases besides the prison cases, and I've got a case that's a dispositive motion for a year and a half, but we filed a joint motion for the judge to rule, so he sets it a month later for reargument. I mean, it's -- it's an unusual thing. That's not -- don't get me wrong. It's not a burning issue, but it does occur in other cases, and if it's a dispositive motion, they should 8 make a ruling. Sometimes they need to carry things with them, I understand. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Orsinger. MR. ORSINGER: So at the very least it seems 12 to me like we ought to mandate or permit this procedure 13 for all interlocutory orders that are appealed, because 14 you can't get your interlocutory appeal until you have a 15 ruling, and if you can't get a ruling, you can't get 16 appellate review. So at the very least we should all be 17 able to agree that you can mandamus a ruling on an order 18 that's subject to interlocutory appeal, and then where we 19 20 go beyond that may be subject to more discussion, but at least we can go that far, can't we? 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We've got a 23 big difference -- most of the practitioners here are civil 24 practitioners. The -- in the criminal courts you have a 25

whole different set of rules and considerations. This particular request from Judge Gray involves a criminal motion of a prisoner case, and it's a post-judgment motion, okay. So we've got the post-judgment motions, some of which a trial judge has authority to rule on, some of which they don't, and so they often ignore those motions if they don't have authority to rule on them.

We've got -- on the criminal case, we have what are known as dual representation motions. The prisoner has been given an appointed lawyer but he files his own motions. Under our case law, those the judge does not have to rule on them, but the prisoner files mandamuses anyway, and then we have what more people here are familiar with, is problems in getting rulings in civil cases.

Another thing to consider when we're looking at the scope of this problem is that there are no rules of procedure that we can revise in criminal courts. Okay. We can revise the Rules of Civil Procedure to deal with a lot of problems that you are having and in terms of a failure to rule, but how do we do it in the criminal context when the only thing that we could really do, I believe, is to do a Rule of Judicial Administration?

Okay. And so I just, you know, started thinking about it, if you look at the last two pages of this memo, I got lots

and lots of ideas, but it's a very complicated scenario, and I think the -- the first question we have to identify is do we do something beyond just the criminal cases? And if we're going to limit to the criminal cases, we can come up with something.

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Then we have to look into, you know, what do we want to do in connection with the civil cases. So -- and for those judges, I don't think we have a general jurisdiction judge here today, but, you know, they're -- they're used to dealing with two different scenarios at all times. So it's just something that this committee needs to be aware of we're trying to make changes, so I think -- I think the first vote perhaps is do we want to only address these -- this particular request for DNA testing, which is a post-judgment motion almost always by an unrepresented inmate that they are entitled to a ruling on. Okay. So versus a lot of other motions that the prisoners file that the trial judge has no jurisdiction to rule on, and I also think that a lot of our problem is education of our judges.

So I specifically asked, you know, in our new judges school that just came out, do we have, for example, a section on, you know, post-judgment motions and how to deal with them? Clerks, when they get motions in cases that have been closed for years, they just put them

in a file, and I mean, and so you have to educate the

clerks. You know, this is the type of motion that has to

be presented to the judge to be ruled on. Do we give the

clerk the ability to, you know, make that determination?

I mean, I started thinking outside the box, that ought to

go to like the public defender's office if you're in a big

enough county to -- to -- that warrants a public defender

to look at it.

It's a very complicated thing, and the first issue is criminal versus civil and if we do want to deal with the criminal, we probably need a few more criminal judges to help us on that point.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Rusty seemed real excited about this.

MR. HARDIN: Well, but I'm kind of rethinking it. I am excited about it because I think the issue you raised is important, but I think that now after listening to everybody, I think that needs to be dealt with separately, but what really got me excited was judges refusing to rule. And in my practice, since I commit malpractice in two areas instead of one, I have exposure, and it's a much bigger problem other than the inmates in the civil side than it is over on the criminal side.

There are too many things -- I mean, there are some

criminal district judges that dally in making rulings, but I don't know that because a few do that's sufficient reason to address it, but it is a frequent problem with particularly inexperienced judges that, quite frankly, we're experiencing right now; and if there was a way to divide out in addition to doing a problem that you're addressing, the more I think about it, I'm schizophrenic about this whole subject because I've always been a proponent of giving judges almost complete discretion rather than dictating what they can and can't do and trying to bind them by it.

On the other hand, they -- we litigants need sometimes that there is a mechanism for making a judge finally rule, and so I guess my suggestion is, is that this committee come up with the proposals for sure for Justice Gray's, which I think is going to be easier to draft based on what both of you are saying than getting off into the hinterland that will probably take up both a Friday and a Saturday whenever we came back with proposals as we all worked our way through it, but -- but what I got really excited about is because it is my frustration of just not being able to get a ruling, and it happens increasingly often.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Wallace.

HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Is it almost a

hundred percent the petitions for DNA testing? Is that what we're talking? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 3 No. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: No, that's actually a 4 5 small part of it. We're seeing a lot on writs of habeas corpus, refusal to rule, and then on the civil side, although it still arises out of criminal cases, where the -- there's been an order to withhold funds from 8 a prisoner's account and the trial judge then denies the prisoner -- or is asked to review that order of 10 11 withholding or withholding notice, and under a Supreme Court case that's a civil proceeding related to the 12 collection of fees, and therefore, it needs a separate 13 ruling post-judgment, and so you've got a motion that's 14 sitting there not filed, and we wind up with a mandamus to 15 compel a ruling on those. 16 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And a judge in 17 a criminal case can do a nunc pro tunc, and sometimes 18 they've got valid ones, but they can't get a -- the judge 19 20 to rule on it. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Scott, and then Buddy. MR. STOLLEY: This failure to rule problem 22 is I think it's a significant problem in the Dallas court 23 of appeals district, that they're issuing a lot of 24 mandamus opinions on this topic, and there are certain 25

judges who are repeat offenders who just don't rule. So I -- I would like to see us do something about this. With respect to the -- the bullet points proposed here, I would venture that the second and fourth bullet points probably wouldn't be well-received by court personnel because it creates more work for them. I personally do not like the first and third bullet points with respect to an automatic default denial, because it's hard to explain to clients, "You mean I don't even get a ruling from a judge? I'm automatically denied?"

I might propose that we change number one to create a universal request for ruling form, but the clock that it would start would be the clock that establishes the length of time after which you can then bring a mandamus, because that -- that establishes you have brought it to the court's attention and after a certain amount of time you're able to bring a mandamus to get a ruling. Because that's one of the hard things to prove in these mandamuses, is that you've brought it to the judge's attention. So if you have this universal form, that would at least eliminate that part of the fight, and you could get on with this business. So those are my thoughts

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy, and then Alistair, and then Roger.

MR. LOW: Chip, I'm not suggesting that we

take the view of the civil situation like mine, because that's only happened to me one time in 58 years.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. LOW: I think we need to deal with the criminal, and if we need to do something with the civil, then do that, but I don't think we should take it all together, and I didn't mean by my example to suggest that we need to do something, because I just deal with it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: So I think we ought to limit it to the criminal circumstance, folks in prison that are filing whatever motions that they're filing for a couple of reasons. One is I don't know how we would craft a rule on when a judge should or should not be ordered or compelled to issue a civil ruling. I mean, as someone pointed out, you know, if they carry a motion for summary judgment until trial, you know, what are you going to do about that. There's all of these areas where the courts properly want to carry motions and you -- I don't know how it -- it would take us forever to try and craft rules on what should be or shouldn't be compelled.

And if it really is that important, you do have the right of mandamus, and they -- we've seen it in Houston. Apparently they've seen it in Dallas where there are judges for whatever reason are not issues rulings, and

if the appellate court thinks you need to issue a judgment after that jury trial, for example, you know, they -- you have a means of addressing that; whereas, these prisoners really don't have an effective means. I do think we should start and certainly go there, and I would at least in this instance limit it to the prisoner type issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger.

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MR. HUGHES: Well, I'm going to echo that -that the two remarks that we limit it to criminal. not completely adverse to some sort of administrative report as a check, and I'll tell you why. I can remember back in the early 1990's when everybody was all riled up about the, shall we say, astronomical ad litem fees that were coming out of my neck of the woods, and one of the things they did was pass an administrative rule that every month the district clerks has had to report on who had been appointed an ad litem and how much every ad litem award was. Well, I know that a couple of district clerks kicked and screamed, but they finally got on board, and now every month like clockwork in the counties you can find -- they have a report online. These are the following people that got reported -- appointed as ad litem on which cases and then a listing of each case by ad litem, type of case, et cetera, that they got awarded for a settlement. It can be done, but I would suggest it

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can only be done if we narrowly define the kind of
   criminal cases that this report would be required, and
   then I think that would be helpful to the clerks.
                                                       That's
   what I think.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Judge Wallace.
                 HONORABLE R. H. WALLACE: Yeah, it sounds to
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  me like it's mainly a problem where people are
   incarcerated because if they're not incarcerated, if
   they're represented, they will be calling; and if they're
  pro se, they will be calling about getting a hearing.
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   It's the people who are -- can't do that, it sounds like
   is the problem.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Sharena.
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                 MS. GILLILAND: On the criminal side or for
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  folks who are incarcerated, some of what we see in the
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  clerk's office is gibberish and some of them can write a
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  better brief than some attorneys, and it's very clear what
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   they're asking for, they've identified the rules, they've
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   got --
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                                 I want the record to reflect
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                 MR. RODRIGUEZ:
   she was not looking at me when she said that.
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                 MS. GILLILAND:
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                                 I did not.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Looked to me like she was
   looking right at you.
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                 MS. GILLILAND:
                                 But it's not something --
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but the point being some are very clear in what they're asking for, and some we are debating what do we do with this, is this something the judge needs -- are they asking for anything, or are they just complaining? crafting some kind of rule or guidance or report, that's going to be really tough, so it may be an all or nothing kind of thing, you know, based on just some of the stuff that we have coming in. It's not always identified of "I want a rule such and such relief, " or "I want relief under this, " or "DNA testing." It's just, "I'm not happy with 10 11 the way things turned out and I'd like a different result," and so from the clerk's standpoint, what do you do with those? Does the judge want to see them, or do 13 they not want to see them? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. Bill, what 15 16 other direction do you want? HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: 17 I think to wrap up, it would be helpful to have direction around the threshold 18 issue. Are we -- are we talking solely about Chapter 64 19 type cases? Do we want to have the subcommittee look at 20 21 criminal cases more generally or try to think about an approach that could encompass civil as well? I think -- I think that threshold guidance would be useful to go back 23 to the subcommittee and start in more specific. 2.4 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Based on what's

been said, my sense of the committee that's here was that it was more on the criminal side than the civil, but -and maybe I didn't hear much at all from the civil side, but I could be wrong. Frank, what do you think? 5 MR. GILSTRAP: Well. Let me ask you this. Justice Christopher, when you say post-judgment, you don't 6 mean something where there's a right of appeal. You mean where they've been -- that they've already been convicted, 8 they've lost their right of appeal. 10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. MR. GILSTRAP: Well, why can't we -- why 11 can't we start with those kind of cases? Those criminal cases where the person is incarcerated and can't appeal. 13 It seems to me like that's a narrow -- a subset that we 14 could do something with. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray, that was 16 what kicked this whole thing off, right? That's what you were --18 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, that happened to 19 20 be that particular mandamus of probably three or four that was in that month. And I would say we have one of these 21 probably a week, maybe two a month. I -- we've had two since this -- in the last two week, we've had two out of 23 I don't know how many from the other chambers my chamber. 2.4 25 that weren't Chapter 64. They were post-conviction -- no,

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they were pretrial failure to rule on writs. So they're
   still criminal, they're still inmates, but it happens at
   different times.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: But once -- I mean, can't
  they complain about all of that in the appeal from their
   conviction?
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      No.
                                           Because they're
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  actually -- in those two cases, they're trying to keep
   from being tried.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's the Court's view
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  on this? Martha.
                 MS. NEWTON: I don't know.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Chip, I do think we
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  should circumscribe it with the criminal pro ses
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  potentially. That would capture some civil and pre- or
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  post-conviction motions where the -- they were in a
   proceeding where they were not otherwise represented by
   counsel. Now, there's some wrinkles even in that, but --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I was going to say that
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  doesn't sound like an easy rule to write, but --
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Just defining what
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  motions would fall within that. I mean, this may be just
   one of those things where the -- where the efficiency is
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  still with the existing procedures of mandamus.
                                                    I mean,
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   it may still be there. Actually after I wrote the letter
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to judge -- Justice Boyd, I started a process where I
  would send a letter requesting a response and in asking
  for the response I would point out to them, by the way, if
  you rule on this before you file your response, just send
  me a copy of the order. And that disposed of the next two
   that I got in very easily. I got a copy -- I got a
   ruling. But Chapter 64's are different because they don't
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   actually get a ruling. They start a process --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- with the DA, and
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  they have to go find the evidence that has biological
12 material in it and submit it to the DNA testing or file a
   response that says there is none. You know, it's a
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   different problem with the Chapter 64.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I mean,
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  that was one of my potential suggestions, was that the
   request for a response should come from the judge in a
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   failure to rule situation, rather than the real party in
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   interest.
                 CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT: We don't get but a
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   couple a year and that's what we do, and usually the judge
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   rules the next day, so --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
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                                   Do we need a rule, or do
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  we need to keep looking at it?
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CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT: Not for our Court, but
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   I was worried about the courts of appeals.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: We can ask the trial
  judge for a response. We just -- for some reason they
   don't pay nearly as much attention to us as they do
   when -- I'm just saying, you know.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we -- we don't want
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  to take up the full committee's time nor the
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   subcommittee's time drafting a difficult rule if -- if we
   think the problem is not severe, but -- but on these
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  cases --
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: We spend a lot of time
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  with these cases, and I was actually hoping that more the
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  trial judges would have ideas about how they manage their
   docket, sort of best practices and see if we could
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  incorporate that into a rule, but Judge -- Judge Estevez
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   is probably the only general jurisdiction trial court
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   judge we have on the committee, and so I was just -- I was
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  just hoping we could find some solution to keep from
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  having these mandamuses just where we get very little help
   from the litigant because they can't get out of their cell
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   to do anything.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You know.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Bill, what's your
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thought?

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HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: I think what I'd like to suggest is take a shot at the specific Chapter 64 context that gave rise to this and bring it back to the committee as a whole, and then if we can get satisfied with that, perhaps see if that's a springboard to other discussion to address other failure to rule issues in other contexts, criminal or civil.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody opposed to that? Everybody think that's okay? All right. Okay. that's what we'll do. You're only 10 minutes over your estimated time, which is not too bad, and so this means we don't have to come back tomorrow. So thanks for hanging 14 in there until 5:10 on a Friday afternoon, and we don't have the 2020 schedule yet. It's, for some reason, becoming increasingly difficult to put these things together when you figure out space and UT football and schedules and everything else, hotel accommodations, but Marti and Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Bland and I are going to try to get some --

MR. DAWSON: All of the Houston people are happy to come back to Houston.

23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I bet they are. We'll get that out to you in the next couple of weeks. 24

MR. HARDIN: Marti's cancellation was one

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minute ago.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's that?
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                 MR. HARDIN: I want to know if she canceled
   it before you said it or if she just canceled it.
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                 MS. WALKER: No, I canceled after he told
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   me.
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                 MR. HARDIN: It's timed 5:10 or 5:11.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: No meetings in December?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no meetings in
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   December. Happy Thanksgiving, Merry Christmas.
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                  (Adjourned)
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                    REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
                          MEETING OF THE
 3
                SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
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                 I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand
8
  Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported
10 the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
   on the 1st day of November, 2019, and the same was
11
  thereafter reduced to computer transcription by me.
12
                 I further certify that the costs for my
13
14 services in the matter are $ 2,143.00
                 Charged to: The State Bar of Texas.
15
                 Given under my hand and seal of office on
16
  this the <u>25th</u> day of <u>November</u>, 2019.
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